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ABSTRACT 
The education policy development in the Sudan should be understood within the context 
of Islamic general policy orientation and the specific goals and aims of education as 
perceived by the national policy-makers in the Central Government. The policy orientation 
has been in line with how the Islamic leaders in the country defined Sudanese society. The 
framework of educational policies showed a consistent trend towards the building of an 
Arab-Islamic society. The government's determination to uphold this trend was showed by 
the persistent policy of centralisation of education policy development. There was in all of 
this a lack of political will on the part of the central government to meet the real 
educational needs of the South Sudan. 
For practical and security reasons as well. as for the fact that the Sudan Government 
censors research on policy issues it was not feasible to carry out the investigation in the 
Sudan. The researcher however was motivated and influenced by the availability of 
resource persons and the convenience of carrying out the empirical work within the LJK. 
The study puts into proper perspective the impact of the educational policies on 
educational development in the South Sudan which, to some extent, was compounded by 
the lack of unity among the southern politicians. The research has filled in some of the 
gaps in the existing knowledge about education in the South Sudan. It provides a vital 
insight upon which future action regarding the direction for educational development in 
the South Sudan could unfold. 
B. K. Beninyo. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Tbis thesis presents an examination of educational policy development in the Sudan 
especially as it relates to the southern part of that country. In an ideal world educational 
policy-making would be a process whereby the various pressures for educational change 
are translated into formal governmen expression. This normally presupposes an 
understanding of the educational needs of different parts of a country and a close 
examina ion of the means available to the relevant authorities to meet those needs. 
However in a country like the Sudan, which has been afflicted by severe inter-ethnic 
rivalries and distrust and where peculiar difficulties bedevil the relationship between its 
northern and southern regions, such policy making is not easily done. Moreover the 
political situation of recent years has seriously limited the examination and publication of 
educational policy in the southern Sudan. T'llis thesis is therefore intended to bridge a gap 
in public understanding particularly concerning the connection between the educational 
situation which has recently existed in the Southern Sudan and the actions of all the parties 
concerned with educational policy: the politicians and officials of the Khartoum and 
Southem goveinments and those implementation agents who have had the task of 
interpreting policy and actualizing its expectations. 
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T'he main burden of this thesis is that the central goverriment in the Sudan has been 
influenced in its policy making not by the realities of the educational situation in different 
parts of the country but by its own ideological and constraining political agendum. This 
political stance has overridden the serious environmental, cultural and other factors which 
delineate different sections of this large and various country. However in the case of the 
Southern Sudan an additional reason for the failure of realistic educational development 
appears to lie with the Southern Sudanese politicians who have neglected to assert that 
limited autonomy which, at least for a time, was their prerogative and have been drawn by 
self-interest into supporting the pan-Sudanese agenda determined by Khartoum This 
thesis is not however wholly backward-looking, for it does present some lessons for the 
future if an educational policy which leads to some genuine development in the Southern 
Sudan is going to become a reality. 
So this thesis attempts to assess the context of the educational policy development in the 
country with particular reference to the impact and implications of the policies on the 
development of education in the Southern Sudan. The lack of information regarding the 
realities of educational development in the Southern Sudan made this subject area of 
sufficient importance to warrant investigation at this opportune moment. Taking into 
consideration the nature of policy development in the Sudan and the sensitivity of this 
particular policy area chosen for investigation the researcher feels that this is a suitable 
time to carry out the research. Ideally empirical research should have taken place within 
the Sudan where a broad spectrum of witnesses, well placed in educational policy-making 
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positions and other section of the population who have some relation to issues of 
educational policies, would have been interviewed. The cuffent political situation in the 
Sudan and the rigid educational policy direction pursued by the Sudan government, which 
does not allow for other alternative educational policy options, made it practically difficult 
for the researcher to carry out the empirical research within the Sudan. As a result it has 
been rather difficult for the researcher to employ the most ideal methods of investigating 
this policy area. The choice of the research method was therefore influenced by the 
complex political enviroroment within the country and the environment in which the 
individual interviewees, chosen for the interviews, were placed. More elaborate 
explanation of the methodology is provided in chapter two of this thesis. 
One of the reasons for doing this research is to define the policy problems faced by 
decision makers and their agents. It is intended to develop awareness and understanding of 
Sudanese educational policies and define the actual constraints with particular relation to 
educational development in the Southern Sudan so as to provide a basis for the future 
educational development, hopefully when the present war in the country comes to an end. 
The research therefore focuses mainly on various educational policy areas and their 
implementation problems. It also analysis why the autonomous Southern Sudan Regional 
Government was ineffective in the developing suitable and relevant educational policies 
for the Southern Sudan. 
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The contents of this thesis include a general description of historical, political and religious 
development in the Sudan which, to a large extent, influenced the later policy development 
in the country. The chapters that follow the introduction relate to specific educational 
policy areas - Universal Primary Education in the Sudan; Curriculum Policies; Policies on 
Teachers; Language Policies; Mgher Education Policies; The Regional Government and 
Decentf alization Policy of Education; and the National Education Policies. 
The following sections of this introduction focus on the racial and ethnic characteristics of 
the people of the Sudan; its colonial and missionary history and the independence period 
firom 1956 to 1969. This background is important because it set into proper context the 
understanding of the political and educational development in the contemporary Sudan. 
1.1 RACIAL AND ETHNIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PEOPLE OF 
SUDAN 
One of the most striking characteristics of the Sudan is the diversity of its peoples. It is a 
country of ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious conglomeration. It makes it a 
microcosm of the black continent; a factor that made the achievement of unity among the 
various groups difficult (1). This fact led to the experiences of the political, social and 
educational turmoid during both the colonial and post colonial periods. The Sudanese are 
divided among 19 major ethnic groups and about 597 subgroups and speak more than 100 
languages and dialects (2). The total population of the country is broadly divided into two 
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groups based on historical, racial, linguistic and cultural origins. The northern Sudanese 
are identified broadly as Arabs and the southern Sudanese as Africans. The major ethnic 
composition of the Sudan is shown in appendix 8. 
1.1.1 THE NORTHERN SUDANESE. 
The dividing line between the north and the southern Sudan is at 12 degrees latitude. The 
northern Sudan is an example of a region where an immigrant race has gained cultural and 
political domination over a less well-organized indigenous population. The longest 
established inhabitants of the northern Sudan fall into two groups: 
The first were the Negro Groups. These are now represented by some of the various Nuba 
tribes who live in the Nuba Mountains; the inhabitants of the Ingessana hills and the Fur of 
Darfur. The Fur are sedentary agriculturists who live in or near the Marra Mountains 
(Jebel Marra). These tribes are related to the Negro population of West Affica e. g. the 
Kanuri and the Hausa of Nigeria. (3) 
Ile second group represents the people referred to by Barbour as the brown race. These 
are represented by the Red Sea Hills Beja tribes. They bear the physical similarities to 
certain of the tribes of south Arabia but whether they are originafly of the African or 
Asiatic origin is not known. They occupied their present territory for at least the last 5000 
years (4). Although the Beja are Muslims or adopted Muslims, they retained their 
Bedawiye language which belongs to the Cushitic branch of the Hamito Semitic language 
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family. The Nubians who are occupying the area between Khartoum and Upper Egypt are 
also primarily representatives of the brown race (5). 
The question 'Vhat is an Arab? " is particularly complex in the Sudan. According to the 
definition by Clovis Maqsud "an Arab is one whose destiny is either by force of 
circumstances or intentionally, bound to Arab World as a whole. Whoever is descended 
ftom Kurdish,. Negro or Armenian stock but has inhabited an Arab country becomes an 
Arab by force of circumstances and by reason of the free association of his destiny with 
that of the Arab World" (6). In the Sudan many of the 39% who claim to be Arabs today 
are really Arabised Nubiyin, who have over the last four or so centuries adapted Arabic 
language, culture and Islam. As explained by John Markakis however, once a community 
becomes Arab in self-concept, it is important for it to secure status within the Arab 
framework by devising a genealogical pedigree more impressive than mere Arabisation 
(7). 
Biologically the Arabs who immi rated into the Sudan were mainly assimilated by the 
indigenous people, but their language, religion and to a large extent their tribal structure 
were superimposed throughout the area (8). No mention is made in any manuscript of 
Arab immigration to the Sudan prior to the foundation of Islam The reason is obviously 
the lack of interest felt for any ancestor who left Arabia in the pagan "days of ignorance" 
(9). The desire of all was to display their fathers as pillars of the true faith. According to 
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the general impression given by H. A. McMichael there were four tides of Arab immigration 
into the Sudan: 
1. The first flowed through Egypt in the 7th and 8th centuries and was a natural sequel of 
the conquest of the country. These are divided into two main groups according to their 
genealogies: 
(a) the Jahyin and Danagla group who are descended from the Ismailite tribes of 
northern Arabia. 
(b) The Guhayana group whose ancestors included Kahlan and Himyar and who 
originafly came from Southern Arabia and Yemen. 
2. The second immi ration took place in the 8th century across the Red Sea by way of 
Abyssinia as a result of the overthrow of the Ommayyads and the 'Abbasids' and 
eventually resulted in the foundation of the Arab-Fung hegemony in the Gezira. 
3. In the 13th and 14th centuries, the conquest of the MamIuk Sultans that broke down 
the barrier which had been for so long presented by the Christian Kingdom of Dongola 
opened the way for the third wave of fresh inflow of Arabs into the Sudan. To this period 
belongs the great Guhayna movement. 
4. The fourth great immigration foRowed the foundation of the Fung Kingdom and the 
conquest of Egypt by Selim 1. No mention is made of any intensive tribal movement into 
the Sudan occurring later than the first half of the 17th century. 
Arabisation and Islamisation of the northern Sudan was completed by the early 15th 
century, as the Arab newcomers married local women, including the daughters of the 
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traditional rulers. This helped solidify their hold since inheritance in the local tribes 
traditionally passed through the females, although this customs soon changed to 
accommodate the Arab practice of inheritance through the male line. At the same time the 
conversion of the native people into Islam had often established between them and the 
Arabs a potent link of spiritual brotherhood (10). 
From the 16th century to the 19th century a semblance of political unity was given to the 
northern. Sudan by the supremacy of the Fung Kingdom of Sennar. In the 17th century this 
Kingdom extended from the third cataract to the Abyssinia highland and from the Red Sea 
to Darfur. The northern Sudan was thus held together by the Arabic language, the Muslim 
faith and a sense of sharing in the Arab heritage (11). Whatever schisms exist between the 
educated and the illiterate, abnost all the northern Sudanese are agreed on the acceptance 
of the Arab heritage, and of the Islamic faith and way of life that go with it. Nor is there 
any significant demand among those whose mother tongue is not Arabic, whether Beja, 
Nubian or Fur that their languages be adopted in place of Arabic for administrative, 
educational or general use (12). 
A demand for education arose because of the spread of Islam, the settlement of the Arab 
tfibes and the rise of the Muslim Kingdoms. Unlike the southern Sudan, the northern 
Sudanese have been in contact with the sources of Muslim education in the north and east 
and had a developed political system 'Mey were relatively easier to reach than the other 
regions of the Sudan. Religious education, being a basic requirement of all Muslim 
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societies demanded a knowledge of the Koran and consequently an ability to read and 
write in order to "inculcate and strengthen the faith". As a result of these factors they were 
able to establish and develop an educational system suitable to their needs (13). 
In the north the British colonial administration, which commenced its control of the 
territory in 1898, had therefore begun with a sound working knowledge of the structure 
and dynamics of Muslim Sudanese society. It had conciliated a wide range of notables and 
religious leaders. The notables were encouraged, within the limits of deference and 
'loyalty' to speak their minds in a way which produced a useful and diversified feed-backs 
of Sudanese opinion. In fesponse to this opinion, the colonial government sometimes 
undertook major revisions of policy. By 1918, the northern Sudanese notables were 
prosperous and secure; their views were treated with deference and had a visible influence 
upon policy making (14). 
1.1.2 THE SOUTHERN SUDANESE 
The people of the southern Sudan are characterized by their ethnic and linguistic diversity. 
Ile inhabitants consist of members of many Negroid tribes, speaking many languages and 
professing many beliefs (15). According to anthropologists there are altogether 572 tribes 
and sub-tribes in the southern Sudan under three broad headings: Nilotic, Nilo-Hamites 
and Sudanic (16). They have little unity among themselves and virtually no affinity with 
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the north (17). Of the three, the Nilotic traditions contain no reference to migration from 
outside the Sudan. Their way of life is generally so minutely adapted to their present 
environment that it seems likely that they have occupied the same region for a very long 
time ( 18). 
There are three major Nilotic- speaking peoples in the southern Sudan - the Dinka, the 
Nuer and the Shilluk. These three groups form a very large, compact and sharply 
demarcated group which in 1956 included 56% of the total southern population (19). All 
the Nilotics are conspicuous for their absorbing interest in cattle, which enter widely into 
their customs and traditions. Some observers have pointed out that "it is not easy for 
anybody unacquainted with the Nilotics to realize the overwhelmingly important part that 
the cattle play in their lives". Almost their only possession, cattle have a prominent role in 
economic, social,, religious and aesthetic life, "and to their acquisition almost everything is 
sacrificed". Local kinship groups were centred round the activities of a cattle camp and 
the society was organized in a series of smaH, mutuafly opposed segments, which 
occasionally combined for a cattle raid but whose tribal life was normally "a kind of 
ordered anarchy in which every section plays the game of feud according to the rules" 
(20). The economic self sufficiency and independence arising from this pervasive pastoral 
emphasis did not predispose them to cooperate readily with foreigners (21). 
Temperamentally the Nilotics are by far the most introvert of the people of the Sudan, 
desiring nothing from the foregner except to be left alone, and when this is not granted 
showing determined opposition and only yielding with extreme slowness to the 
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overwhelming pressure brought to bear on them by the government and the missionary 
(22). 
The Hamitic speakers are generally considered to have spread outwards from the 
Ethiopian highlands and the hom of Affica. Other traditions say that these tribes seem at 
one time to have come from the mountainous area that lies along the Sudan-Uganda 
border east of the Nile river (23). Within this group are the Bari, Mundari, Nyagbara, 
Pajulu, Kakwa, Lokoya, Lolubo and the Latuho. T'his group as a whole is distinguished by 
their cultural features which include the great importance attached to rain-making, and 
existence of rain chiefs. This made the political task of creating a sense of tribal, regional 
or national patriotism very difficult (24). 
Some of the Sudanic- speaking Negroes are very long established, but others have been 
entering Sudan in successive waves from the south-west over a considerable period. Apart 
from the large Azande tribes they have been little studied by anthropologists. Though 
speaking loosely related languages they possess little unity among themselves. This group 
falls into four main classes: (25) 
(a) The Azande 
(b) The Ndogo-Sere group. 
(c) The Moru-Madi group. 
(d) The Bongo-Baka group. 
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It was not only the great number and the extreme variation of scale of the southern 
languages and politics which made the south Sudan a difficult field for educational 
experiment, the south also represented an extreme diversity of its modes of political and 
socio-economic organization (26). For example: 
1. The Azande were organized politically as severely despotic and ruthlessly 
competitive military principalities. The Azande piincipahties, with perhaps closest 
analogies to the Baganda, developed a highly centralized system of provincial 
governmen and a fairly elaborate military and administrative organization at the 
court of each Zande prince (27). Absolute authority lay with the only aristocratic 
clan,, the Avongara clan, from where the princes were derived. The Avongara clan 
recognized rigid distinctions between chiefs and the commoner s. Pohtical, 
economic and social status depended exclusively on birth, but the politically 
superior group, the Avongara, had to maintain their position by organized political 
and military means (28). 
The Nilotic Shilluk were held together by the "divine kinship" of their King 
(Reth). There were no tribal divisions among the Shilluk. Anthropologists 
emphasized that the Reth's fimetion in the Shilluk society was religious and ritual 
rather than political and administrative and that the Shilluk shared with the other 
Nilotic peoples a tendency to divide into mutually opposed segmentary sections 
(29). Power among the tribe stemmed from wealth and strength of personality. 'Ile 
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Shilluk King actively resented the mission as a rival source of authority i. e. a threat 
to ritual and religious status (30). 
3. The Nuer are, on other hand, what L. S. M. Sanderson and G. N. Sanderson caffed 
4acephalous' people. They had no chiefs and no specifically political structure of 
any kind. The Nuer institutions are the most extreme and clearest example of the 
absence or extreme fragmentation and weakness of political authority (3 1). 
Among the Bari, political influence was divided largely according to the 
accidents of personal prestige, village chiefs and clan heads. Among the other 
tribes of Eastern Equatoria e. g. the Latuho, rain makers seemed to have been the 
most in-fluential individuals; but these ritual experts were not the kind of 'chiefs' 
that the colonial governmeint could easily use as administrative subordinates (32). 
The societies of the southern Sudan as narrated demonstrated extreme cultural isolation 
before they were opened up from 1840 onward. The Nilotic people in particular have been 
throughout their recorded history, very resistant to external influence of any kind, whether 
Arab or European, Muslim or Christian. Until the second half of the 19th century most of 
the peoples of the southern Sudan had never been in contact with any major civilization 
(33). Therefore no forces making for unity counteracted their multiple diversity. The 
Nilotics, with their inflexible way of life, bound up with their cattle complex, were 
notoriously conservative in their modes of thought and behaviour, which made them hard 
to 'develop' (34). They had a highly ascriptive social system The opportunities offered by 
missionaries were attractive, possibly, to social misfits, which were quite rare in the 
society. The Nilo-Hamites e. g. the Bari and Latuho, were less accessible and almost 
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equally specialized in their modes of life. T'heir economic organization did not cater for 
altemative ways of life. A child in school was a loss to his family (35). 
The unsettled history resulted in large numbers of small tribal or kinship groups within the 
Niloticl Nilo-Hamitic and Sudanic peoples. ne conditions varied considerably and 
nowhere were the tribes united and prepared to conftont any forces from outside on equal 
terms (36). Such a situation could not form a proper base for western educational system 
to take off easily. 
Appendix 8 shows the ethnic composition of the people of the Sudan. 
1.2. COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION AND MISSIONARY EDUCATION: A 
PERIOD OF CONFUSION AND CONTRADICTION. 
1.2.1. British Colonial Administration in the Sudan: 
The background to the British intervention and eventual occupation of the Sudan is 
connected with the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 which set into motion the 
scramble for the partition of Africa. Before the British occupation of Egypt the Sudan was 
fi-om 1820 to 1881 under the control of Egypt. The Egyptians invaded the Sudan in 1820 
and instafled an Egyptian governor at Khartoum. Ile main objective of this exercise was 
15 
to gain control of the "te Nile slave trade and to ensure a regular supply of Negro slave 
recruits for the Egyptian army. Slave raiding was thus an official fimction of government 
and during the next 30 years a series of expeditions ravaged the country southwards of 
Khartoum between the Blue and White Nile, the homelands of the Dinka, the Nuer, the 
Shilluk and the Bari. As early as 1839 an Egyptian military post was planted at 
Gondokoro,, close to where the White Nile cuts the modem frontier between Uganda and 
the Sudan (37). Appendix 9 which shows northern Africa on the eve of pairtition clearly 
indicates the extent of the area under the Egyptian control of the Sudan before the 
partition. The Egyptian drive to the south petered out some four years before the 
revolution of the Mahdi in 1881 put an end to Egyptian administration in the Sudan as a 
whole (38). The boundary of the Mahdist Sudan ahnost represented the boundary of the 
modem Sudan (Appendix 10). 
British occupation of the Sudan in 1898 had important security and strategic significance 
in the British position in Egypt. There seemed to have been no fresh social or economic 
impulses for British imperial expansion in the interior of Africa. Tropical Aftica was 
looked at as a third rate adjunct of the British economy, which was worth the extension of 
coastal influence, but did not justify the effort of administration inland (39). The British 
invasion of Egypt in 1882 shattered the general Anglo-French collaboration based on the 
old coast arrangements for territorial self-denial which had a significant effect on the 
European balance. After the occupation of Egypt, it seemed to French observers that 
Britain was driving for African empire. French diplomacy was therefore focused on 
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putting pressure on the British in Egypt. The occupation of Egypt also gave Bismarck the 
chance to deepen the rift between Britain and France and to enter the "Affican game" 
(40). This development thus set off the scramble for Africa. 
Lord Salisbury, who as Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary handled the British side of 
the partition during the decisive years from 1886-1892, built the whole of his Affican 
policy around the retention of Egypt (41). Tbroughout the partition the over-riding 
concern of the policy-makers in Britain was to claim those regions of the continent which 
seemed vital for the security of the Mediterranean and therefore in the world (42). For the 
French the British occupation of Egypt was felt as an intolerable affiront to French national 
self-respect and so the Nile project enjoyed support far outside the ranks of convinced 
colonialists once its connection with Egypt had been cleafly established (43). Sahsbufy had 
decided in 1889 that the European powers must be kept out of the Nile Valley for the 
security of Egypt and the British position in that country. The Nile was therefore essential 
to Salisbury's overall imperial strategy (44). By 1898 Britain had endowed with strongly 
acquisitive overtones a Sudan policy which had in the later 1880s been gradually and 
father reluctantly initiated as a purely defensive strategy to protect the Nile water s and so 
to safeguard the British position in Egypt (45). The Southern Sudan, except for its 
contribution to the Nile waters, was seen as "useless territory". The main priority for the 
British policy-makers was the urgent need to defend its frontiers against other European 
powers but only exceptionafly any need to 'waste' precious funds on the administration of 
its 'savage' inhabitants (46). 
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The great confrontation between French and British imperialism which eventuafly 
determined complete British control of the whole Sudan was the struggle for the control 
of Fashoda in Southern Sudan. This came to be known as Fashoda crisis. Ronald 
Robinson and John Gallagher regarded Fashoda as the logical conclusion of the strategic 
necessity of the Egyptian policy assiduously practiced for over a decade by the men who 
controlled foreign affairs in Britain (47). During the Fashoda crisis all the leaders of the 
political parties in Britain came out openly in favour of the Nile Valley strategy. In a 
speech on 12 October 1898, Rosebury warned the French not to make a mistake 'Vhich 
can only lead to a disastrous conflagration"; the next day Asquith spoke in the same sense; 
on 28 October Harcourt spoke of the need for national unity; while Campbell-Bannerman 
said on 24 November that "we ranged ourselves as one man in terminating to resist the 
aggression" (48). 
The Sudan's southern international frontier was finally settled in 1906. In 1907 and indeed 
for nearly two decades thereafter, 'administration' in much of the southern Sudan was still 
virtually synonymous with military operations. The peculiarities of southern administration 
in this period did not reflect any long-term plan to separate the southern from the northern 
Sudan. They reflected rather the almost complete dereliction by Khartoum of its 
admiriistrative responsibilities in the south, and its refusal to provide resources for 
anything but punishment. It greatly used fire and the sword as a cheap substitute for 
administration (49). 
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This historical background, to a very large extent explains the reluctance by the British 
colonial administration to get much involved in the later development, particularly in the 
Southern Sudan 
1.2.2. The advent of the Christian Missionaries in the Sudan: 
Christian missionaries had quite a different motive from the British occupiers for entering 
the Sudan. Of the missions which were anxious to enter the Sudan in 1898, the Anglican 
Church Missionary Society was the first established. According to the Sandersons, the 
policy and strategy were often determined, not by financial constraints nor even by the 
experience of those responsible for day-to-day administration, but by 'ýprompting of the 
Spirit") at meeting of the General Committee (50). For the Society, in 1898 and at least a 
decade thereafter, the overwhehning priority in the Sudan was the conversion of Muslims, 
not of Southern 'pagans' (5 1). This priority indeed reflected the overall policy of the 
missionaries in the late nineteenth century and twentieth century. The claim of Islam to be 
a final and perfect revelation which superseded Christianity was seen as an inescapable 
challenge. Nowhere was the 'rebuke of Islam' felt more sharply than in the Sudan, where 
the fate of Gordon in January 1885 was seen as the sacrificial death of a Christian martyr - 
a martyrdom to which Christians should respond. This was the background to the 
foundation, at a meeting called by the CMS at Exeter Hall shortly after Gordon's death, of 
the Gordon Memorial Mission to the Sudan. It was clear ftom the founding resolution that 
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the principal centre of the mission was ultimately to be Khartoum and that the mission was 
to be to "Arabs and Africans" in that order (52). 
However the motive of the missionaries were frustrated by both Cromer and Kitchener 
who did not want the Christian missionaries in the Sudan at aff. Cromer regai-ded 
Christian missionaries as at best almost useless and at worst a dangerous stimulant to 
'Muslim fanaticismý' (53). On 4 January 1899 Cromer publicly assured the Muslim 
notables of Omdurman that the government would respect Islam and would not interfere 
with it in any way. It would, he believe, be unfortunate if this declaration was to be 
immediately followed by the advent of Christian missionaries, especially missionaries 
whose proclaimed objective was to convert Muslims. Cromer feared that 'Muslim minds" 
might fail to distinguish between the missionaries and the administration (54). 
When permission was granted on II October 1898 to the CMS it was with the warning 
that no missionary activity could be permitted in the Muslim north but the CMS could 
begin their work in the Fashoda region in the Southern Sudan, where there was already a 
garrison. The CMS for a long time argued against establishing their mission in the 
southern Sudan. It was not until January 1899 when the first CMS mission station was 
opened in Fashoda. Fashoda was regarded as the Siberia of Sudan. A report in The Time 
of 14 April 1900 that Fashoda was regarded as 'the Siberia of the Sudan" was carefiffly 
noted at the CMS headquarters (55). 
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Catholics had however superceded the British in the Sudan. After the collapse of the Jesuit 
and Franciscan Nfissions on the Upper Nile in the early 1860s, the mission to the Sudan 
had been revived by Daniele Comboniý who had worked on the White Nile in 1857-9. In 
1867, after prolonged study, Comboni had founded a Mssionary Institute for Negroland' 
at Verona; in 1871 he resumed work in the Sudan, but in southern Kordofan and the Nuba 
Mountains rather than in the deep and lethal South (56). In 1882-3, after Comboni's 
death. the stations in the Nuba Mountains were overrun by the Mahdists and the 
missionaries were taken prisoners (57). Tberefore Catholics because of their previous 
experience in the northern Sudan, in sharp contrast to the CMS, had established 
themselves in the southern Sudan with remarkable speed and efficiency. This success 
owed nothing to the Sudan government, which had at the outset been even less helpful to 
the Catholics than the CMS. The Catholics did not waste time and energy in campaigning 
against the restrictions on proselytisation in the northern Sudan (58). The first permission 
granted by the British colonial administration to the Catholics was to the Austrian Catholic 
Mission m May 1899, in principal to start work at Fashoda. The first Catholic mission was 
founded in February 1901 at LuL just upstream of Fashoda. 
Another mission that sought permission to work in the Sudan was the Amecican United 
Presbyterian Mission. It was also granted permission, in principal, in October 1898 to 
work in the Fished region. Their early mission station was established at Doleib Hill, on 
the east bank of the White Nile just downstream of its confluence with the Sobat river 
(59). 
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Under Article VI of the Condominium Agreement of January 1899, the governor-general 
had powers to define by proclamation 'the conditions under which Europeans of whatever 
nationality, shaH be at liberty to trade with and reside in the Sudan or to hold property 
within its limits". These powers were freely used to control the missions and their 
activities. As Sandersons have said the missions operated under the sword of Damocles 
(60). 
1.2.3. The Development of Education during the Colonial Period: 
Educational development in the Sudan in general and in the southern Sudan in particular 
had been shaped by the relationship between the colonial administration and the 
Missionaries. This relationship had, to extent, been influenced by the divergent objectives 
of the British colonial administration and those of the missionaries as well as the attitudes 
and modes of life of the indigenous population. Whatever reactions these three elements 
displayed during the colonial period can probably be attributed to the perception each one 
had about the situation at that time. Because of the varying perceptions each one had there 
appeared to have been created periods of confusions and contradictions especiafly in 
relation to development in the southern Sudan. The receptiveness of the Sudanese 
peoples to the western education could be therefore measured against that perception, the 
degree of contacts with the outside world previously and their nature of life. Ile different 
historical evolution between the north and southern Sudan had a marked effect on the rate 
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of development between the two regions. This factor subsequently subjected the two 
parts of the country to differential treatment by the colonial administration. 
Negative attitudes towards the missionary education in the Southern Sudan and the 
resistance of the southern Sudanese towards the western education tended to obscure the 
understanding of the diversities and the real factors that accounted for the differential 
development of education between the northern and southern Sudan during the colonial 
and post colonial periods. Northern Sudanese writers like Mohammed Omer Beshir 
blamed British imperialism and missionary perversion as an explanation for the 
underdevelopment in the southern Sudan (61). Though there may be some elements of 
truth here, one must not ignore the fact that the south underwent different phases of 
historical evolution in terms of education and civilization in the western sense. While the 
people in the northern Sudan had contacts with sources of Muslim education in the north 
and east, and had a developed political system much earlier, the south had little contact 
with the outside world that had any significant effect on their lives until the second half of 
the 19th century. The societies in the southern Sudan therefore virtuafly remained 
culturally isolated. The lack of broad political allegiance acted as a decisive disadvantage 
which helps explain the difficulties, conflicts and tragedies that subsequently developed in 
the southern Sudan (62) in their relation with the northern Sudan. Mohammed Omer 
Beshii had argued against the educational policies pursued by missionaries and the use of 
English in the schools instead of Arabic. This was on the ground that, he said, the 
missionaries were using the schools as Christian agents for conversion of the children to 
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Christianity. He provided no justification to support this claim; nor did he justify why the 
use of Arabic language and not English would have had a favourable educational effect on 
the tribes in the southern Sudan. 
Kenneth J. King in his article "Nationalism, Education and Imperialism in the Southern 
Sudan, 1920-1970" (63) pointed out the tendency of the northern Sudanese writers, like 
Beshir and Abdel al-Rahirn, to skim over the realities of southern life and attitudes and 
their refusal to make use of mission archival or oral interviews with southerners on the 
scale that has become commonplace in other parts of Africa. King stated that it is difficult 
to come to any very definite conclusions about the nature of missionary work in the 
southern Sudan during the British administration, and will not be possible until access can 
be had to the various mission archives, and much more work is done with the products of 
the schools. On the suggestion that "the missionaries worked for the perversion of 
education to suit their own ends", he admitted that this might have been possible but he 
argued that it is necessary to examine whether a small number of missionaries could really 
have been in-fluential enough to change large sections of the southland to an anti-northem 
position. There is sufficient evidence in East Affica alone to show that a small number of 
foreign missionaries were quite unable to change certain attitudes or customs that were 
central to a particular people (64). In the southern Sudan, it would simply not have been 
possible, one missionary has pointed out, for a group of outsiders to get southerners to 
hate the north unless the animus had already been there (65). King has also pointed out 
that the assumption that the Christian religion was handed to southerners in a way that 
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turned them implacably against their Muslim neighbours is obviously of critical importance 
in the propaganda war. Besides the religious ingredients, the southerners consider the 
south-north conflict as racial and national (66). It is national in the sense that all talk of 
"unification" or national-building from the time of the early Graduates Congress has 
signified to southemers the submergirig of southem culture in Islamic culture. 
It has often been asserted that the missions were deficient in their commitments to 
educational goals and in professional skills as educators (67). The evidences are suspect 
on several grounds: 
1. It was not based upon any first hand experience of educating the southern 
Sudanese. The indigenous educational experience was not based on a western type 
of education but on the traditional way of life of the people. 
2. The official criticism was not validated by any marked superiority of the 
government's own system in the northern Sudan which was, as the De La War's 
Commission, pointed out and Sir Stewart Symes admitted, lagging far behind the 
mainly missionary systems in Kenya and Uganda. With its usual intense and 
introverted parochialism, the Sudan Government never made any serious study of 
education in these territories -a study which might have enabled it to evaluate its 
own missionary educators more objectively and constructively. 
3. The British officials often made the Missions scapegoats for the confusions 
and contradictions inherent in the educational policy which the government itself 
prescribed for the southern Sudan, especiafly from about 1930 onwards (68). The 
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government demanded that the schools should produce a handful of efficient 
clerks, teachers and minor officials,, but without any "detribalizing" effects and 
indeed while educating the majority of boys for a return to 'traditional' life. In the 
formation of this policy the Missions had no say whatever (69). 
Lauwerys has aptly pointed out that the Missionaries were never entirely free to do as they 
wanted: the British authorities supported them when it suited their purpose and placed 
restrictions on them when this seemed necessary in the light of their own aims (70). 
In the Sudan the support or restrictions imposed on the Missions, in terms of education in 
the southern Sudan,, have been influenced by the colonial administration's relation with the 
Muslim northern Sudan. The overriding motive for the stringent control of the Missions' 
activities, especially between 1895 to 1905 was the conviction by the British 
administration in Khartoum that indiscreet missionary activities in the southern Sudan or 
the appearance of active government support for the Missions would provoke a dangerous 
outbreak of Muslim protest in the northern Sudan. "It was of the utmost importance that 
the Muslims should not gain the impression that the government was conniving at unfair 
competition with the Mission", said the Governor-generaý Wingate (71). "Once such an 
impression gets aboard it can only result in exciting the prejudice of the Mohammedans 
both against Christianity and against the government" (72). According to R. Wingate, the 
Governor-general of Sudan in 1902, the development of education in the southern Sudan 
can be carried subject to two over-riding conditions: 
1. That nothing should be done which might promote conversion to Islam 
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That this opposition to Islamisation should not become known in the 
northern Sudan, where it might provoke an embarrassing and even dangerous 
Mushm protest (73). 
These are confusing attitudes that made the taking of proper direction of education 
difficult in the southern Sudan. This trend had adverse consequences on the future 
development of education in the southem Sudan and cultivated the earlier air of 
superiority by the northern Sudanese over the Southern Sudanese. Despite the 
Government's stringent control not to give the Missions a free-hand in the running of 
education in the southern Sudan, it too was not interested to get directly involved with it. 
For instance J. Currie, who became the Director of Education in 1900 persistently refused 
to become involved in the southern education until a comprehensive policy had been 
evolved. Such a policy never developed until the British left the Sudan in 1956. In the eyes 
of Currie the major tasks of education in the Sudan was to produce adequate Sudanese 
junior officials, clerks and artisans to replace expensive expatriates for employment in both 
the northern and the southern Sudan. This meant almost exclusive concentration on 
northern education, where even small sums produced quick and tangible results (74). Out 
of the 4178 classified posts in the Sudan Govenimen service in 1920,1544 posts were 
held by northern Sudanese, 535 by the British, 1824 by the Egyptians, 167 by the Syrians 
and 108 by others (75). None of these were held by the southern Sudanese. Currie even 
quoted a report on the native education in South Africa which emphasized the need for 'a 
thorough knowledge of the actual social conditions of the native people as an 
indispensable foundation for a complete and scientific scheme of education'(76). 
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At this time it was inconceivable to carry out a comprehensive study into the social 
conditions of the fragmented societies of the south. In the first place access to the tribes 
was difficult if not impossible for colonial officials and secondly most of the many 
languages spoken by the numerous tribes were incomprehensible to the officials. Tlirdly 
the southern tribes, particularly the Nilotics, have been noted throughout their recorded 
history to have been very resistant to external influence of any kind whether Arab or 
European. With the lack of any broad political unity among the tribes, the study intended 
by Currie, in order to provide some bases for comprehensive policy, was to a great extent 
not conceivable in the short term. It would not, for instance, be easy to establish a proper 
ground for education in such acephalous tribes as the Nuer. Practically the colonial 
administf atof s were not in a situation that could enable them to have access to the needed 
iaformation about the social conditions of the tribes in the southern Sudan. 
In the late 1920s the government recognized the difficulties in taking direct responsibility 
for education in the southern Sudan and recognized the missions as a more suitable 
instrument. Of particular importance for the future development of education in this 
respect in the southern Sudan was the Hillelson Report of 1922 (77). Hillelson, an official 
of the Department of Education, did not recommend any governmein directed elementary 
education, even though he considered that offered by the missionary societies to be 
inadequate. His recommendations were for increased government control, accompanied by 
increased government assistance through a system of grants-in-aid. He advanced, among 
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other things, the idea that the syllabus should be regulated by the government, and also 
proposed that a resident representative of the Department of Education should be posted 
to the southern Sudan. In 1926 a Resident Inspector of Education was located in the 
south. This year also marked the begi-nning of the formal payment of subsidies to the 
schools in the south. The subsidies were given subject to the following conditions: 
1. That a European exercise uninterrupted supervision over the schools and 
withdrawal ftom. the station was permitted only in the cases of sicluiess and home 
leave. 
2. That the syllabus as laid down be adhered to. 
3. nat the Resident Inspector is satisfied with the progress and efficiency of 
the schools. 
4. That if any of the conditions are unfulfilled, the Resident Inspector may 
reduce or withdraw the grant for the fbHowing year. 
An Educational Conference held in Juba in 1932 under the Chairmanship of the Director 
of Education confirmed that the government would not provide its own schools, but 
cooperate with the Missions in providing an education which would not only aim at 
, pjiding against 
"the destruction of native social institutions and the diversion of the 
African from his natural background" but also at 'leaching him to adopt himself and his 
histitutions to changing ideas and conditions" (78). But the govemment, especiaRy the 
Civil Secretary, H-A-McMichael, was determined to prevent the Missions from exploiting 
this indispensaWity. 
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The Missions were not to be permitted to achieve a share in the educational policy-making 
lest they become an active force in the development of general southern policy. The 
Missions could not therefore use their educational monopoly as a means of pressure. 
H. A. McMichael saw in the possible missionary participation in educational policy-making 
not a useful contribution,, but an irrelevant nuisance. He pointed to the Govemor-general 
that,, for instance, the establishment of a Southern Educational Advisory Council with the 
Missionary representation would make it difficult for the government to resist a similar 
Northem Advisory Council with unofficial Sudanese representation. The formation of 
such a council as an officially recognized body would of course have made it difficult for 
the government to ignore the missionary's view on educational policy in the southern 
Sudan (79). An analysis of this policy approach taken by the colonial governmen indicates 
a strong inclination towards accommodating the northern interests. Apparently all the 
policies developed have been equated against the northern reactions or opinions to the 
policy proposals. 
One of the reasons why the British Administration was reluctant to get involved in the 
development of education in the southern Sudan was the financial commitment involved. 
The adoption of indirect rule, which meant leaving the tribes to sort out their own affairs 
emanated from the British Administration's recognition of the reality of the situation: the 
British simply were not willing to invest resources in the southern Sudan (80). Sir Stewart 
Symes who succeeded Maffey as the Govemor-general of the Sudan in 1933 was reluctant 
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to what he said a 'ývaste of any of his litnited fimds on the very unpromising south" (81). 
Martin Parr, the Governor of Equatoria Province in 1936 said that the Govemor-general 
"wanted the administration kept on a care and maintenance basis without the undertaking 
of new work",, and warned the D. Cs to restrain 'their Englishman's passion to put wrong 
things right". The Missions were warned that they must "respect tribal sanctions and 
utilize the existing customs". They were further charged to "ensure that their educational 
policy was entirely in accord with the declared policy of the government" (82). In 
R-K. Winter's circular of July 1932, as the new Secretary for Education, he bluntly stated 
that elementary vernacular education should concentrate neither on 'adaptation' nor on 
4producing intermediate entrants', but on 'sending the boy happily to his tribal 
enviromment'. By 1933 the Missions were being officially encouraged, to open more bush 
schools and sub-grade schools. This attitude showed the lack of interest in education in 
the southern Sudan at a time when the south badly needed the educated manpower to 
spearhead its development. The British administration advocated indirect rule but could 
not provide the opportunity for the indigenous population to have the education so as to 
enable them manage the native affairs effectively. 
Because of the peculiar situation in the Sudan especially in terms of north verses south the 
missionaries did not enjoy the relative freedom of opportunity that have been provided to 
other missionaries in the other African countries such as Uganda. Ile Phelps-Stokes 
Commissions' recommendations which were supposed to be the educational analogue of 
indirect rule in the British colonial countries had a better ground for success in,, for 
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example Uganda than in the Sudan. For instance the Governor-general Sir Stewart Symes 
was less concerned to preserve 'the so-called traditional institutions" than to modernize 
the Sudan and develop its economy (83). It is true, as has been stated by Garvey that 
comparatively few of the detailed suggestions of the Phelps-Stokes Commissions were put 
into effect (84), but the confusions and the contradictions in the application of some of the 
recommendations in the southern Sudan muddled the trend of education. For instance at 
the initial stages the missionaries believed that Christianity and civilization were intricately 
related. The government, on the other hand, was motivated in its educational programme 
of the 1920s by the desire to adapt the education to the supposed capabilities of the local 
Africans and to local conditions as they perceived them These two sets of motives are 
sianificantly different. One is basically conversional, the other basically adaptationist. 
A general review of the educational situation in the southern Sudan indicates a general 
state of neglect by the central government in Khartoum. This was clear in the statement of 
one of the British officials who stated that the state of the south was fundamentally the 
result of neglect, and neglect was itself the result of Khartoum's misguided parsimony. He 
felt that the 'Northern Administrative system was unsuitable for the south"; but felt that 
under any system of administration centralized at Khartoum, the south would always be at 
disadvantage in its competition with the north for fimds and skilled personnel (85). "If one 
has clever and stupid boys in the same class one cannot blame the master for spending his 
time on the former, to the detriment of the latter. So if one has a country in which one part 
is progressive and the other backward and they are bracketed together, the latter goes to 
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the wall", said Stinand. He recommended that "the Negro provinces should be a class by 
themselves under a Vice- Governor- General if necessary" (86). This argument explained 
the great disadvantage into which the southern Sudan was placed. 
In terms of educational progress, economic and social development the south therefore 
lagged far behind the northern Sudan. Separate administration of the two regions could 
have been an ideal option for development in the Sudan. Practically speaking, anything but 
one-Sudan policy was unthinkable (87). There was the assumption, kindled by nationalism, 
that the north would be able to do much more for the south than the British, and that they 
would be welcomed as liberators (88). The reaction of the southern Sudanese was that 
"you can't do this to us, putting us into the jaws of the northern Sudanese". There were 
too few educated Southern Sudanese in the south to formulate a policy or hold their own, 
so they said: 'Tor God's sake stay and keep the wolves at bay, while we get some 
education" (89). This is a situation where two distinctively different racial groups with 
quite different backgrounds and hostile past relationships have been forced to be governed 
together. This is "the colonial paradox of creating nation-states out of previously 
segmented and even mutuaffy independent units, yet keeping them disunited and 
sometimes intensifying mutual disrespect and animosity"(90). This fact is attributable to 
the present unstable situation in the Sudan. 
A colonial policy that had significant political and educational implications on the southern 
Sudan was the "Southern Policy". The onset of the indirect rule in 1925 saw the real 
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genesis of the Southern Policy as a practical form of government for the southern 
provinces (91). The cspurious landmark' in the Southern Policy was the Passports and 
Permits Ordinance of 1922, which empowered the Civil Secretary to declare certain 
regions "Closed Districts" and to forbid any alien or any native of the Sudan to enter and 
remain in the same Districts (92). Sudanese historians are unanimous that this Ordinance 
was "intended to exclude Egyptians, Northern Sudanese and other Muslim likely to 
engage in activities which would prejudice the administrative policy followed in the south" 
(93) and generally to insulate the south from the northern influence. The political object of 
the Southern Policy was clearly stated in a Memorandum by H. A. McMichael on 10th 
August 1928: "to create a solid barrier protecting the south against the insidious political 
intrigue which must in the ordinary course of events increasingly beset our path in the 
north" (94). This was seen as a way of combating political agitation which would have 
been detrimental to the stability of the British administration. H. A. McMichael defined in 
explicit terms what had come to be known as the Colonial Southern Policy: 
"The policy of the government in the Southern Sudan is to build up a series of self- 
contained racial or tribal units with the structure and organization based to 
whatever extent the requirements of equity and good government permit upon the 
indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs" 
The implementation of the Southern Policy required a number of measures that would 
eliminate all traces of Arab influences in the south and revitalization of Negroid African 
customs. Ile steps instituted by the govemment to carry out the policy included the 
encouragement of the use of English language in the mission schools and in offices, the 
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prohibition of the use of Arabic language and Arab dress, the replacement of Arab 
Administrators by the indigenous ones and the removal of Arab traders from the south and 
the recognition and use of African laws (95). Following a Conference held in Rejaf 
southern Sudan,, it was recommended that the following languages be recognized and 
adopted: Dinka, Bari, Moru, Ndogo, Nuer, ShiRuk, Madi and Zande (96). 
In terms of ethnic relationship between the north and the south, the Southern Policy only 
served to reinforce the general situation of mistrust already prevalent, though some 
extremely ethnocentric authors in the northern Sudan have in the past attempted to 
attribute the entire separation of the south ftom the north to a British colonial device (97). 
The controlling postulate was that the south was fimdamentally distinct from the north and 
required distinctive administrative organization (98). The creation of this barrier implied 
the eradication from the south of the Arabic language which would indisputably bring 
Islam with it. According to John O. Voll (1991) the acceptance of Christianity and the 
resistance to Islam in the Southern Sudan could be associated with the contrasting images 
of British and Arab intervention in the Southern Sudan (99). Although the British did 
little to develop the south educationally and economically, aspirations for such 
development were then still foreign to communities (100). However the British 
administrative system that respected and protected the autonomy of the local communities 
became more acceptable in the later years of the colonial rule. The image of the northern 
Arabs,, whether prior to colonial rule or since independence has never enjoyed a similar 
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appreciation (101). Instead aggravated animosity became the pattern rather than the 
exception in the south-north relationship. 
Dunstan M. Waiý in his book The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, provided the 
southern perspective of the merits and demerits of the "Southern Policy". According to 
him the Southern Policy was based on two premises: 
1. that the Negroid Africans of the south are culturally and, to some extent, racially 
distinct from the northern Arab Sudanese; 
2. that the southern provinces would either develop eventually as a separate territorial 
and political entity or be integrated into what was then British East Aftica. 
Wai argued against the northern Sudanese view that the Southern Policy erected artificial 
barriers between the north and the south and that the policy eliminated Arab influence in 
the southern Sudan. Tensions and animosities had for a long time characterized the 
interactions between the north and the south as evidenced by the fact that no previous 
administration had achieved political and economic unification in the Sudan (102). Hatred 
already had deep roots between the two parts of the country before the existence of the 
Southern Policy in the 1930s. According to Wai to blame the colonial administration for 
eliminating Arab influences in the south is to imply that the south needed Arabization. The 
contention is in itself culturally imperialistic; it is an argument against a rival in cultural 
imperial pursuits (103). The most valid criticism of the Southern Policy, according to Wai, 
is that it did not strive to bring about social or economic progress in the south as it did in 
the north. Not only did the two-pronged policy serve to further alienate one region from 
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the other,, but after the policy was later abandoned by the colonial administration, the 
south was left dangerously vulnerable to the pursuits of the Arab north (104). 
Consequently when Sudanization of the administration took place virtually all the posts 
vacated by the British and other foreigners were taken over by the northern Sudanese. It 
took little beyond this to convince southerners that a new colonialism had arrived. 
In the educational field, one of the intentions of the Southern Policy was to educate the 
southerner 'up to government service standards' and to create a new literate class in order 
to dispense with the northern Sudanese officials who carried the 'contamination' of Arab 
and Muslim influence (105). In fact the reaffirmation of the Southern Policy by Sir 
H. McMichael in 1930 implied the training of a large body of southern Sudanese as a minor 
civil servants and technicians through Intermediate schools. There was a rapid growth in 
terms of pupils in the southern Sudan between 1930 and 1932. The total pupil population 
rose from about 2600 to over 4100, while post elementary education rose up by nearly 
80% from the figure of 1930 to nearly 500 (106). This growth however ended there. 
McMichael's 1930 programme of accelerated educational development had by 1932 been 
quietly abandoned. In the early 1930s the British officials in the south Sudan developed 
the techniques of administration which enabled them to dispense with expanded 
bureaucracy. District Commissioners became paramount chiefs among the people whom 
they served. In this situation therefore there was no need for rival educated southem elites. 
Consequently between 1932-1936 there was virtually no increase in the school enrollment, 
while the intermediate enrollment,, the growing point of the system actually shrank by over 
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12% (107). In the final analysis of this policy, the educational aspect of the policy was the 
deliberate discouragement of the development of a southern Sudanese intelligentsia similar 
to that which had grown up in the north (108). 
An 
After 1933 the Government convened no more "Southern Education Conference" and 
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avandoned any pretense of consultation. Such a state of affairs had disastrous implications 
on the southern education and placed the southerners at the greatest disadvantage at the 
time of independence of the country. The absence of southern official candidates for 
Sudanisation posts was not therefore inevitable. The educational policies pursued by the 
government contributed greatly to this situation. Out of about 800 posts Sudanised only 8 
of them were occupied by the southern Sudanese (109). 
The foRowing section tries to demonstrate whether there is any significant differences in 
the policy approach developed by the government in independent Sudan in relation to that 
during the British colonial period. 
1.3 THE INDEPENDENCE PERIOD (1956-1969): WHAT'S THE 
DIFFERENCE? 
The Sudan achieved its independence on the Ist January 1956. The first Parliamentary 
government that was formed was at first held in high esteem as the symbol of nationalism 
(110). But at best Parliament was a superficial instrument. It had been introduced into the 
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Sudan at precisely the time parliamentary forms were rapidly disappearing form other 
countries in the Middle East (I 11); this has been the main source of influence for the 
political development in the Sudan. Apparently the political parties in the Sudan were not 
well-organized groups with distinct objectives, but loose alliances motivated primarily by 
personal interest and loyalty to the various religious factions (112). 
The country obtained independence without the rival political parties having agreed on the 
form and content of a permanent constitution (113). As a result factional maneuvers 
dominated the parliamentary session at a time when crucial decisions affecting the 
proposed constitution and the future of the south had to be made. No proper formula was 
found in terms of the north-south relation; what became clear was the policy of control of 
the south by the national government. This was shown by the wholesale replacement of 
the British administrators in the southern by northern Sudanese, which confirmed the 
southern fears of domination by the Muslim Arabs. The government's policy was to 
employ northern administrators in the southern region, to ignore demands for a federal 
system, and assimilate the south through a policy of Arabization and Islamisation (114). In 
the Legislative Assembly that was formed only 13 of the 95 seats were allotted to the 
southern Sudanese and therefore they had no effective means of exerting any influence in 
the Parliament (115). 
The structufal dispafities that existed between the nofth and the south dufing the colonial 
period continued into the independence period. The precedence set by the colonial 
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administration in favour of the development of the north, in terms of all aspects of social 
economic and educational developments, gave the north the advantage of superiority over 
the south. The north had a number of advantages over the south in terms of setting the 
basis for development. It had earlier access to sources of civilization of the north and east. 
From the 16th to 19th centuries a semblance of political unity had almost been achieved in 
the northern Sudan mainly through the influence of Islam and Arabic language. The 
southern Sudan remained isolated up to the end of the l9tli century. No forces making for 
unity therefore counteracted its multiple diversity. The Turko-Egyptian and the Mahdiya 
period have been highly instructive periods (116). The entrenchment of slavery during the 
former period and the rise of economic class of traders Oalaba) dependent on the slave 
trade have both had profound effect on subsequent history and economic structure of the 
country, particularly as regards the alienation of the mainly Negroid south from the north. 
This factor underlines how the vestiges of the slave culture are still reflected in the 
prejudices that persist in modem Sudan with serious political and economic repercussions 
(117). 
The British occupation altered the socio-economic structure of the country by introducing 
a colonial pattern of development. But though the colonial power had destroyed the earlier 
forms of economic exploitation it installed its own condition for exploitation and by 
favouring mainly the northern group within the country, the system set in motion the 
dynamics of marginalisation (118). This situation was responsible for the present profile of 
elites in the Sudan. The uneven distribution of educational facilities produced relatively 
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large number of educated elites in the north Sudan who were later to constitute an 
important layer in the national political and administrative set up. This resulted in a gradual 
emergence of a national middle class with virtually full monopoly over the economic, 
political and administrative powers in the central and northern belts of the country (119). 
These were the elites who determined the trend of education in the southern Sudan during 
the periods of independence. Education became the main ideological tool of the Islamic 
national government. The main objective of which was to establish a new Sudan 
characterized by cultural and religious homogeneity. 
The earlier approach to the development of educational policy by the national government 
of the Sudan apparently has been shaped by the previous trends taken by the colonial 
government. The initial attitudes of the northern politicians and the civil servants towards 
the south were not that much different from that of the British imperialists. They assumed: 
"the south had been deliberately underdeveloped, its people were particularly 
backward, and it deserved the benign assistance of the more developed and 
cultured north, backed if necessary by firmness" (120). 
This attitude by the northern politicians was seen as rather colonial by the southern 
Sudanese. But in the eyes of the northern. politicians and policy-makers the Missionaries 
were the primary impediment to the development of education in the south Sudan and to 
the policy of cultural integration where it was hoped Islam and Arabism could have played 
the same assimilative role as for the north (121). 'Me abandonment of the Southern Policy 
was discussed in the Sudan Administrative Conference held in Khartoum in April 1946. 
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The Conference pointed out the relative backwardness of the peoples of the southem 
provinces which it attributed to the Southern Policy pursued by the colonial administration 
(122). In his circular of 16th December 1946 the Civil Secretary called for the revision of 
an obsolete Southern Policy, in response to "recent political development both inside and 
outside the Sudan; and for the re-statement of the policy in a form which can be publicly 
explained and supported, and which would be acceptable to the northern Sudanese 
opinion" (123). T'llis revision implied that the southern Sudan should henceforth be 
regarded as inextricably bound for future development to the middle-eastern and Arabised 
northern Sudan. This reversal of the Southern Policy was bitterly criticized by the 
Governor of Bahr El GhazaL in the south Sudan, who said that: 
"The South's future is being advised upon and is even likely to be decided by the 
wrong men in the wrong place, i. e. by a body of people capable and conscientious 
but without any direct understanding of the south; preoccupied with the political 
ferment of the north and seeing everything through Omdurman spectacles" (124). 
This set in motion the pattern of centralized policy making that continued to affect any 
development and educational activities in the southern Sudan. This suited the interest of 
the northern Sudanese very weU. 
One particular report of the International Commission on Secondary Education has given 
some support and encouragement to the northern Sudanese, in terms of their drives for 
Aiabisation and Islamisation of the education system in the latter period to independence. 
This Commission was appointed on Ist December 1954 by the British governor-general 
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on the initiative of the first Sudanese Minister of Education. The Commission consisted of 
one Civil Servant from the Indian Ministry of Education (Chairman), four British as 
members, which included Charles Morris, then Vice-Chancellor of the University of 
Leeds,, Miss Charlesworth,, Headmistress of Sutton High School for Girls, L. C. Welcher, 
the Australian Principal of the University Col-lege of Khartoum, two Egyptian members, 
Sayyed Mohammad Farid abu Hadid of the Cairo Higher Training College and Dr. Abdeal 
Aziz al. -Sayyid Ibrabim, Director General of Egyptian Primary Education and Professor of 
Education at the University of Ain Shams, and a Sudanese, Dr. Ahmad Al-Tayyib 
(Secretary). The Commission spent some six weeks in the Sudan with a few days in the 
southern Sudan (125). It came out with the following recommendations which had far 
reaching implications for educational development in the southern Sudan: 
1. Education "had to deal with problems like the unification of the people, 
particularly as between the north and the south, bridging the social, cultural and 
economic differences which exist between the different regions, eradicating 
customs and traditions which are reactionary or out of harmony with the new 
shape of things". By implication this means the eradication of the southern cultures 
and traditions because the history of the Sudan has shown that the southern tribes 
have been the most reactionary in the country. 
2. "The aim of education in the Mission schools is chiefly religious" and that 
there were in the south "hundreds of elementary schools which are mostly 
sub-grades". On the basis of this gross misinformation, the Commission 
recornmended that the govemment should: 
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(a) Take over the education of the people of the south and provide them with 
schools that can develop them into 'good citizen' of the country. 
(b) That Arabic should become the medium of instruction not only in the 
southern secondary schools, but also in the elementary schools. 
(c) Vernaculars in the southern Sudan should be discontinued as medium of 
instruction at any level of education. 
These recommendations, especially in regards to vernaculars, were based upon evidences 
which can be described as a farrago of ignorance and prejudice. None of the members of 
the Commission had knowledge of any of the southerners; nor does the Commission's 
report contain any hint that it had taken evidence ftom educationists who had such 
knowledge (126). However, Sir Charles Morris and Miss Charlesworth, who nevertheless 
signed the main report, did record a dissenting opinion. They recommended that 'Uhere 
the vernacular is extensive, and where there exists some literature and strong local 
sentiment, the vernacular should continue as the language of instruction in the earlier 
stages". Interestingly this dissenting opinion appeared neither in the body of the report, 
nor in the summary of the main recommendation. It appeared in another document entitled 
"Summary of the main conclusion and recommendations", which appears to have been in 
origin an analysis, with official comments, prepared for internal use within the Ministry 
and which may have been included by oversight in the published report. Here the Morris- 
Charlesworth amendment appears accompanied by official covering minutes which ends 
with the words 'Tor vetting and approval please" (127). 
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The International Commission,, so ready to promote cnational tmity' by condemning the 
mission education and rejecting southern languages had almost nothing to offer to the 
specificaffy southern needs which secondary education might be expected to serve. The 
report was quite silent about the crucial role of secondary education in producing the 
political, administrative, technical and professional cadres which the south so urgently 
needed in the Sudanisation process going on. The report instead sets a disastrous 
precedent which the north had picked up and used as a weapon or means to retard the 
development of education in the southern Sudan. The Commission's incautious remarks 
about the role of education in 'nation-building' encouraged the Ministry of Education in 
its policy of "assimilation and indeed of Islamisation", for in 1955 few northern Sudanese 
had any doubts that the expansion of Islam was the most effective means of bridging 
cultural differences (128). As the Minister of Education later appreciatively remarked, 'the 
Commission had submitted many valuable recommendations especially as regards the 
south, the system of which will be assimilated with that of the north accordingly" (129). 
According to Mohammed Omer Bestir, the report of the Commission marked a period of 
dissection of the problems of education and suggestions for remedies respectively (130). 
In a practical sense the commission's report has focused the attention of the Khartoum 
government on areas which are irrelevant to the development of education in the southem 
Sudan. Since independence (1956), the Khartoum government continued to pursue this 
same policy approach with regards to educational development in the southern Sudan but 
with no apparent good results. The outcome of this policy has been the continuous civil 
wars in the country with no apparent end in sight. Logically this policy should have been 
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dropped for a more acceptable one to accelerate educational development in the southern 
Sudan. The Sudan government never made any serious study of education in the southern 
Sudan as a prerequisite for relevant education for the south; a study which might have 
enabled it to evaluate its own education more objectively and constructively. 
Another development that shaped the minds of the pioneers of the independence period of 
Sudan came from the first pressure group of elites who formed themselves into what 
became known as the "Graduates Congress". As early as July 1939 this "Graduates 
Congress", in a note on education submitted to the government, had caRed for the 
nationalization of the Church schools in the southern Sudan (131). By implication the 
Congress held the Missions responsible for the backwardness of education in the southern 
Sudan. It suggested that education should be oriented towards the Arab and Islamic 
culture but not African culture because the Sudan had much in common with Arab 
countries of the Islamic Orient (132). According to the Congress the improvement of 
education in the south could not be achieved through a missionary system subsidized by 
the government, but through the opening of government schools similar to those in the 
north and where the Arabic language could provide the lingua franca. It also suggested the 
cancellation of subventions to mission schools and the unification of education syllabus in 
the northern and southern Sudan (133). 
Since some of the founders of the Graduates Congress were also the initial or pioneer 
leaders of independent Sudan e. g. Ismail El Azhari and Sayyid El Mlirghani, the ideas 
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advanced by them formed the nuclei of the educational reforms in the Sudan. Tke role of 
the Missions in the southern education was intensively disliked by the northern Muslim 
Sudanese. The Missionaries were regarded as enthusiastic auxiliaries of the old Southern 
Policy and conversion of southerners to Christianity was seen as a politicafly-inspired 
exercise in national disruption (134). The lAidespread southern suspicion of the 
northerners was popularly attributed to a successful missionary campaign of denigration 
with plentiful reference to the iniquities of the old slaving days (135). By very natural 
over- simplification, the intensive Arabisation and Islamisation of the south was seen by 
most northern Sudanese as the obvious road to national integration, and as the culmination 
of a long process of historical development (136). 
The attempts at Islamisation and Arabisation of the southern Sudan by simply reversing 
the British policy did not work though it did a lot of damage to the development of 
education in the southern Sudan by retarding further progress. The northern political 
parties failed to give sufficient weight to the undeniable differences between the two 
regions. For instance the Special Commission formed in 1956 listed a number of points 
which it urged all Sudanese to bear in mind so as to understand the 1955 southern revolt. 
The Commission identified five broad categories of points, which emphasized the 
differences between the north and the south: (137) 
1. The northern and the southern Sudanese have very little in common. 
Religiously, the north is Muslim, the south is Christian and pagan; racially, 
the north is Arab, the south is Negroid; finguistically northern Sudanese 
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speak Arabic while the southern Sudanese speak more than 80 languages. 
In addition to these factors,, there are geographical, historical and cultural 
differences. 
2. For historical reasons the southern Sudanese regarded the northern 
Sudanese as traditional enemies. 
3. The British administrative policy until 1947 encouraged the southem 
Sudanese to progress along African and Negroid lines. Through the Closed 
District Order and the Permits of Trade Order the Sudanese were 
prevented from knowing each other or learning from each other. The 
Missionanes, who controffed much of the education system in the south, 
favoured this policy for reasons of their own. 
For political, financial, geographic and economic reasons the northern 
Sudan progressed quickly in every field, while the southern Sudan lagged 
behind. This inevitably created a feeling among the underdeveloped people 
that they were being cheated, exploited and dominated. 
All of these circumstances contributed to the absence among the southern 
Sudanese of a feeling of common citizenship with the northern Sudanese or 
a feeling of nationalism or patriotism towards the Sudan as a whole. Their 
loyalty remained tribal. 
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Aggrey Jaden, (a Southern Sudanese politician), the President of the Sudan Affican 
National Union (SANU), at a Conference on the southern Sudan, held in Khartoum in 
March 1965 offered a case in point. He declared that: (138) 
"'Me Sudan falls into two distinct areas in terms of geographical area ethnic 
groups and cultural systems. The northern Sudan is occupied by a hybrid Arab race 
who are united by their common language, common culture and common religion 
and they look to the Arab world for their cultural and political inspiration. The 
people of the southern Sudan, on the other hand, belong to the African ethnic 
group of East Africa. They do not only differ from the hybrid Arab race in origin, 
arrangement, and basic systems, but in all conceivable purpose. There is nothing in 
common between the various sections of the community, no body of shared 
beliefs, no identity of interests, no local signs of unity and above alý the Sudan has 
failed to compose a single community". 
Between 1957 to 1964 education in the southern Sudan was pressed into the service of 
political objectives. In order to reduce the western influence and ideas, and in a way to 
harmonize the educational system the government decided in 1962 to nationalize the 
Church schools in the southern Sudan and expelled the Missionaries from the southern 
Sudan. The Missionary education system was seen to undermine the Islamic institutions in 
the country, particularly the 'Kalwa'. (139). Ironically the Missionaiies were not expelled 
from the northern Sudan and they continued to play important role in the education of the 
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Muslim children in the northern Sudan. Today more than 95% of the students in the 
Church schools in the north are Muslims. 
A new Southern Policy had come into force in 1949 when it was endorsed by a Legislative 
Assembly. Tle first Sudanese Minister of Education informed the members of the 
Assembly that: 
"As the Sudan is one country sharing one set of political institutions it is of great 
importance that there should be one language which is understood by all its 
citizens. That language would only be Arabic and Arabic must therefore be taught 
in all our schools" (140). 
In August 1949 the Anglo-Sudanese Executive Council resolved that Arabic should 
become the common language of the Sudan (14 1). 
In another policy statement the Minister declared that the policy is: 
"to weld the system of education hitherto in use in the northern and southem 
provinces respectively into one harmonious whole designed to meet the needs of 
the pupils in all parts of the Sudan" (142). 
The new system was designed to bring a halt to the whole system of education that has 
been established in the south Sudan by the missionaries. The abrupt nature by which the 
policy changes were to take place meant a complete disruption of the iim progress 
made by the missionaries. 
50 
Ideally changes should be planned in the light of information, research and experiment and 
consultation at the regional and local levels. The results of such research and experiment 
can be used to guide the changes effectively. Educational needs cannot be evaluated 
except in the light of A the individual and social purposes which education may serve. in 
the Sudan such ideals are taken for granted as shown by the deeds of the government. In 
November 1950 the Legislative Assembly passed the Minister of Education's Five-Year 
Plan fof the Southem Sudan (1951-1956) without any study of the southem situation. 
The main objective of this plan was to "go a considerable way towards the unification of 
the education systems in the whole of the Sudan by the assimilation of methods of teacher- 
training, the use of similar text-books, the adoption of common syllabus and the 
introduction of Arabic into all schools above the village level (143). What was new in the 
educational policy adopted for the southern Sudan after 1957 was that, unlike the British 
policy of restricting the educational development during the 1930s, it involved active 
interference with the existing system. This was carried out in great haste and with very 
little regard to the destructive educational consequences upon the southerners. 
Instead of expanding the secondary sector and maintaining the pace of intermediate 
expansion, the governmen lavished fimds upon post elementary institutes of Islamic 
studies, known as the 'Mahads'. By 1962 there were in the southern Sudan six 
intermediate Mahads and one secondary Mahad with a total of 500 pupils. Recruits for 
these intermediate Mahads were sometimes obtained simply by an administrative order 
posting qualified elementary leavers to them rather than to secular intermediate schools 
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(144). Expansion in the post elementary secular schools was less encouraging. There were 
only 8 intermediate schools by 1953/54 and only one secondary school (145). The total 
numbers of students in the southern secondary school in the year 1953/54 was only 187. 
In 1959/60 there were two secondary schools in the south with a mere total student 
population of 361 boys. In the northern Sudan between 1959/60 and 1961/62 enough 
teachers were found to create 31 new boys' secondary school streams and to provide 50 
streams in all. This trend was intended to retard secular education in the south and 
indoctrinate the southern children through Islamic education. The indirect motive of this 
development was to use education as an ideological tool by the regime to obtain their 
political and religious persuasion. 
The independent government of the Sudan has no inclination towards what the southern 
Sudanese considered relevant education for the south. Soon after independence the Sudan 
government opted to identify itself with the Arab nations. Subsequently its educational 
policies are derived and influenced by the educational policies adopted in the Arab world 
countries. Educational cooperation among these countries is facilitated not only by the 
common language, culture and religion but also by similar structural and fimctional aspects 
in the educational enterprises (146). The standardization of the education system came 
fi-om 1957 Agreements on Cultural Unity signed by Syria, Jordan and Egypt; and the 
Cultural Charters signed by Iraq and Egypt in 1957. These two Agreements, endorsed by 
all the Arab States, sought to strengthen the feelings of Arab unity by eliminating the many 
vaiiations of education within and between the Arab states and to adopt the educational 
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system to the needs of development (147). The Agreements called for a 6: 3: 3: education 
ladder and provided for the application of a model curriculum in terms of content and time 
allocated to various subjects (148). Much of the time in the time-table is devoted to Arabic 
and religion i. e. 8 periods per week to Arabic and six periods for religion as compared six 
periods per week for English, two periods for the sciences and two periods each for 
geography, history (except in the final class in the secondary school where the number is 
increased to four) and other subjects. The implementation of such a framework had some 
repercussion on relevant education for the southern Sudanese and meant a total alienation 
of the southern Sudanese from the main-streams of the education in the country and the 
uprooting of the southern students from their local environment and culture. The question 
of the need of relevant education for the southern situation became no more a debatable 
issue in the Sudan. Relevance is defined according to the northern Sudanese's perception 
of the term relevance. 
Under the military regime of General Ibrahim Abboud (1958-1964), Islam and Arabic 
were officially championed by the authorities with the objective of creating a new Sudan 
characterized by cultural and religious homogeneity to replace the state of pluralism ( 149). 
The Abboud's government lacked dynamism and made no efforts to satisfy or even placate 
political demands in the country (150). It failed to launch a convincing programme of 
economic and social development (151). The regime suppressed expressions of religious 
and cultural differences using police to bolster government's efforts to Arabise the society 
(152). The dissolution of parliament by the regime cut off any legitimate outlets for 
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southern complaints. This stress on conformity with the Islamic education persisted until 
the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 when the Southern, Sudan was granted 
a regional autonomy. Whether the south had benefited during the period of the regional 
autonomy has not been studied or evaluated. The period of the regional autonomy lasted 
with the period of President Nimeiry which is researched in the main body of this study. 
The history of the Sudan, in terms of north- south relationship, has shown that the southern 
Sudan has been subjected to the perceived needs and ideologies of the rulers in Khartoum 
in all its economic, social, political, and educational aspects. The structural bases 
established by the colonial administration, that favoured the northern Sudanese, placed the 
northern Sudanese at great advantage over the south. It laid a good ground for the 
Khartoum governmein to pursue its perceived objectives in terms of Islamisation and 
Arabisation. The national government has been conceived by the Southern Sudanese as 
the replica of the colonial government. 
The British Colonial government's objective in the conquest of the Sudan was not 
primarily to develop the Sudan nor was it for any economic interests. The objective was 
purely defensive strategy to protect the Nile waters and so to safeguard the British 
position in Egypt. Though the Missionaries had eventually got involved in the field of 
education this was not also their original motive for entering the Sudan. The primary 
objective was the conversion of the Arabs in particular and African in general into 
Christianity. It was because the law did not allow the missionaries to operate in the 
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northern Sudan that forced them to concentrate in the southern Sudan. These factors 
accounted greatly for the lack of motivation in serious educational development ýn the 
southern Sudan. 
Chapter two discusses the research methodology employed in carrying out this research. It 
also contained some explanation of why the empirical research was undertaken within the 
United Kingdom and not within the Sudan. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. JUSTWICATION AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1. INTRODUCTION. 
The central theme of the study is to examine the contemporary educational policy and 
practices in the Sudan and to analyze its impact and implications on educational 
development in the Southern Sudan with the desire to establish a basis for the future 
educational policy development for the Southern Sudan. Very little documentation or 
literature exist in relation to education in the southern Sudan within the contemporary 
Sudan. A relatively large body of documentation about education in the Sudan originating 
ftom the north Sudan, is available but most provide quite patchy reflection of the true 
picture of the state of education in the southern Sudan. The understanding of such 
literature gives one the impression of the educational policies in the Sudan as being 
profoundly inter-linked with the specific Islamic educational policy context. Other 
literature reviewed provides some basic insight into the policy trends, the factors that 
influenced the shaping of the policies and the conflicts in the Sudanese policy 
development. 
63 
This study will attempt to provide an analysis of the government educational policy and to 
explain this in terms of particular understanding of the diverse characteristics of the 
Sudanese society. To provide a broader picture of the Sudan as a whole it has been 
necessary to trace the trends of the educational policy development in the Sudan from the 
earlier periods and to examine how they relate to the development of education in the 
period under review. This is to provide an adequate information of the background of the 
current educational situation in the country as a whole and to the southern Sudan in 
particular. The intention is to provide a true picture of the Sudanese educational policies 
and to create awareness and understanding of the policies. The study also attempts to set 
in proper perspective the power relationship between the central government and the 
regional government in terms of the educational policy development. This is to establish to 
what extent the conflict in the educational policy development in the country was 
dependent on the locus of the central control over education. It is expected that what 
would be learned from this would form a basis for the future educational policy 
development for the southern Sudan. 
2.2 LITERATURE SYNOPSIS (1969 - 1992). 
The 1969 to 1992 period marks the sixteen years of the Nimeiry era which was followed 
by the rule by four other leaders. Little literature is available during this period that 
specifically focuses on educational policies of the Sudan in genefal and the southem Sudan 
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in particular. No particular reason has been advanced for the lack of documentation on the 
policies of education but the possible explanation could be related to the policy of 
censorship by the Sudanese government on studies connected to government policies. 
However from the little literature available it is possible to establish the general picture in 
the country during the period under review and the general trends of policies that might 
have possibly affected the educational policy development in the country. Those that 
provide substantial insight into the general trends of policies in the Sudan include Garvey- 
Williams (1976) (1); the Report of the Sudan Education Sector Review (February 1977) 
(2); Harold D. Nelson (1983) (3); EI-Fatih A. Abdel Salam (1989) (4); Graham F. Thomas 
(1990; 1993) (5); Peter Woodward (1994) (6); Bona Malwal (1994) (7). The most 
comprehensive of these is the country study edited by Harold D. Nelson. 
In the book edited by Harold D. Nelson, Nimeiry is said to have justified his military coup 
in the Sudan on the grounds that the bickering and corruption of the civilian politicians 
had pafalyzed the decision-making pfocess, had pfevented actions being taken to deal with 
the country's economic and regional problems and had left the Sudan after 13 years of 
independence without a permanent constitution. One of the initial successes which has 
been attributed to Nimeiry was the ending of the 17 years civil war in the southern Sudan 
that resulted in the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement and provided a Regional 
autonomy to the southern region. However it has been stated that despite the apparent 
solution of the southern problem, Nimeiry failed to provide the country with a sense of 
national unity. According to Nelson after the settlement in the southern Sudan Nimeiry 
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attempted to mend fences with the Muslim religious groups in the north. He reinforced 
the special position of Islam in Sudan - one of the elements of conffict between the north 
and the south, - and recognized the Sharia as the source of all legislation. 
The literature mentions the various political organs of the government during the reign of 
Nimeiry and the problems associated with them The constitution enacted in 1973 
provided for the sharing of legislative fimctions between the President and the National 
People's Assembly. In practice much authority is said to have remained concentrated in 
the hands of the President through his control over appointments, candidates and elections 
and his ability to issue decrees bypassing normal governmental channels. The subservience 
of the People's Assembly has been underscored by changes in its size and composition 
ordained by Nitneiry and the frequency with which he has brought its dissolution- in 1978, 
1980 and again in 198 1- far short of the four-year term prescribed in the constitution. 
The powers bestowed on the President by the constitution enabled him to control high 
government appointments at both national and regional levels. He determined when the 
People's Assembly was to meet and appointed some of the members. He was believed to 
exercise de facto control over designation of members of the Political Bureau and over the 
Central Committee of the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU), which nominated the single 
presidential candidates, made policy recommendations to the government, and cleared all 
candidates for national and local offices. It has also been stated that by frequently shifting 
leading politicians among posts in the Cabinet, the SSU, the Assembly, Regional 
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Government,, and other Organizations, Nimeiry employed his broad appointive power as a 
tool for ensuring that the country's complex political institutions remained subject to his 
authority. These changes of personnel and dependence of officeholders on the President's 
approbation reduced the likelihood of any political rival building an autonomous power 
base and have enabled him to divert blame for economic and other shortcomings to the 
failing of subordinate officeholders. 
Another significant practice mentioned in Nelson was that of having a few individuals 
identified as members of his inner circle. But the degree to which he has sought their 
counsel is said to have remained unknown. 
The literature describes the political situation in the southern Sudan as well. The Southern 
Provinces Regional self-govemmen Act of 3rd March 1972, translated the Addis Ababa 
Agreement into an organic law having the character of a constitution for the Southern 
Region. The law provided for an executive body in the form of a High Executive Council 
and a legislative body known as the People's Regional Assembly. In addition to its 
regional law-making powers, the Regional Assembly by a two third majority could request 
that the Pfesident of the Republic postpone the coming into fofce of any national law the 
members believe would adversely affect the welfare and interests of the citizens of the 
Southern Region. The President of the Republic, on the other hand, could veto any bill 
passed by the Regional Assembly that he deemed contrary to the constitution. 
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The Regional Assembly and the High Executive Council were forbidden to legislate or 
exercise powers with respect to national defense; external affairs; air and inter-regional 
river transport; communications; customs and foreign trade; immigration and nationality, 
economic, social, and educational planning and cuffency. 
In summary Nelson's study pointed out that the dominating features of the Sudanese 
politics since the assumption of governmen by Nimeiry in 1969 was the heightened 
concentration of actual power in the hands of Nimeiry. All major initiatives in both 
domestic and international affairs were carried out by his personal direction. 
The state of education in the southern Sudan from the signing of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement (1972) to 1976 was clearly presented in the report prepared by Garvey- 
Williams, who was an Adviser on education in the Regional Ministry of Education (1972- 
1976) (8). Garvey-Williams mentioned in the report the general picture of education in the 
southern region. In general terms, he stated that the quality of education in the southem 
region of the Sudan was poor. Education at primary level in particular was unproductive 
in that the needs of the children who form the bulk of the output were largely disregarded 
and the children derived little from their schooling that was of real benefit to them in their 
future lives (9). According to Garvey-Williams the schools were generally lacking 
guidance and direction although he did not specifically mention the reasons for this lack of 10-- 
, guidance and 
direction. He however attributed the inadequacies in the southern education 
to the f6flowing factors: 
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1. Shortages of manpower and finance. 
2. Poor organization and weak administrative procedures. 
3. The lack of effective monitoring and the absence of well-formulated curricula reflecting 
weH-defined objectives. 
These short-comings, according to Garvey-Williams, could be attributed to the breakdown 
of normal government, the absence of econoniic development and the paucity of 
educational opportunity in the region during a period of abnost two decades. 
The study conducted by the government- sponsored Education Sector Review Commission 
(Dec. 1975-Feb. 1977), which was presented in the Report of the Sudan Education Sector 
Review, February, 1977 (10), in many respects reflected an ideal theoretical approach of 
educational development in the country. The probable explanation was to attract foreign 
assistance for educational development in the country. The Review Commission's study 
focused on two main areas: firstly the appraisal of the system of education from 1970 to 
1977 and secondly to provide a strategy for adoption for the future. What was indicated in 
the letter of transmittal addressed to the Minister of Education showed that, though the 
study lasted for 14 months, the commission did not visit the southern Sudan in order to 
have a comprehensive coverage of the state of education in the whole country. Tliere was 
also no mention of inputs emanating from the Southern Regional Government related to 
the study. 
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The report focused on a number of areas which were central for the development of 
education in the Sudan. The following are the summary of the areas relevant to this study: 
1. Universalization of Primary Education: - 
The commission's report mentioned the universalization of primary education within a 
period of 15 years starting from the date of the presentation of report (1977). One way to 
attain universalization, according to the commission, was to diversify the form of the 
primary school so as to suit the various local conditions and circumstances. 
2. Higher Education: - 
The report recommended that the higher education institutes must be regarded as sources 
of cultural, social and technological influences on society. Their establishment must be 
planned with a view to equable distribution among the various regions of the country and 
to the suitability of conditions in their locations. Each must make its contribution towards 
serving national objectives. 
3. Financial Decentralization :- 
The report mentioned that financial decentralization must go hand in hand with 
administrative decentralization. Independent regional units must be set up with powers to 
collect and spend money, develop local resources and appoint local teachers. Educational 
legislation must be developed in such a way as to allow for greater participation not only 
by the concerned organizations but also by individuals outside these organizations. The big 
question was whether the governmen was prepared to part from central financial control. 
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4. Eradication of Iffiteracy- 
The report proposed the formulation of a plan for the eradication of illiteracy within a 
period of ten to fifteen years. It is not easy to point out here the basis that the commission 
has used to set this target taking into account the debilitating state of education at that 
time and the fact that the commission did not travel widely to assess the true state of 
education in the whole country. The achievement of this objective through the approach 
put forward by the commission was also quite doubtful and unreliable. According to the 
commission,, the approach should be both political and popular (whatever is meant by 
popular), through a competent organization relying on financial resources outside of the 
education budget, such as development fimds, returns from industrial and commercial 
firms., donations and contributions by employers, organizations and societies, besides 
voluntary efforts. 
5. Arabic Language: - 
The report mentioned that Arabic language should be used as a language of instruction at 
all levels and for all types of education. This recommendation provided no allowances for 
the unique situation in the southern Sudan where Arabic is not much known and English 
has been the medium of instruction at all levels of education. The report stated that care 
should be taken to raise the standard of the Arabic language as a subject taught in itself 
and as a medium of instruction. This can be accomplished, according to the report, by 
satisfactory qualification of language teachers, linguistic vetting of all text-books and 
provision of school libraries with Arabic books suitable to students at various grades. 
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6. Centralization of Teacher Training and Education: - 
The report stated that the Teacher- Training Department of the Ministry of Education 
Should continue to be responsible for laying down the general policy for initial and in- 
service teacher trabiing. 
Some of the issues raised in the report of the Sudan Education Sector Review were bound 
to have some implication to the development of education in the southern Sudan. 
The article by EI-Fatih A. Abdel Salam on 'Ethnic Politics in the Sudan' (11) provides a 
reflection of the northern Sudanese perception of ethnicity in the Sudanese politics. The 
article mentioned that many of the northern Sudanese conceive the existing cultures of the 
Sudan as being in a state of melting pot that would eventually simmer into an invigorated 
and uniquely one Sudanese culture. They assumed that the southern Sudanese would 
retain distinctions in language, custom, and religion, but only for some time. Whatever the 
varying rates of assimilation, however, most would eventually disappear into the larger 
Sudanese cultural totality. This is assumed to eventually result into a 'core culture' 
composed essentially of Islamic Afro-Arab values, life styles and identification. However, 
the article pointed out that since the social and political base for ethnic politics has failed, 
so far, to simmer into the expected core culture, there remains great unfinished task of 
national building for the government. 
This perception has likely implications on the development of education in the whole 
country ýi general and the southern Sudan in particular. This is because of the use of 
72 
education to achieve this objective. According to the article the core culture theory 
provides broad criteria for detecting and curtailing the influence of 'ahen' politics that 
threaten the stability of the society. This specifically pointed to the western influences and 
the southern Sudanese cultures. This probably has been one of the main reasons for the 
central control of educational planning and educational policies. 
The study carried out by Patrick D. Lynch and Saifeislam Omer (12) pointed out the 
reasons why the promises made by Nimeiry's governmen , 
in the 'New Educational 
Policy' could not be accomplished. The article looked at the issues within the national 
context. It analyzed the process of implementation of the new educational policy and the 
degree to which the NEP achieved its goals as perceived by the participants in the system 
of education at that time. The new educational policy plan was to have prepared the 
people for constructing a new socialist society by introducing a "new" kind of education in 
addition to an expansion of schooling. In practice there was nothing new in the declaration 
in relation to perceived educational needs of the southern Sudan. The south remained 
subjected to the educational policies perceived as relevant by the central govemmen 
without the practical participation of the southern Sudanese to the policy formation. What 
the study considered as success were the change in the schooling system from 4-4-4 plan 
to 6-3-3 plan, expansion of access to schooling and the regionalisation of the educational 
system. What it did not present was what these successes meant to the development of 
education in the southern Sudan. How relevant were the changes? 
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Ile factors which were said to relate to the low rate of implementation of the educational 
plans included: 
1. 'ne failure of the planners to take into account the complexity of the p olitical- cultural 
process in the country. 
2. The resource constraints which affected all planning. Missing was also a reliable data 
base upon which to make decisions about school mapping and where to allocate resources 
effectively for maximizing learning and increasing learning. In a country as large as the 
Sudan is and as remote as most of the southern Sudan is, there are bound to be some 
difficulties in terms of identifying and quantifying the education that could be necessary to 
meet the needs of the majority of the population in the country. Policy- decisions cannot 
mtelligently be made in the absence of reliable data and the analysis of the underlying 
factors in implementation of the policies. This required proper research. 
3. The management and leadership of the reform was poor. The schools were built 
enthusiasticaRy by the communities without the benefit of guidance. 
4. The change in the curriculum could not be accomplished because its leadership was too 
unstable, and the govemment provided too small a resource base to provide a quality 
education for the expanded enrolhnent. 
5. The frequent changes in Ministers of Education negatively affected the implementation; 
ten Ministers served during the 15-year period of Nimeiry's reign. Twelve Ministers of 
Education held the portfolio in the southern Sudan in the same period. The result was a 
lack of decision-making about the direction of the plan, its curriculum and the shaf e of the 
national budget necessary for expanding school system. 
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The necessary conditions which were missing in the NEP, according to the study, include 
a planning in-ftastructure to make manpower projections and a reliable data base upon 
which to make decisions about school mapping or where to allocate resources effectively 
for maxitnizing learning and increasing equality. 
Peter Woodward's article (13) provides us also of a further insight into political situation 
of the Sudan during Nimeiry's period and the period thereafter. He attempted to assess 
broadly the extent to which those now in power appear to have "broken the mould" of 
Sudanese politics, or how far even their experiences represent less a revolution than a 
continuation of themes in Sudanese politics. His past analysis had not suggested that 
Sudan was likely to be transformed by an essentially ideological grouping, be it communist 
or Muslim Brotherhood in origin. The obvious route to "revolution", he said, is for such 
movements to capture the state and then use its power to transform society to the 
particular ideological blueprint of the movement. The state itself has limited capacity and 
its ability to impose the views of its rulers on such a vast country as the Sudan with a 
heterogeneous population has always been limited, he said. 
Political control., said Woodward, has never been that assured to any regime, and since 
independence in 1956 there has been a succession of unstable civilian and military 
governments. They lacked the kind of ethnic and religious links that could spread their 
influence widely into the Sudanese society, at least in the northern Sudan. He mentioned 
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that a sense of something less than a clear revolutionary ideology was apparent in the large 
congresses called to decide on Sudan's direction. For instance in the autumn of 1991 no 
less than 4000 'experts' were assembled to a conference on a Comprehensive Strategy at 
which they were invited to chart the course for the Sudan to the year 2000. At the same 
time, and apparently unrelated to this conference, a new stricter code pertaining 
particularly to women-dress, and office conditions was suddenly promulgated. Such 
developments, according to Woodward, made it unclear how far there is a hidden 
ideological agenda unfolding; how far a small group are taking ad hoc and/or pragmatic 
decisions on ideological matters; and how far there really is a degree of ideological doubt 
in the regime which would be receptive to some inputs from Sudanese society more 
generaRy. 
With regard to the economy, Woodward said, the developments of the late 1970s have 
largely continued. Thus, the 'Islamisation' of the economy through the banking and credit 
system is not new. The Islamists may be just as much perceived as milking what they can 
from the economy by controlling currency, community markets, foreign trade and aid, as 
did those who ruled before them. The combination of the slide into civil war, economic 
collapse and general political incompetence throughout the 1980s had long left Sudan 
increasingly isolated and marginalised. 
Bereft of resources, and with accelerating inflation, there was, in Woodward's view, little 
with which to win support. Education and the media may be used for the purpose of 
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achieving Islamic objectives, but while the quantity of the former may have expanded, its 
quality is widely believed to be in sharp decline. Coercion may repress opposition, 
according to Woodward, but it is hardly likely to cement the state in place especially in 
such a heterogeneous and historically lightly governed country. International isolation will 
not also make the task any easier. 
Bona Malwal (14) presented what in his view is at stake in Sudanese politics. He focused 
his attention in the north-south Sudan relationship. In his point of view the mistrust 
between the north and the south is a general problem; it has not just arisen with the 
present Islamic fimdamentahsts but is at the heart of the Sudanese conflict. No northern 
political party or leadership is prepared to concede anything approaching equality to the 
south. According to him most northerners seem to believe that the south must remain part 
of Sudan, but that southerners must accept that they are not equal of northerners, and that 
the north must remain in control of the country. The north is very suspicious about what 
the south might do with its power given half a chance. The northerners believe that the 
south seeks every opportunity to break away from the north and that the only way to 
ensure that this does not occur is for the north to maintain a strong military and security 
presence in the south, to thwart any such attempts and to maintain the union by force. 
Bona Malwal argues that the Islamic ftmdamentalists use the role of Islam as an excuse 
with which to disguise Arab racism. The apparent debate about the role of Islam in the 
politics of Sudan today is not basically a genuine religious call of duty but a strategy to 
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dominate and control the Sudanese politics and the state. This is how the religious conflict 
in the Sudan should be understood, he said. 
Graham F. Thomas' books (15) discuss the political conflicts in the Sudan from the year 
1950 to 1989. He apparently focused very particular interest in the Sadiq al-Mahdi's 
government possibly as being his personal friend. In general he said the governmen in the 
Sudan was sliding from one crisis to another. There was no effective government, and 
chaos and disorder were widespread phenomena. He mentioned the open criticism of the 
internal and external policies being pursued by Sadiq al-Mahdi between the year 1986 and 
1989ý in particular the fact that nothing had been achieved economically. Agreement with 
the IW was elusive and the inftastructure had collapsed. 
Close examination of the structure of the democratic governmen headed by Sadiq al- 
Mahdi,, indicated a total lack of stability, according to Thomas's analysis. By the time, for 
instance, the fourth fist of Cabinet members was issued in March 1989 only three of the 
original 1986 Council members remained in major posts, and even these had been moved 
to other departments. Not only had there been major reshuffles of posts, but the Ministries 
themselves had been re-cast, necessitating even more changes. The prime pre-occupation 
of the government, according to Thomas's assessment, was simply to survive and none of 
the major problems were being addressed. 
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As well as existing within the context of recent literature on Sudanese politics the subject 
of this thesis demonstrates a modem phenomenon which indicates on example of intra- 
national conflict. As such it has a place within modem studies of ethnic conflicts. There 
has been several studies carried out about ethnic conflicts,, not specifically directed to the 
ethnic situation in the Sudan, but which have a relation to the state of ethnicity in the 
contemporary Sudan. A study carried out by an American sociologist, Melville Dalton, is 
relevant to the ethnic conflict. In a book based on his long experience as a participant and 
observer in six business firms (Men who Manage, 1959) Dalton offered a revealing picture 
of organizational structure in terms of conflicting cliques and their interminable struggles 
for gaining more power and ensuring a greater share of organizational rewards. Even if 
sometimes exaggerated, the analysis showed in a striking way to what extent organization 
members and groups can be primarily interested in the pursuit of their narrow interest and 
the consolidation and improvement of their own power position, even at the expense of 
wider organizational interests (16). This analysis has some semblance to the situation in 
the Sudan in terms of the use of religion and ethnic identity to hold to political powers in 
the country. 
Donald L. Horowitz explains ethnic conffict in terms of modernization theory. He defines 
conflict as a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to 
neutralize or eliminate rivals. Horowitz attributes conflict to uneven distribution of 
economic and educational opportunities in the modem sector. The fiwdamental 
assumption underlying modernization theories has been articulated in terms of converging 
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aspirations: "People's aspirations and expectations change as they are mobilized into the 
modernizing economy and polity. Men enter into conflict not because they are different 
but because they are essentially the same. It is by making men more alike in the sense of 
possessing the same wants that modernization tends to promote conflict" (17). One 
further instance of the use of modernization theories is that because some groups gain a 
headstart in the competition for the rewards of modem world, the social classes that 
emerge tend to overlap and reinforce ethnic group boundaries, thereby making ethnic 
group confrontations more intense (18). This theory partly fits well in terms of northem 
and southern Sudan conflict situation where the northern Sudan had greater advantages in 
terms of modem sector of development. 
Ethnically divided societies have a problem of achieving equity and maintaining national 
cohesion. The position of ethnicity as presented by Bacchus (1989) is that "there is 
enough evidence to support the view that the achievement of equity and maintenance of 
cultural diversity in multi-ethnic societies are not only desirable objectives in their own 
right but are also important prerequisites for achieving social stability and sustained social 
and economic development of these societies (19). However, as argued by Watson, 
", which policies are pursued will depend upon how the majority views its own economic, 
political and/or cultural position vis- -vis other groups in society, how it perceives the 
socio-economic development of that society and how the minority groups respond" (20). 
How the minority respond to the policies may well depend upon how far they perceive 
these policies as improving or hindering their position within the society. In the case of the 
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Sudan where the relationship between the northern and southern Sudan has been most of 
the time antagonistic, the perception by the Southern Sudanese of the northern policies has 
been that of hindering their development. There is presumably a high degree of 
unvMfingness to compromise on the existing prejudices and assumptions. This is speciaffy 
so because of the stress placed by the national government upon the dominant religion as a 
basis for national unity and national integration. One would agree with Watson that where 
integration is the policy pursued educational diversity wiH no be recognized. Tlie long- 
term aim of both politicians and educationists is that minorities will gradually become 
integrated into the social and political framework of the majority with future generations 
becoming assimilated (21). On reflection, this is the conception the central governmein in 
the Sudan has in their relentless insistence in pursuing their centralizing policies. 
Watson has also identified one of the most effective strategies used in most developed and 
developing countries to bring about national unity. "The most effective long-term 
educational measures to achieve national unity have been to use the curriculum and the 
svllabuses of individual subjects taught, reinforced through the state's control of I -- 
examination system and policy towards national language provision" (22). The Sudan 
government has attempted to employ these policies and this has been apparently one of the 
key factors in educational policies related to the key educational areas. 
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2.3. J-USTIEFICATION OF THIS Eli-VESTIGATION AND WHY THE 
EMPIRICAL STUDY TOOK PLACE IN UK. 
The structure of this thesis has been influenced by the availability of sources and the 
convenience of carrying out the empirical work within the United Kingdom (UK). This 
research could not have been easily carried out within the Sudan because of a number of 
reasons. The first is the question of the interplay between the researcher and the current 
government (the policy-makers). The existing conflicts between the southern and the 
northern Sudan as reflected in the present on-going war in the country would not have 
provided a safe atmosphere for the researcher to carry out the empirical work without 
security risk. The researcher was a Headteacher for Secondary School in the Southern 
Sudan for a period of seven years (1978-1985). He held a number of other posts in the 
Regional Ministry of Education thereafter; this included the posts of Deputy Director for 
Administration (1985-1987); Director of Research and Educational Documentation (1987- 
1989); Director of Plannin and Development Administration. He represented the 
Equatoria State Ministry of Education in a Coordination Meeting of Directors General of 
Education in the Sudan in Khartoum (Feb. 1991). He was the only person who strongly 
opposed the new Islamic educational policies which were being introduced at that time. 
All the Directors General who attended the meeting were of Islamic background. His 
opposition to the Islamic education policies created an unfavoufable relation between him 
as the educational planner for the Equatoria State and his Minister who was an Islamic 
fimdamentalist. 
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Education is one of the main issues of contention in the present crisis in the country and is 
also central to the current Islamic fimdamentalist ideological attempt to mould an Islamic 
society in the Sudan. The nature of the research and what it intends to investigate would 
not therefore fit in the educational programmes of the government. The question that 
would have been asked would be what the findings of the study would be used for. The 
present government of the Sudan censors researches on policy issues because it has got its 
own agenda of how the policies for the country, including educational policies, are to be 
developed and what trends they should take. Generally educational policy issues are areas 
which are not subjected to open discussion in the Sudan as this would provide avenues for 
challenging the official views of the government on educational matters. This can be 
reflected in the absence of detailed analysis of the educational policies in the available 
literature on policies in the Sudan. The researches which are aRowed are those whose 
findings are expected to justify or reinforce the trends that the government has already set 
itself to achieve or follow. The term for such research will not provide a sufficient degree 
of freedom to ensure that the work is genuinely conditioned by curiousity, freedom to 
establish the researcher's own research methods, and freedom in the nature of presentation 
and dissemination of the results. 
The censorship by the Sudanese governmein of most of its policy issues is extended even 
to the control of its documentation within certain organizations within and outside the 
Sudan. The ODA Library in Glasgow, for instance, contains a large number of reports and 
journal articles about Sudanese educational policies but access to them have been severely 
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restricted. Out of the 42 journal articles and consultants' reports identified as available in 
that Library, the researcher was granted access to only seven of the reports and journals. 
Access could not be availed to him to the rest of the reports and articles because the 
Sudan governmeia has commissioned their uses (23). The Senior Education Adviser in 
ODA reported that at the present moment the Sudan Government has very poor relations 
with the British governmen and several world organizations, as a result it is quite 
reluctant to allow the exposure of its policies through the available documentation with 
such organizations. The researcher was advised to seek clearance from the Sudanese 
government. The researcher believes that such clearance would not have been granted to 
him. Consequently, because of this restrictions, there is too little awareness of the real 
context in which the Sudanese governmen has developed its educational policies. This has 
led to ill-informed policies especially in relation to the southern. Sudan. 
Research on educational policy is regarded with suspicion in the Sudan because of the 
political and religious context in which they have been made. The education system in the 
Sudan has been one of the principal instruments through which the Islamic system has 
been sustained and perpetuated in the country. It has always remained a central political 
issue and has been perceived by A the political parties in the Sudan as a terrain over 
which political struggle occur. 
There is a significant reason why the study focuses mainly on the southern Sudan. It is 
intended to fill in the gaps in the present knowledge of the educational policies and 
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practice in the Sudan in terms of the southern Sudan and help to underline the basic 
problems affecting educational development in the southern Sudan. The researcher is 
aware of the fact that the present Sudan government would not be interested in the 
findings of this research and it would not make any difference to the educational practice 
of the government. But the research is important in the sense that it provides a vital insight 
into the Sudanese educational practices and sets a basis upon which future action will 
unfold in terms of development of education in the southern Sudan, for instance, when it 
gets separated from the northern Sudan. 
The research has also been influenced by a sensitivity to the area of policy in regards to the 
Sudanese politics. The sensitivity of the policy area would not have allowed respondents 
within the Sudan to be at ease to freely provide answers to the questions relevant to the 
research area. Fortunately, the researcher has discovered a number of Sudanese resources 
available within UK who are in a position to provide adequate information in regard to the 
research area. The selection of the persons to be interviewed was therefore based on the 
individual person's knowledge of the Sudanese educational policies. Those interviewed 
were regarded as having had empirical knowledge of particular areas of educational policy 
or being in position of influence with regards to educational policies in the Sudan. Some of 
these persons had played key roles in the development of government policies. They are 
therefore in a position to provide information and unique insight into the educational 
policy issues in the Sudan which could not have been easily provided if the interviews 
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were conducted within the Sudan. The researcher was able to identify 39 of such persons 
available for the interview within UK 
2.4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: 
The choice of a research method for this study was determined partly by the nature of its 
subject matter and partly by the situation of Sudanese politics and its relationship with the 
researcher at the time. The subject matter is clearly educational policy and it must 
therefore be governed by the traditions of policy research. But unfortunately little has been 
written about policy research in the field of education. Standard education research 
textbooks (Louis Cohen and Lawrence Manion, 1992; Torsten. Hosen and Maurice 
Kogan, 1984; Rene Sarah and Vernon Trafford, 1990) discuss historical research, survey 
research, and describe different techniques related to this subject matter such as archival 
and questionnaire oriented methods. Policy research has been defined as the process of 
conducting research on, or analysis of, a fimdamental social problem in order to provide 
policy-makers with pragmatic, action-oriented recommendations for aReviating the 
problem (24). Doing policy research for problem definitional purpose has been described 
by Weiss (1977) as the "enlightenment fiwction" of social research (25). An example of a 
policy research study for definitional purposes is described by James Coleman (1975) in 
his famous study on the equality of educational opportunity. Coleman made the 
observation that major contribution of his study was to help policy-makers define 
educational inequality. Previously, inequality had been defined solely in terms of the 
amount of resources that were put into educational system. Coleman's study helped to 
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shift attention and understanding away from input and toward the unequal effects of the 
resources on the children. Therefore, many policy research studies may actually focus 
primarily on shaping policy-makers' understanding of the social problems, and by doing 
so, make the causes and alternative solutions clearer (26). 
Policy research may be considered as a branch of contemporary history because much of 
the evidences are derived from written sources such as regulations, acts, and policy 
statements. It indicates for instance who took part in devising policy; who took part in 
implementing policy and who were affected by the implementation of the policy. In fact as 
mentioned by Richardson and Jordan (1979), policy-making has to take account of how it 
will be implemented, who will implement it and who will be recruited and motivated to 
help in its implementation. The policy-maker who fails to think about the impact on clients 
or likely response of practitioners in the field wil-I not be making policy that wiH work (27). 
Methods include archival (desk) research, individual testimonies from questionnaires, and 
individual interviews. If possible triangulation should involved all of these methods 
measured against each other, and triangulation would also require a variety of witnesses 
whose testimonies can be measured against each other. The problems with written 
questionnaires, especiaUy in the subject area as this, are that they provide no immediate 
feedback as in the case of interviews which permit one to follow-up leads and thus 
permitting much greater depth and clarity. Questionnaires are framed with specific 
answers in mind, to which the respondent replies with a selection from a number of short 
responses. They can be usefully employed in surveys of opinion about previously known 
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and agreed phenomena. Questionnaires cannot however be exploratory: cannot thereby 
attract answers which the questioner has not previously thought about. Questionnaires 
also have the weakness of not probing deeply enough to provide a true picture of the 
situations studied. The flexibility and adaptability and human interaction that are unique 
strengths of the interview also allow subjectivity and possible bias that in some research 
situation are its greatest weakness (28). 
Ideally the empirical research should have taken place in the Sudan where a cross-section 
of the population, particularly the policy-makers like the Ministers and civil servants well 
placed in the policy-making positions, plus the teachers and, could have been involved in 
the research. This has not been possible because of the prevailing political and security 
situation in the Sudan. The choice of witnesses was therefore necessarily limited by the 
need to be restricted to those living at present in the United Kingdom (UK). The chosen 
methods for this research were a Enited amount of desk research and interviews of 
witnesses. The researcher had chosen interview approach to this research mainly because 
of the limited number of the well informed respondents available in LTK The researcher 
would not like to lose the valuable information the respondents may possess by unduly 
constraining their responses. The use of the interview method enabled the researcher to 
obtain information that would probably not have been provided if questionnaires or 
other methods were used. The interview questions were focused toward eliciting the 
respondents knowledge on: 
1. The Sudanese educational policies. 
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2. How the policies were implemented. 
What were the impact and implications of the policies on the development 
of education in the southem Sudan. 
The verbal questions were open-ended so as to enable the respondent to provide the 
researcher with much factual information they know about the Sudanese educational 
policies during the period under review. To substitute for open questions as stated by 
Janet Buttolph Johnson and Richard A. Joslyn, the researcher would need to lengthen the 
questionnaires with endless lists of multiple choice and agreed/disagree statements, which 
are then handled by sophisticated data-processing analytical techniques to try to massage 
some pattern or meaning out of the huge mass of pre-coded and punched data (29). Open- 
ended questions eliminate the need for several closed questions and that subsequent data 
analysis becomes clear and easy. 
Before practically carrying out the empirical research, the researcher had taken the task of 
identifying possible individuals within W who are assumed to have some knowledge of 
the Sudanese educational policies. These were done mainly through some Sudanese 
organizations and communities and friends in UK. Initially 152 persons, of various 
professional backgrounds, were identified. This number was later shortlisted to 45 persons 
based on their presumed knowledge related to the educational policies. The questions and 
the methods to be employed were signaled to the participants in advance, mainly through 
telephone. All, except two, had accepted to be interviewed. This then led to the researcher 
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scheduling the dates and possible times to interview the individual persons who accepted 
to take part in the interview. 
The interviews,, which lasted from the middle of January to the middle of September 1994, 
were tape-recorded. Pei-mission for the tape-recording was sought from the individual 
from the initial start of the interview. Four persons had declined to be tape-recorded. In 
this case the researcher had to take notes of the interviews. The resulting interview 
audiotapes and written notes were transcribed into proper script and provides a testimony 
of those interviewed. This coflection will be deposited in the Department Library of the 
University of Leeds, School of Education for use by other researchers. 
Tape-recording had the advantage of obtaining all the information of each of the individual 
respondent verbatim, and allowed the tape-recorded data to be played back more than 
once and thus enabled thorough study of the testimonies provided by the respondents. 
During the process of interviewing it made it possible for the researcher to give thought to 
what the interviewee was saying and enable him to formulate follow-up questions. 
However the tape recording had a number of disadvantages. The disadvantages included 
the fact that everything said by the individual respondent was recorded. The material 
recorded were then transcribed and read before useful data were at hand. It was an 
expensive exercise in terms of the fimds, i. e. to obtain the machine and A its accessories. 
Secondly it took quite a long time and required a lot of patience to have them transcribed, 
leave alone the ear-aching exercise of listening to all the tapes. Tbirdly there was the 
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problem of finding a conducive atmosphere to carry out the recording without undue 
interruption, especially in family homes where the presence of the small children was 
sometimes difficult to avoid. One other principal disadvantage of using a tape-recorder 
with the mterview,, as mentioned by Walter R- Borg and Meredith D. Gall (1989), which 
was observable in few cases during the interview, was that the presence of the tape 
recorder changed the interview situation or the mode of the interviewee to some degree. 
However despite these problems, over 90% of the interviews were successfully conducted 
without much interference. 
One other basic problem encountered was related to the expenses incurred in the process 
of traveling almost all over the LTK to carry out the interviews. In order to complete the 
interviews the researcher had to travel to a number of cities in the UK, sometimes more 
than once. 'Me researcher traveled to the following cities in the whole course of the 
interviews: London,, Reading, Oxford, Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Blackburn, 
Durham, Edinburgh, and Glasgow. 
One other significant problem encountered was that despite the fact that the individuals 
selected for the interviews were informed quite in advar4ce a number of them did not sort 
themselves out for the day of the interview. This fact underlines one of the reasons why 
the researcher did not opt for the questionnaire approach for the fear of low returns. This 
could be attributed to the preoccupation of the individuals to other pressing problems and 
needs in the environment in which they reside. 
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2.5. COMMENTS AND OBSERVATION: 
The responses and what had influenced the responses reflected very much on the political 
orientation and cultural inclination of the individuals and from which part of the Sudan the 
individuals come. The refusal rates by people to be interviewed and the presumed reasons 
for refusal reflect also the same orientation. The political judgments are possibly 
permeated by the sense of the past in assessing the motives of the research, rather than on 
the merits of the research. Three persons (aH from the northern Sudan) have refused to be 
interviewed although they have initially accepted the researcher's request to interview 
them. These three persons belong to the National Islamic Front, the party of the present 
Fundamentalist Islamic government of the Sudan. This is quite understandable in the 
Sudanese situation where different value judgments opposed to each other exist in the 
country, especiafly between the north and the south. Within the context of the present 
Islamic government the policies being implemented cannot be inconsistent with the socio- 
economic, religious, political and military strategies of the National Islamic Front (30). 
The assumption is that the exposure of the real context of the government policies througb 
such research would increase the already existing polarization in the country and 
undermine the government-intended policy drives. Out of the 39 persons finaUy 
interviewed only seven were from the northern Sudan. 
Though the pohtical differences in the Sudanese politics, especiaRy between the northern 
and southern Sudan, seemed to have affected the responses of some of the respondents, 
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the research has revealed significant factual information related to the educational policies 
in the Sudan that was not easily obtainable before. It is assumed that this will contribute 
sipificantly to the future development of educational policies in the southern Sudan in 
particular. 
The following table shows the categories of the respondents to the interview. 
TABLE 1. TIHE RESPONDENTS TO THE INTERVIEW 
OCCUPATION: NUM13ER: REMARKS: 
1. School Teachers 5 
2. University Lecturers 18 Some of these have been previously school 
teachers. 
3.. Politicians 5 These include former Vice President of the 
Republic of the Sudan and former President of 
the Southern Regional Government; Governor 
of Regional State; and National and Regional 
Ministers. 
4. Others 11 
5. TOTAL 39 
The next chapter analyses one of the specific policy areas - Universal Primary Education in 
the Sudan. It points out that though universal primary education has been considered as a 
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desirable and basic form of education for the majority of education, the implementation of 
the pohcy has not been easy to reahzed. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
UNIVERSAIL PREMLARY EDUCATION IN THE SUDAN 
3.1. INTRODUCTION. 
Most of the governments of the African and other third world countries have the desire to 
offer basic education to A their citizens but the ways and means of achieving the objective 
have not been easy to come by. The meeting of the Affican Ministers of Education in 
Addis Ababa in 1961 noted that education was a fimdamental ingiredient in social and 
economic development of the African countries. They resolved that basic education should 
gradually expand so that by 1980 universal primary education could be achieved (1). The 
question of how the initiative and the implementation of the programmes were to be 
carried out was left to the individual country using its own devices, since the conditions 
and environment in each of the countries varied. The Sudanese national governmen , 
in its 
Five-Year Plan (1972-1977), had the provision of the universal primary education as one 
of its long term goals (2). Its plan was to achieve a nationwide enrollment of 60% for the 
primary schooling by 1977 and universalisation of primary education to be achieved by 
1992 (3). It did not however define how this was going to be achieved in such a country 
as the Sudan with its heterogeneous population and environment as well as wide 
diversities in the provision of education. What was apparent was that no research was 
undertaken in particular to determine the possibility of success in the implementation of 
the plan and the back-up services that might be required to the system 
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The UN Inter-Agency Team (11,0) that carried out a study connected to growth, 
employment and equity in the Sudan in 1975 noted, from the onset of the introduction of 
the policy for the implementation of the primary education, that the achievement of 
universal primary education in the Sudan at the earliest possible date had no reasonable 
prospect of being realized without a change in policy that was being pursued by the 
Sudanese government and without a complete break from the trends of enrollment (4). 
The trend of education taken by the Sudanese government did not take into consideration 
the realities of the educational needs in the various parts of the Sudan. The educational 
policies developed in the Sudan have been influenced by educational policy developments 
in the Arab world which focused more towards the Arab strategy for the development of 
education. The difficulties that the governmein was bound to face were clear from the 
existence of regional disparities in the enrollments of the school aged children. For 
instance, though the southern region housed about 25% of the population of the Sudan in 
1972, the ratio of registration for the primary school was only 8.2% (5). There was also an 
imbalance between the urban and rural areas. For instance, although about 79% of the 
population lived in the later its share of education was less than 30%. 
One of the main reasons for the air of pessimism about the trend taken by the government 
was attributed to the national policy geared towards the establishment of Arab culture and 
Islamic faith through education. This approach was irrelevant to the southern region and 
the response from that end to the sort of education provided was largely negative. For 
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instance President Nimeiry, in his speech about the new educational policy in 1970, stated 
that his education revolution was intended to enable the Sudanese nation to play its role in 
diflusing the Arab culture and the principles of the Islamic faith throughout the Aftican 
continent (7). The educational programme of the revolution stressed the social and 
cultural importance of Arabic (8). This policy trend was bound to come into conflict with 
the southern cultures and therefore alienated the southern part of the country from the 
main stream of the national education. 
The orientation of the policy of education towards the Arab World has been reflected in 
the content of the curriculum provided for the school throughout the period under review. 
The policy direction has remained unchanged for all this period. The national government 
probably found it difficult to reconcile its Arab World interest with the relevant 
educational needs for development throughout the country. This insistence is clear from 
the report of the ODA/BC Adviser in Public Administration and Management 
Development in 1987, ten years after the report given by the UN Inter-Agency Team. This 
later report stated that 'the target for universal primary education cannot be achieved for a 
long time to come" for the same reasons as provided by the UN Inter-Agency Team. It 
ftu-ther stated that there were insufficient fimds to expand pritmry education to reach 
100% or even 90% enrollment rates before the year 2000. The whole educational 
development strategy was based on the optimistic financial presumptions that were not 
easy to realize e. g. the dependence on local government fimding, self-help fimding and 
external contributions. The ODA/BC Adviser therefore stated that "the achievement of 
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universal primary education at the earliest possible date has no reasonable prospect of 
being achieved without a change in the policy of the national government" (9). The 
national government has apparently been reluctant to provide a real breakthrough in the 
search for ideal system that embody the wide diversities in the country. 
The management structure of the education system in the country as a whole is top-heavy 
and highly centralized, with little room for regional government, parents, teachers and 
other members of the community to participate in the education of the children. There was 
lack of a well-defined policy regarding the development of the relevant and viable 
alternative educational policy that would take account of the traditional societies in the 
southern Sudan. Such a state was not therefore conducive to motivating parents, 
particularly those in the rural areas, to send their children to school. 
3.2. PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 
The national government had intended to raise the ratio of acceptance of children aged 7 
into the first grade of primary schools from 45.7% in 1975/76 to 100% in 1990/91. The 
southern and western parts of the Sudan at this time had less than 10% enroibnent rates. 
In 1974/75 the total number of pupils in the primary schools for the whole of the Sudan 
was 1,249,43 1. This number of pupils increased to 1,491,704 in 1980/8 1, a rise of 7.2%. 
In 1990/91 the number went up to 2,079,649, an increase of 39% over the 1980/81 figure. 
This was relative to the population increase in the country and represented only 18% of 
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the total population of the children under 15 years, estimated at this time at 11,300,000 
(10). 
There were great disparities in the enrollment of school age children between the various 
parts of the country. The north and the east enrofled about three times as high a 
proportion of children as the west, and the southern region only enrolled about one sixth 
as many as the rest of the country (11). Table two below shows this variation. 
T ABLE 2: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PUPILS IN THE PRINLkRY SCHOOLS 
IN THE SUDAN, 1974/75-1980/8 1: 
REGION 1974/75 1977/78 1980/81 
NORTHERN 175411 198581 181273 
CENTRAL 397557 429489 456494 
EASTERN 120397 124680 141486 
KORDOFAN 150339 173623 218492 
DARFUR 92065 81071 137310 
KHARTOUM 192982 169394 214051 
SUB/TOTAL 
N. SUDAN 1128751 1176838 1349106 
UPPER NILE 26059 20693 32431 
BAHR EL GHAZAL 41168 28114 32491 
EQUATORIA 53363 48307 77676 
SUB/TOTAL 
S. SUDAN 120590 97114 142598 
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TOTAL-SUDAN 1249341 1273952 1491704 
Source: The Department of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1975, Table W. 7,1981. 
In 1975/76 approximately 97,000 children were enrolled in the government maintained 
primary schools in the southern Sudan. This number represented less than 22% of the total 
primary school age children in the south Sudan, which represents less that 10% of the 
national enrollment. The total number of the school age children was estimated as 446,664 
(12). The average enrollment rate in the northern Sudan as a whole in the same year was 
more than 50%. 
The proportion of the primary school age group (7-12) actually attending schools also 
varied considerably from one province to another in the southem Sudan. For instance the 
Lakes Province had 12.4% enrollment,, Bahr El Ghazal Province 12.8%, Jonglei Province 
13.6%,, Western Equatoria Province 39.6%, and Eastern Equatoria Province 40.8%. 
There were 445 primary schools in the southern Sudan in the year 1975/76 and a total of 
2J99 classes. These number of classes did not represent however the actual number of 
classrooms. There were classes of pupils with no classrooms and schooling was 
undertaken out of doors. There were also other premises where two sessions of schooling 
took place and the same classroom being used daily by two separate classes (13). All these 
situations were indicative of the problems the government was to have been faced with in 
the implementation of the universal primary school policy in the southern Sudan in 
particular. There has not been any indication that the government took into consideration 
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these problems before setting the target date for the achievement of universalisation in the 
colmtry. 
The provinces with the low rates of en-roflment were those where cattle herding is the main 
preoccupation of the tribal people. This suggests that labour requirements linked with 
cattle herding, the traditional migratory patterns associated with grazing of cattle at 
diffiefent seasons, the tribal customs and the parental attitudes were all contributory factors 
that limited the number of children sent to schools. These factors determined the low 
levels of demands and support for schooling (14) in the western sense of formal education. 
Controlling the migratory movement of these tribes would entail the provision of 
permanent areas for pastures and water. The regional government neither had the ftwds 
nor others means to persuade the parents to send their children to school or to support the 
policy of the universal primary education. It was not even easy for the regional 
government to develop the patterns of schooling that would meet the special social and 
economic conditions of these people. The orientation of the national education policies 
towards the Arab backgrounds would also mean that there would be some discrepancy 
between the values taught in the school and the dominant values of the societies in the 
southern Sudan. These societies did not conceive of the education provided as part of a 
series of socio-economic changes designed to bring about real improvement in their 
material and cultural conditions. This meant that the setting of targets for the achievement 
of universal primary education was inconceivable (15). There was lack of political will 
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right from the start to develop an awareness and understanding of the environmental, 
cultural, economic and social problems existing in the various parts of the country. 
Another important constraint in the implementation of the universal primary education 
policy especially in the southern Sudan was the number and quality of the teachers 
available. The number of teachers employed in the govern ment-maint ain ed primary 
schools in the south Sudan in 1975/76 was 2460 for 2199 classes. This gave a ratio of 
about 1.1 teacher to a class. This was indicative of a heavy teaching load for the teachers. 
Apart fi-om. the inadequate number of the teachers available the quality was as well poor. 
Nearly 46% of the teachers were untrained. The cattle herding provinces had more 
untrained teachers than the trained ones. This was because many teachers were reluctant 
to go to teach in those provinces (16). 
'Me only areas in the southern Sudan where the prospect for universal primary education 
was relatively possible were the provinces of Eastern and Western Equatoria. A study on 
'Demand and Supply of Educational Facilities in the Sudan" between 1973-1986, revealed 
a rapid quantitative expansion in education in Equatoria (17). The enrolhnent of the school 
aged population (7-12) had reached 60% in 1985/86. The total number of the primary 
schools reached about 400 in the same year. However this upward trend of enrollment was 
interrupted by the intensification of the war in the country between the national 
government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army which forced ahnost all the schools 
in the area to close. As a result, from 1986 to 1991, the total number of the primary 
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schools in the area dropped from 400 to only 72 i. e. almost 82% drop from the 1985 
figure (18). The number of the pupils had also drastically dropped. Despite this adverse 
development resulting in massive defense and national security costs leave alone the 
mounting debts and lack of adequate resources, the national government in 1990 came up 
with a new target date, 1993, for the achievement of universal primary education in the 
country. It is difficult to gauge the logic behind the setting of this new target time. 
3.3. THE UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION SITUATION IN THE 
SOUTHERN SUDAN. 
The implementation of the universal primary education in the southern Sudan had a 
remoter chance of success than anywhere in the country. The southern Sudan is the 
poorest part of the country and much of it has remained inaccessible to modem influences 
and the established government schools. It is as well the least developed area in the 
country. The former Vice President of the Republic of the Sudan and a former President 
of the Southern Sudan Regional Government (1978) attributed the lack of the educational 
development in the southern Sudan to the policy and attitudes of the national government 
towards education in the southern Sudan. He said "the ruling elites in Khartoum are 
opposed to the expansion of education in the southern Sudan because this was going to 
deprive them of their educational monopoly and would awaken the southerners to demand 
for their rights. The northern government was therefore determined to keep the south 
105 
down educationally through such devices as the imposition of Arabic, the lack of good 
teachers, irrelevant learning and teaching materials and control of ftmds for educational 
development in the south Sudan" (20). However, although the major block in the 
educational development in the southern Sudan was the national government, about three 
quarters of the researcher's interviewees had blamed the southern regional government 
and the southern politicians for not having played their roles well enough to effect changes 
in education in the southern Sudan. For instance,, although the national government came 
up with the policy of universal primary education, however unrealistic this might have 
been,, the regional government on its part never seriously studied or analyzed the policy in 
order to devise a better approach in implementing the policy in the southern Sudan. The 
regional government never informed the citizens of the south about the policy (21). It did 
not also have clear agenda of how education was to be developed in the southern Sudan 
(22). The politicians focused much of their attention to the survival of their individual 
interests. The southern political parties on the other hand were there "to create faces" for 
election into offices and once that was achieved they succumbed to what the national 
government directed them to do irrespective of its relevance to educational development 
in the southern Sudan (23). "They do not want to be left out" (24). 
There was, in general, a lack of political will on the part of the southern regional 
government and the southern politicians to press for the improvement of education in the 
southern Sudan. For instance the regional govemment provided no explanation about the 
significance of the policy of universal primary education and did not initiate discussion 
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about the general framework with the implementers of the policy e. g. the teachers, the 
area education officers, the local chiefs and the parents who were particularly influential 
among the rural population (25). These groups of people were not aware of what roles 
they were to play in the implementation process of the policy. Like the national 
government the regional government did not carry out any feasibility study or any kind of 
research into how best the policy could be handled and what pace the implementation of 
the policy could take especially in regard to the semi-nomadic tribes. This was necessary in 
order to employ a suitable approach or procedure to initiate the programme in the region 
(26). The regional government therefore, like the national government, lacked accurate 
statistics for the school age children and others factors that could have formed the bases 
for the implementation of the programmes (27). 
The former governor of Equatoria State (1989) and a one time Minister of Education for 
the same state (1986) stated that the needed data of the school aged children could not be 
collected because of lack of manpower to carry that out (28). Universal primary education 
could not be effectively undertaken without knowing the needs of the local communities 
through an effective inspectorate (29). This was a basic problem in the system of 
education in the southern Sudan according to the Governor. Funding was not also made 
available to the regional government for the implementation of the universal primary 
education programmes and moreover the south did not have a guaranteed source of 
raising revenue locally (30). One of the weaknesses that the former Minister of Education 
mentioned was that the Regional Ministry of Education had spent greater efforts in 
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strengthening the positions in the headquarters of the Ministry and thus ignored the vital 
areas of education such as the Inspectorate and Teacher Training Departments (3 1). These 
were supposed to be the essential Departments for the implementation of the universal 
primary education policy. 
The haphazard plan of education in the south especially in terms of realizing universal 
primary education has been shown in the location of the primary schools in the region. The 
government educational plan, particularly in choosing the location of schools, has been 
political in the sense that the politicians decided the building of schools simply for the sake 
of getting votes (32). Concentration of schools were more in the urban areas than in the 
rural areas. Some of the schools found in the rural areas were constructed without taking 
into consideration the catchment areas for the pupils to feed the schools. For instance the 
government had built a number of schools in the Kapoeta area but no educational activities 
were taking place in thern, e. g. the schools at Iwato, Pariga, and Tijeye. There were 
neither pupils nor teachers in those schools. The schools at Iwato and Moboya were 
located in the middle of no man's land though they were more beautiful than even the 
University of Juba (33). 
The Toposa and the Boya tribes who occupy greater area of Kapoeta Province have no 
desire or incentive to send their children to schools. These attitudes also apply to the other 
pastoralist tfibes like the Dinka, Shifluk, Nuef, Murle, Anywak and Latuho. These tfibes 
prefer their children to look after the cattle. In order to succeed in educating the Toposa 
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people, for example, you need first to settle them while gradually introducing them to the 
new way of life (34). These tribes have their unique ways of life which required a different 
approach. A proper research at the initial stage would have been necessary to assess the 
possibilities of carrying this out. The main sources of attraction to them are grazing land 
and water (35). Increasing the size of enrollment of children into the primary schools 
among these tribes therefore entailed the digging of wells to provide water for the cattle 
and for the growing of pastures around them (36), which the government was not able to 
provide. This would reduce the amount of their movement and thereby availing the 
opportunity to provide some form of formal primary education to the children (37). The 
second factor would have been to use the vernacular as a language of instruction. This 
would require having teachers who were capable to teach in those vernaculars. No 
provisions have been made in the government educational system for the training of the 
vernacular teachers in the Sudan. The third essential strategy, which was of crucial 
importance, could have been to provide more boarding schools (38). In the past, a few 
boarding schools were provided but were mainly confined to pupils in the urban areas. 
This policy was later scrapped by the government because of lack of fimds to sustain 
them. The absence of boarding schools and local initiatives, i. e. the active involvement of 
the local chiefs,, meant that getting the children to schools from such tribes was difficult 
(39). There were no incentives that could have motivated the parents to send their children 
to schools (40). The goveniment was not in a position to provide answers to the question 
of pasture and water, two important factors that guided the lives and movements of the 
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tribes (41). There was therefore no basic ground for any success of the policy of the 
universal primary education. There was no way of how it could be enforced. 
One of the mistakes that have been existing in the Southern Regional Government was 
that of being complacent in accepting any Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) to 
carry out its own projects without concern for the regional needs and regional priorities in 
the field of development (42). Normally the Regional Government called meetings of 
Cabinet Ministers or those connected to policy decisions to hurriedly evaluate NGO 
projects and readily accepted them without proper study of how the project would be 
incorporated into the general development framework of the southern region (43). This 
has been clearly demonstrated in the projects of the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) that 
operated in the Eastern Equatoria Province. The NCA took up an educational project 
which was entitled 'Educational Support Project". This was originally intended to provide 
support to the existing regional government educational programmes. But the Regional 
Ministry of Education provided no guidelines of operation for the NCA (44). In the 
absence of the government's educational plan of work the NCA developed it own plans of 
action which were presented to the governmen and were endorsed without any change 
(45). 'Mere was no monitoring and inspection of the NCA educational activities by the 
Regional Ministry of Education. This resulted in the NCA locating schools in the locations 
of their choice not necessarily where the government wanted the schools to be located. 
This resulted in some schools being located in areas where the demand was low or 
motivation for education was not available (46). For instance the schools built in Imurok 
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area had no pupils to use them In Kiela, the people actually burned the school desks to 
use as firewood for cooking (47). In a way the educational activities of the NCA were not 
properly directed by the governmen for a long term educational impact e. g. in effecting 
universal primary education programmes. 
Paradoxically in the areas where the parents had great interests to send their children to 
schools e. g. in the Achoh, Madi and Bari lands, not enough schools were provided to 
suffice their needs. Ile local council educational institutions in the rural areas that were 
meant to be the main organs for the implementation of the universal primary education 
policy were crippled by financial constraints and other basic institutional infrastructures 
such as buildings (48). The self-help schools built by the local people, e. g. those in the Yei 
area,, through local initiatives were not provided with the needed teachers by the Regional 
Ministry of education or the provincial Education Department. The lack of educational 
provision and the absence of the needed teachers acted as a break in the attempts to 
expand education through self-help (49). 
3.4. EDUCATIONAL WASTAGE 
One of the characteristic features of the educational system in the Sudan is its dependence 
on annual promotional examinations within a level of education and the terminal public 
examinations for transfer to the next educational levels. This practice is said to have made 
a mockery of the whole concept of the universal primary education (50). This was an 
accepted norm by the governmen as reflected, for instance in the educational policy 
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speech of President Nimeiry iDhis declaration of the new educational policy in 1970. The 
President stated that "every child has equal right to the opportunity of education; the only 
11imiting factor is the child's ability to participate in it. Everyone with the necessary ability 
and ambition will have a fair chance" (5 1). The examination was the only device used to 
prove the abilities of the children. For the pupils in the southern Sudan the chances of 
success were very minimal because of the number of obstacles to fair competition such as 
the Arabic language and the irrelevant (abstract) curriculum. They did not therefore have 
an equal opportunity for education. The examinations practically destroyed most of the 
children at the bud, particularly the children from the southern Sudan. Many were either 
dismissed at the various stages of the primary school or were asked to repeat the class. 
The question that remained unanswered was the purpose of the policy of universal primary 
education and what form it was supposed to take. Many children were being dismissed 
ftom the first stage of the primary school when they were as young as 8 or 9 years. This 
practice existed throughout the period under review. Statistical figures are not avaidable 
from the Sudanese Ministry of Education to show the decline in enrollment between 
Grade I and Grade 6 of primary education, either in the country as a whole or in south 
Sudan in particular. What follows in tables 3 and 4 are the results of the Grade 6 leaving 
examinations which demonstrate that half of the candidates in the Western. and Eastern 
Equatoria regions managed to gain admission into intermediate education. If we consider 
Equatoria Region as a better region in terms of educational provision and development 
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than the other regions in the southern Sudan, then we can conceive of how the situation 
was in the other regions. 
Table 3: The Primary Leaving Examination Results for Western Equatoria 
Province: 
Year Cand Cand Cand Total 
Pass. 
Total 
Pass. 
Total 
Pass. 
Total 
Fail 
Total 
Fail 
Total 
Fail 
% % 
Male Fem. Total Male Fein Total Male Fem. Total Male Fein 
85/6 2342 899 3241 1236 286 1522 1105 2627 1719 47.0 53.0 
86/7 1703 732 2435 744 199 943 959 533 1492 38.7 61.3 
Table 4: Primary Leaving Examination Results in Eastern Equatoria Province: 
Year Cand 
Male 
Cand 
Ferm 
Cand 
Tot. 
T. P. 
Male 
T. P. 
Fem 
T. P. 
Tot. 
T. F. 
Male 
T. F. 
Feni. 
T. F. 
Tot. 
% 
Male 
% 
Fem 
85/6 3180 2061 5241 1861 623 2484 1799 1058 2757 47.4 52.6 
86/7 2794 1344 4138 1299 386 1685 1508 945 2453 40.7 59.3 
Source: Education Statistics Report 1986/87, Equatoria Region, Juba, June 1987. 
There was no indication in the policy of the universal primary education that suggested 
that the primary pupils were being prepared for a future as farmers, to become men and 
women who might develop the resources of the country. As reported by the UN Inter- 
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Agency Team they were studying in the hope of getting a good enough marks in the grade 
six primary leaving examinations to enter the intermediate schools (53). The " Purpose of 
learning is to pass the examinations; the purpose of passing the examinations is to climb up 
the educational ladder; the purpose of climbing the educational ladder is to gain the 
certification which will ensure subsequent employment in the modem sector activities" 
(54). This was a concept that was en-grained into the minds of the pupils, parents as well 
as the teachers. 
3.5. THE SOURCES OF FINANCING THE UNIVERSAL PRIMARY 
EDUCATION: 
The Sudanese governmen had a persistent problem of mobilizing the necessary financial 
and human resources to achieve the quantitative targets of the universal primary education 
policy. An analysis of the economic problems of the Sudan as presented jointly by the 
Sudanese Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, the World Bank, and the IMF 
pointed out to a number of constraints that affected the Sudanese economy (55). Ilese 
included: 
1. The economic and financial effects of the intensification of the war between the 
national government and the southern based Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement. 
2. The collapse of Sudan Government revenue, leading to unstable levels of 
expenditures and excessive borrowing. 
3. Significant declines in the level of inftastructural provision and in general 
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maintenance of the government revenue. 
4. An over-elaborate apparatus of ineffective controls which increased the size 
of the unproductive bureaucracy. This was said to have accounted for the 
reluctance of the Sudanese expatriates to have nothing to do with the government 
in terms of investment in the country. 
The Sudanese enviromment was so unreliable and the government policies so inconsistent 
that no long term investment was undertaken by any private investors (56). Because of 
this state of the economy the Sudanese government sought the community's cooperation 
to reduce the cost of the reforms in education. It is not easy to judge the commitment of 
the community and the type of resources the government expected the community to have 
at their disposal to sustain such long term programmes. In the drive to achieve universal 
primary education the government of President Nimeiry estimated that 2/3 of the cost of 
building schools, hostels and houses for the teachers would be covered by local efforts i. e. 
through self-help (57). According to the 1975/76 proposition, the central government's 
share to education was 14.1 %; of the People's Local Councils was 81.7% and only I% 
from the self-help source and 3.2% from external sources (58). From the general 
economic and financial situation in the country the reliability of the government on the 
local efforts had a very meager chance of success. No basis was provided by the 
government that indicated the significance of the local sources. The concept of self-help as 
envisaged by the government could only be understood by the tribes who had understood 
the values of education in the western sense of education. Those who valued their 
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traditional way of life such as the pastoral tribes saw no relevance to those types of 
education and the request for self-help therefore would not have appealed to them. 
The new sources of financing education proposed by the new Islamic government that 
came to power in 1989 showed similar unreliable fimding sources as those proposed 
during President Nimeiry's period. The new sources of fimding education proposed in 
1990 were the following: 
1. Establishment of Education Financing Fund to be financed by non- govern mental 
sources, such as companies, investment Firms and Banks, in particular percentages. As 
mentioned earlier in the report of the UN Inter-Agency Team, no private investors were 
motivated to invest in the Sudan because of its failing economy. 
2. Regulation of certain fees designated for Education Financing Fund. 
3. The citizen, the expatriates and the revenues from the investment institutions. 
4. The unused revenues from the lands of the Ministry of Education. 
The establishment of investment firms such as paper maimfacturing factory, copy 
books and textbooks printing press, chalks, teaching aids and toy producing factories. The 
establishment also of estates in strategic places in the towns and a Commercial Bank in 
which the students should be the share holders. 
When establishing major developmental projects, the cost of education was to be 
included in the general cost of the project. 
Educational institutions were to be encouraged to become productive units to 
contribute towards the fimctions of the institutions. 
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These were in many aspects faifetched proposals which did not have any chance of 
success. In the first place there was no research or simple study carried out to assess their 
viability. These were proposals moreover made at a time of the intensification of the war 
in the country. The execution of the war in the southern Sudan, in particular, was a 
governmeja priority. All these factors made the implementation of the universal primary 
education as proposed by the national government unthinkable 
3.6. CONCLUSION: 
The universal prhnary education policy was adopted without the appropriate research and 
the appropriate provisions in terms of the physical facilities such as the school buildings, 
relevant textbooks and the needed teachers. There was no prospect that the teachers 
required would be available particularly for the remoter regions like the southern Sudan. 
The remote nature of much of the Sudan and very poor communication and transport 
inftastructures, made the collection of the much needed data for designing sound policy 
to plan realistic implementation phases of the policy in the whole country very difficult. 
There were very limited consultations between the national government and the regional 
government as well as the population in general on the matters related to the 
implementation of the universal primary education policy in the country. The governmen 
apparently did not take into consideration the difficulties that it would encounter in terms 
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of mobilizing the necessary financial and human resources to achieve the quantitative 
targets within the specified period. The lack of adequate resources, the mounting debts 
and the massive defense and national security costs would have been sufficient reasons for 
careful and resourceful planning of how the policy could be implemented. Success in the 
implementation of the policy in the Sudan required major changes in the educational policy 
thinking, pf actice and provisions, as well as financial and human resources. 
There was an apparent lack of political will on the part of both the national and the 
regional governments to develop an awareness and understanding of the policy of the 
universal primary education in the light of the environmental and other cultural or social 
problems involved. This has been clear from the poor organization and the lack of 
effective monitoring of the educational activities related to the policy. The government's 
educational system in a way worked against the concept of universal primary education by 
maintaining the examination system at all grades and at all terminal levels. For the case of 
the southern Sudan the irrelevant curriculum and the language problems had an added 
disadvantage. These factors bring into question the validity of the policy of the universal 
primary education. The government did not specify clearly at what level or grade it 
considered the basic education to end. With all these multitudes of problems and obstacles 
in place, the possibility of the government achieving universal primary education in the 
country in the foreseeable future is not conceivable. 
In the next chapter we will consider the possible viability of government policies on the 
curriculum in the schools (primary intermediate and secondary). To a large extent the 
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curriculum policy of the government demonstrates the unwillingness of the central 
government to embrace a multicultural dimension in the curriculum that would be relevant 
to all the regions in the country. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. CURRICULUM POLICY 
INTRODUCTION. 
Curriculum policy development is ideally considered a matter of national deliberation and 
choice. This is based on the assumption that the national governmeja has the obligation to 
cater for the national interests and needs of the whole population in the country and has 
the capability to meet these needs. In an ideal situation the development of curriculum 
should be subjected to public participation through discussions or consultations in order to 
rationalize the desirability and feasibility of the policy nationvAde. In most of the 
developing countlies the degree of public participation in policy framework is dependent 
on how the national government views the impact of the public inputs in the policy 
formation i. e. in terms of how the national leaders perceived the national interests and 
needs. Curriculum policy development and formation in the Sudan has to be therefore 
understood within the context of the general national policy trend of the government and 
the specific goals and aims with respect to which education is relevant. It has to be also 
viewed in the light of the type of society the national governmen wants to mold through 
education. 
The trends of policies adopted by the Sudanese national government pointed toward the 
building of an Arab-Islamic society. To achieve this within such a heterogeneous society 
as the Sudan is, the government resolved to adopt a centralized system of policy 
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development. The approach therefore taken by the government was to have the curricula 
in the Sudan developed nationally through the Central Ministry of Education, which works 
out the details of the curricula and draws the syllabus for all stages of general education 
according to the general goals and aims of education in the country. What has been 
revealed from the responses from the research interviewees about the curriculum policy 
development in the Sudan is indicative of a lack of consultations with experts in the field 
of curriculum and the people at the grassroots levels. Debates, in open forums, have not 
therefore been normal procedure in the development of curriculum in the country in-spite 
of the diversities. There were no interactions between the curriculum policy-makers in the 
centre in Khartoum and the professionals at the grassroots, such as the teachers, a process 
that would have provided the necessary bases for the curriculum development policies. 
This might have led to the development of curricula more acceptable and relevant to the 
whole country. Not completely represented in the curriculum development processes have 
been the southern Sudanese. From the available statistics fi-om the southern Sudan, up to 
1989 there were only three trained curriculum developers in the whole of the southern 
Sudan (1). Even these were neither provided with the opportunity to take, ýmrt in the 
development of the curriculum nor consulted for matters related to the curriculum 
development in the whole of Sudan, leave alone the southern Sudan. Consequently the 
curriculum developers in the centre can be assumed to have lacked the necessary 
information or inputs for designing relevant curriculum policy framework for the entire 
country. 
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4.2. THE CURRICULUM POLICY STRUCTURE: 
The main feature of the Sudanese educational policies development has been the 
adherence to centralization. AR the plans of the curriculum development and 
administration were discussed centrally and approved by the National Council for 
Curriculum before they were executed. The Council was chaired by the Under Secretary in 
the Central Ministry of Education. The membership of the National Council for 
Curriculum remained quite fluid over the period under review (2). The membership of the 
council depended very much on how a member's political colours were viewed in the eyes 
of the government. From the government point of view (as presented in the report of the 
Sudan Education Sector review) the members of the National Council for Curriculum 
were selected from experienced professional educationists from the various disciplines of 
education. There is however insufficient information available to support this statement. 
Before the period under review curriculum development tasks, particularly for the primary 
and intermediate schools, were carried out by the staff at the Bakht-er-Ruda Institute of 
Education (3) 
to 
According the researcher's informer the Curriculum Administration Section of the central 
Ministry of Education had the following fimctions: 
1. Planning, development, implementation and revising of the curriculum. 
2. Preparation and revising the textbooks and the teaching manuals. 
3. Selecting other appropriate teaching aids. 
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Assisting in research, technical supervision, evaluation and training related to 
curriculum development. 
The centralization of the curriculum development made it possible for the government to 
censor any educational materials e. g. text-books, introduced into the Sudanese educational 
system (4). This policy trend also acted as a disincentive to people who might have been 
interested in the field of curriculum because of lack of prospects for utilization of the 
knowledge so acquired in the area of curriculum. The policy apparently did not allow for 
expanding options which would have, otherwise, suited the diversities in the different part 
of the country. 
One of the factors that had influenced the curriculum policy development in the Sudan has 
been the government's vested interest in the Arab and Islamic World. This has been 
expressed in a number of educational policy statements of the government as a basic aim 
of education in the Sudan. For instance, the President Nimeiry stated in his first address on 
his new educational policy that: "The educational revolution meant first and foremost a 
fimdamental change in the curriculum to implement the aims of the revolution and to 
nurture its ethos. This is to confirm the links of the country with the Arab and Islamic 
heritage" (5). This special external influence on the development of the Sudanese 
education was also evident in the statement of the Central Minister of Education in 
llý-esident Nimeiiy's govemmen (1970), when he stated: "The pattem of the education 
system is the type recommended by many Arab Education Conferences, particularly by the 
Conference of Arab Ministers of Education in 1964. Tle same recommendation was put 
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forward by the Conference of Arab Ministers of Education and Planning held in Tripoli in 
1966 and in Morocco in 1970. It was strongly felt that a common pattern of educational 
organization would facilitate the interchange of teachers and educational ideas throughout 
the Arab World" (6). 
The common approach to educational development in the country has also been reflected 
in some of the content of the syllabuses of the Sudanese schools. This is particularly clear 
in the humanity disciplines such as geography, history and civics. For instance the 
geography for the third year intermediate school has been divided into two sections. The 
first section is devoted to the geography of the Sudan; but the content is largely based on 
the northem part of the country. The second section concentrates on the geography of the 
Arab land which include the following Arab countries: Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, the 
Kingdom of Morocco, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, the Gulf Emirates of Bahrain, Gatar and Abu Dubai, and Yemen (7). The 
geographical environment in these countries, to some extent, resemble the northern part of 
the Sudan but not the southern part. Since these areas were examinable in the intermediate 
leaving examinations they were therefore an obvious disadvantage for the students from 
the southern Sudan. T'he content of the history covers the same areas. The general aims of 
teaching history were: 
1. To explain to the students the ideas of belonging to the Arab World through the study 
of the history of the ancient Arab civilization and discovering the origin of the common 
civilization of the ancient Arab World. 
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2. To enable the students to attain a minimum historical facts and information which 
would enable them to absorb their ancient and modem history and thereby introducing 
them to the rest of the world civilizations. 
3. To inform the students of some historical facts which connect them with the ancient 
international,, Islamic and national inheritance in accordance with the study of the history 
of the Arab civilizations and the history of the Islamic countries as well as the modern 
history of the Sudan. 
4. To develop in the students the skills to construct, criticize, analyze and evaluate the 
different news, views and stories which often conflict with each other and how to interpret 
them correctly and to develop a logical response to the historical events (8). 
The contents of these two subject clearly show that the curriculum policy development did 
not take into account the diversities prevailing in the country. As a result the relevance of 
the curriculum developed only suited the northern Sudan (9). The policy was not , 
in 
anyway designed to link the individuals, particularly those from the south, to his local 
enviromment. It provided no incentive or motivation to both the teacher and the student 
except to pass the examinations. 'Me curriculum policy developers could therefore 
be considered as having overlooked the socio-political and cultural complexity in the 
Sudan and the varied environmental and geographical differences between the Sudan and 
the rest of the Arab countries. These curricula remained unaltered for the whole period 
under review. They were translated from Arabic into English at Maridi 'Curriculum 
Centre' for use in the southern schools. 
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Arabism, as an important element in the cultural development of the people of the Sudan 
had also had an important influence in the development of the curriculum in the country. 
This fact has been mentioned by 23 of the research interviewees. This was also clear from 
the statement of President Nimeiry in 1970 as an important element of the new educational 
policy. He stated that: "The educational programme of the revolution stresses the social 
and cultural importance of Arabic, which is now the only obligatory subject in the school 
certificate curriculum. The education revolution enables the Sudanese nation to continue 
to play its historic role in diffusing Arab culture and the principles of the Islamic faith 
throughout the African Continent" (11). This trend continued to be evident from the 
, guidelines of the 
Sudanese curriculum policy that came out from the 1990 Education ; I-- 
Policy Conference held in Khartoum. These guidelines contained the following: 
1. The national curriculum should be applied in all. the regions of the Sudan with Arabic 
language as the medium of instruction. 
2. The school syllabuses should deal with the cultural, religious and ethnic diversities in 
such a way that they focus on its positive aspects to consolidate national unity. 
3. Attention should be paid to Airabic language programmes and to the development of its 
teaching methods and giving it much care in areas of language interference. 
4. Teaching of the living foreign languages should be paid attention to. 
5. The content of the curriculum should be based on originality and integration of aspects 
of knowledge. 
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6. School programmes and educational activities should give special consideration to girls' 
education and upbringing as future wives and mothers, as welU as effective participants in 
the overall development. 
7. Pre-school education curriculum should inculcate in the young children religious values 
and disciplines, making use of the children's talents of imitation and memorization through 
recitation. 
8. Taking cognizance of the Arab strategy on education and curriculum development, 
emphasis should be put on the professional aspects of teacher education and training 
curriculum. These aspects should equip the trainees with basic skills which include 
continuous education and learning throughout the life time and providing them with 
enough knowledge of the sciences of the holy Koran to enable them to effectively impart 
this knowledge to the pupils (12). 
The absence of the southern Sudanese educationists and politicians in the 1990 policy 
conference was indicative of the government desire to take the Islamic way without 
hindrance from the southem opposition. This exclusion has not however been a new 
element in the trends of the Sudanese national government education policy formation. 
Perhaps in contrast to the previous governments, this has been an open reinforcement of 
the practices inherited from the previous governments. This has been clear from the list of 
the participants to the conference which set the national framework of the educational 
policies to be followed in the country. Those who effectively participated in the 
conference were those who represented the aspirations of the government of the day. T'he 
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whole conference was orchestrated for demonstrating a support for Islamic education 
policies. AR the main participants were Arabs in race and Islamic in religion (appendix 1). 
The stress on Arabism is also noticeable in the subject allocations (appendix 2 to 5). 30% 
of the time budgeted in the time-table in the primary school per week was devoted for the 
teaching of Arabic language. In the intermediate school this takes up about 19% of the 
time in the time-table. In the secondary school the number of periods per a week for the 
Arabic language is equal to the that allotted for the English language for the first and 
second year. In the third year of the secondary school the number of periods for the 
Arabic language is greater than that for the English language. 
Islamisation of education has been one of the conspicuous features in the Sudanese system 
of education,, though this remained a hidden agenda, to some extent, during the earlier 
period of the regime of President Nimeiry. It featured more prominently during the 
government of Omer El Beshir , that took over power 
in 1989. This last drive was 
reinforced by an academic Islamic Conference held in Khartoum in 1987. In January 
1987, the Department of Islamic Studies and Psychology at the University of Khartoum 
and the Washington-based Institute for Islamic Knowledge held a conference on 
Islamisation of knowledge. This notion appealed to the Muslim Brothers, the Islamic 
Fundamentalists, and became the cornerstone of their educational theorizing when they 
took power in 1989. This notion eventually formed the bases of the Sudanese educational 
philosophy of the Islamic Fundamentalist government (13). To effect this notion two 
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institutes for Islamisation of knowledge were set up in 199 1; one in Khartoum and the 
other within the University of Gezira. The basic aim of these institutes is to see to it that 
all knowledge emanates from 'Islamic principles' ( 14). 
4.3. DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATION AND THE CURRICULUM 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
Decentralization policy is a phenomenon that appeared in the Sudanese political scene at 
the time of President Nimeiry. In 1972 as a result of the Addis Ababa Agreement the 
national government promulgated a policy of decentralization of the administration of 
education in the Sudan. But the hollowness of this policy was clear from the initial stage 
of the implementation. For instance the central Minister of Education, in a speech on the 
new educational policy, stated that "there will be a strengthening and reinforcement of 
education in the regions to enable them deal with the day to day requirement of the 
regions. The aim is to give a large measure of local autonomy within the framework of 
tactful central control" (15). There were no bases provided for the realization of relevant 
educational development in the southern Sudan as the declaration was not followed by 
giving the Regional Government of the south the legislative power to produce any other 
education policy option that it considered relevant to educational development in the 
southern Sudan. The Regional Governmen did not have the type of decentralized 
authority to enable it to exercise its own independent powers and to enjoy a legal 
personality distinct from that of the central administration. It was compelled to operate 
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within the national policy framework set for it in Khartoum. The tactful control mentioned 
by the Minister has been reflected in the tighter control over ftmds for the southern Sudan. 
The lack of participation of the southern Sudanese in the curriculum development was 
therefore indicative of the tactful approach of the government to the curriculum policy 
issues and thus depriving southern inputs into the curriculum 
The curriculum development and the training of the teachers remained firmly under the 
central control in Khartoum. All the school text-books and other school materials 
provided for the southern schools remained in Arabic even though over 75% of the 
schools in the southern Sudan used English as a medium of instruction (16). No provision, 
particularly in terms of fimds, was provided for the regional government to translate the 
books into English, leave alone the fact that the south lacked good translators for the 
different school subjects. Such handicaps were said to have accounted greatly for the 
failures in the local and national examinations (17). These were reflected in the number of 
school drop-outs and repeaters at all the levels of education. Two out of every hundred 
pupils enrolled in the first primary grade proceed on to tertiary education. As for the rest 
they leave before the end of the period by drop-out within each level and by failure in 
public examinations. 
'ne lack of relevance in the curriculum contributed greatly in the creation of the big gap 
between the community and the so-called 'educated' who seek livelihood in the urban 
areas and despise the rural areas (18). The curriculum development in the Sudan, with 
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particular reference to the southern Sudan, illustrated a case of dealing with unequal 
powers i. e. a top down approach (19). It provided no opportunity for the regional 
government to provide an alternative policy option. The initiatives taken by the regional 
government for alternative approaches were frustrated by the lack of funds to implement 
them. For instance the attempt by the regional government, in 1984, to revise the primary 
and intermediate schools syllabuses so as to produce some relevant teaching materials 
could not take off because of lack of fimds (20). 
4.4. RURALISATION OF EDUCATION. 
The policy of ruralisation of the curriculum, particularly for the primary level of education, 
has been a policy advocated by most developing countries of the Thifd World and most of 
the aid agencies mainly because of the orientation of the majority of the population in 
these countries towards the rural areas. The intention has been largely to make the 
curriculum content more relevant to the rural environment. A number of reports about 
educational development in the Sudan have pointed out the irrelevance of the education 
provided for the majority of the rural population in the country. A typical report connected 
to this situation was that of Garvey-Williams (1976). It stated that: "Commonly what was 
taught was ill-planned, limited and in large measure irrelevant to content and purpose. 
There is very little in reasoning and application. Education does little to prepare the 
majority of the chidden for whom the primary schooling wil. 1 be terminal, for better life in 
the countryside where most will remain and where, in the foreseeable future, opport-unity 
for the majority of the population should be found. The education provided is extremely 
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ineffective and wasteful" (2 1). This criticism for the curriculum for the primary also 
applied to those of the intermediate and secondary schools curricula. The result of this, to 
the southern Sudan, was reflected in the poor results in the Sudan School Certificate 
Examinations as compared to those of the northern Sudan. 
Relevant education in the Sudan has always been defined in the northern Sudanese context 
of relevance and has not always been favourable for the south. President Nimeiry, in one 
of his educational speeches in 1976 stated that: "education needed to be revolutionized in 
order to meet the challenges of the socio-economic and cultural development" (22). But 
the orientation of the education policies as reflected in the school curriculum clearly 
showed that it had no proper basis for the socio-economic and cultural development of the 
whole country. The trend of education policies focused less on the needs of education of 
the whole country, hence their irrelevance. 
President Nimeiry in 1976 decreed (decree No. 703) the formation of Sudan Education 
Sector Review, whose main objectives (23) were outlined as: 
1. To analyze the educational system and related activities and assess the system's 
capacity and effectiveness in realizing the objectives of general education and development 
in its economic,, social and cultural aspects. 
2. To formulate proposals for realistic strategies of educational development through 
expansion or contraction of training programmes to ensure the needs of the overaH 
development. 
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I To determine priorities for the education investment. 
The committee which was formed was made up of members from the Ministry of 
Education in cooperation with the World Bank (IBRD). This committee reviewed the 
educational,, economic and social development issues in the country and submitted its 
report in February 1977 under the title "Sudanese Education, an Appraisal and Strategy 
for Action". The review confirmed that the school curricula were predominantly 
theoretical and inadequate to meet the requirements of socio-economic development of 
the country. Its recommendations for promoting education and increasing its relevance to 
the developmental requirements formed the basis of the strategies for the educational 
development in the Six-year Plan of Economic and Social Development (1977/78- 
1982/83). It recommended that some primary schools were to take the form of integrated 
rural education centres (24). The new curriculum in the primary school was to be based on 
an environmentally related and activity- oriented approach. The problem that was to be 
encountered was in the area of implementation. As stated by John Theakstone 'Vhen the 
Sudan has a problem, it would call an outsider to come and write a report about the 
problem This would be the end of the problem. Tbe report would be shelved and no 
action taken about it" (25). Educationally the Sudanese government has been entangled in 
an Arab-Islamic educational policy web which apparently it found difficult to back away 
from however irrelevant the policy might be for the Sudan. One of the reasons given was 
the financial backing that the Sudan gets from some of the Arab countries (26). 
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One of the practical steps recommended by the committee for the ruralisation of education 
was the introduction of practical rural activities in the curriculum of the primary education 
with the foRowing objectives: 
1. To acquaint the children with some manual skills. 
2. To help children to learn by doing. 
3. To link their education to the local environment so that a lasting attachment to it can be 
formed. 
4. To strengthen the link between the local people and their schools so that the latter can 
participate fully in educating both young and grown ups and thus plan their role in the 
local community participation. 
5. To develop the schools where possible into economically productive units, so that they 
can maintain themselvesl or at least shoulder a reasonable share in that maintenance. 
The viability and acceptability of this form of education among the rural population were 
not researched into. As far as the perception of the ma ority of the rural African i 
population are concerned the objectives mentioned above were not new innovations. For 
them farming is not an art that can be necessarily learned in the schools. Children in the 
rural areas have been introduced to farming, herding and other rural activities at quite an 
early age. One of the basic reasons why this form of education was unattractive was the 
lack of social prestige associated with it (27). Moreover jobs are not easily available in the 
goveinnment departments for agricultural school graduates. 
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4.5. INTEGRATED RURAL EDUCATION CENTRES (IRECS). 
Four of the research interviewees have been directly involved in the project of the 
Integrated Rural Education Centres (IRECS). The concept of the integrated rural 
education centres revolves around the land i. e. geared towards the development of 
positive attitudes towards the land (28). It discouraged white collar ambitions for jobs in 
the urban areas. The idea was to develop the people to be self-employed in activities 
which were rural oriented (29). Such activities included poultry, pottery, basketry, animal 
husbandry, agriculture and fishery. The introduction of the rural education centres was not 
well planned and not enough time was given to explain and convince the rural population 
about the importance and values of this form of education (30). This was reflected in the 
lack of involvement of the rural population in the project and the scarcity of the essential 
tools and equipment for the project. Tle parents saw no significance of this form of 
education which tied their children to the land (3 1). Most preferred their children to have a 
form of education that would take them up the education ladder and get employed in the 
urban areas with the governmen . For 
instance in 1984, the MEC school at Bahr-Naam 
near Maridi, in southern Sudan, had a total enrollment of 85 pupils. By 1985, the 
enrollment had dropped by half to 44. The parents here preferred to send their children to 
a conventional primary school four miles away rather than having them in the rural 
education centre school (32). 
In the "Sudan Education - An Appraisal and Strategy for action, 1977", the IREC was 
described as a "model primary school whose educational services are extended to the 
or 
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young and whose enlightening and vocational activities are directed to adults and the 
surrounding community" (33). The National Report on the development of Education, 
presented to the Conference of Education in Geneva (July 1979), on the other hand, 
described the IREC as "an ideal form of a primary school in the rural setting that stands as 
a pivot of social activity in all its aspects" (34). This report stated that: "Tbe centre, in 
addition to teaching children, participates in literacy teaching, adult education and training 
in all that is associated with the improvement of rural environment. It provides 
opportunities for continual education based on a comprehensive programme. 'ne centre 
will rely on specially trained primary school teachers and government employees ftom the 
neighbouring countryside" (35). The implementation of the IREC project was however 
difficult, particularly in the southern Sudan for a number of reasons. The essence of the 
fREC development programme entailed community participation and the integration of the 
various services into the programme. This was lacking right from the initial stages (36). 
The costly construction of the buildings (prefabricated) of the IRECS excluded 
community participation and involvement. The specially trained teachers and the supposed 
government employees from the neighboming countryside were not available,, not only at 
the location of the projects but in the whole of the southern Sudan. The Tripartite Review 
and Evaluation Mission that later reviewed the HýECS programmes in the Sudan, for 
instance, noted that 'ývhile visualizing the image of IRECS in concrete terms with respect 
to their expected fimetions, MEC as a one primary school concept would be prohibitively 
costly for any developing country and might even be regarded as in contradiction to the 
education policy of the Sudan. Instead of democratizing education, it would introduce two 
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systems of education unequal in quality and whose cost would affect the whole system" 
(37). 
From the definitions of the fREC given there is a clear indication of misunderstanding of 
the IREC concept. There was no clear direction provided by either the national 
governmen or the regional government in the southern Sudan for successful 
implementation. For instance the Central Minister of State for Education, El Sayed Hassan 
Ahmed Yousif, in his opening speech in the seminar on the integrated rural education 
(30/10/ - 2/11/78) stated that "there is no intention that the IRECS will at any time replace 
the traditional primary schools" (38). This statement contradicted the very concept that 
considered IRECS as model primary schools and was a clear indication of lack of 
government commitment to the programme which could benefit the rural areas, if properly 
planned and executed. For the aid agencies the H(EC development programme was a 
central activity linking education to reality by making it more relevant to rural southern 
Sudan and supporting educational knowledge and skills with services and facilities for 
effective impact on the living conditions of the rural population and the national economy 
(39). 
The planned curriculum reform for the integrated rural education centres envisaged a new 
type of teacher whose traditional role of teaching children would stretch to include some 
community development tasks in the ruf al settings (40). The training intended to be 
provided to the selected IREC teachers was to reflect the rural community needs for a 
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better fife and to help them grasp and understand the guiding philosophy and objectives of 
their future work as well as acquire the skills necessary for their work- In an attempt to 
achieve these goals an ambitious training programme was formulated which included the 
following areas (41): 
A. Rural Education and Home Economics: 
1. Practical and field work. 
Art and craft. 
3. Agricultural extension. 
Cooperatives. 
5. Home Economics. 
B. Workshop Programmes: 
1. Carpentry. 
2. Tin and Plumbing. 
3. Building. 
4. Electricity. 
C. Community Development: 
1. Different topics on Community Development. 
2. Research and Educational Psychology. 
3. Visits to local Departments and Institutions. 
D. Other Training Areas: 
1. Library use. 
2. Demonstration Lessons. 
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Audio Visual and Teaching Aids. 
Discussion and methods of conducting it. 
5. Public lectures by officials of the departments involved in the community 
development activities. 
From the above list of topics it is clear that some of the areas were irrelevant to the 
southern Sudan rural environment e. g. electricity and plumbing and others like building 
and carpentry has limited market. 
Other activities, which were outside the teachers' traditional roles ) which they were 
expected to engaged in, included (42): 
1. To identify the socio-economic and cultural problems in the community. 
2. To impart literacy skiRs to illiterate adults and youth. 
3. To impart health education. 
4. To provide lessons on cooperative organizations and civic training. 
5. To engage in community development activities by providing local leadership for 
various activities, mobilize the community for construction and provision of public 
facilities. 
6. To organize cultural activities such as sports and festivals. 
The teachers selected lacked the abilities to perform the community tasks bestowed on 
them and as a result most of the work of the project in the IRECS in the southern Sudan, 
situated in the Maridi area, was done by the foreign experts, who found themselves 
surrounded by untrained and inexperienced counterparts (43). The three national 
143 
counterparts at the IRECS at Maridi were all secondary school graduates and had no 
previous experience in research (44). 
It was not clear what the new curriculum was intended to achieve since there were no 
substantial changes made in the examinations system, increased school provision, quality 
of teachers and learning materials and the appropriate training of the needed teachers (45). 
The only fonn of training given to the selected teachers was in the form of workshops and 
seminars, which lasted for only a short period of time. For instance, a three week 
workshop was organized on curriculum materials, content formulation and teaching 
strategies from 23rd November to 14th December 1981. Apart from this three weeks 
workshop all the other seminars and workshops were of shorter duration, lasting three to 
five days (46). A further disincentive to the teachers in the rural areas was the perception 
of the teachers' role in the minds of the rural community. The members of the rural 
community have a different conception of the teachers in terms of rural development. For 
them the rural primary school teachers have no place in what they perceived as 
development, except to prepare their children to enter the modem sectors (47). 
The lack of commitment by both the regional and national governments to the IREC 
concept had, in a way, contributed to the failure of the project in the southern Sudan. 
Rural development projects need the support of the government and political leaders if 
they are to succeed. The project in the southern Sudan did not have the strong backing of 
the regional government (48). This has been shown by quite intermittent payment of the 
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staff salaries and the lack of the essential provision for the projects. The planned 
Coordination Committees to supervise and put into action the objectives of the IRECS 
never took off. There were three committees planned to harmonize the effectiveness of the 
IRECS development programmes. These were: 
Inter- Ministerial Coordination Committee. This was to be the highest policy committee 
in the southern Sudan, whose main fimction was to review the progress and policies of the 
project and give necessary advice to the different departments. 
2. The IRECS Executive Board was to concern itself in the discussion of the 
achievements, constraints, drawbacks and budgetary problems of the programme and to 
take necessary administrative measures. 
3. Maridi Executive Committee was to administer and review the day to day activities of 
the pilot IRECS programmes. 
As it turned out the above committees have not only failed to fimction but were not 
constituted (49). This demonstrated the lack of interest by the governmeii in the fRECS 
projects. 
4.6. INSPECTION OF SCHOOLS. 
Inspection of schools is an important element in the evaluation of the schooling system and 
in particular the relevance of the curriculum This important area of education has not 
been properly utilized for the benefit of the schools in the southern Sudan in particular. 
There has been an apparent lack of attention paid to it by both the national and regional 
governments. Consequently the primary aim of education was made to serve largely the 
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requirements for the promotion to the next level of the educational system and did little to 
prepare the majority of the children for whom the primary education, for instance, was to 
be terminal for a better life in the countryside (50). The teacher's concern was therefore to 
teach whatever was there in the syllabus to enable the pupils pass the examinations. 
Relevance was not of much concern to them. 
The Southern Regional Ministry of Education had two departments that were intended to 
have some involvement with the curriculum development matters and other services to 
enhance educational development in the southern. Sudan. These were the Departments of 
School Inspectorate and Technical Service Division. The School Inspectorate Department 
was supposed to compose of a team of guidance and resource persons who were to 
monitor and coordinate educational activities, provide consultancy services, and in-service 
teacher education programmes as weH as on-the-job teacher assistance (5 1). But 
practically little or no real inspection or supervision of schools was carried out by this 
department. The administrative staff and the few inspectors at the regional, provincial and 
district levels did not have the means of transport and other logistics to carry out the 
inspection (52). 
There was a number of indications that showed lack of concern by the Regional Ministry 
of Education of the importance of the Department of Inspectorate. This was iRustrated by 
the small number of inspectors for the schools at the three levels of education and the 
selection of persons with less or no professional experience in the teaching profession. As 
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one of the research interviewees has said: 'the department was meant for those who have 
failed as teachers and school administrators. It was a sanctuary for inefficient and 
disgruntled teachers and school administrators" (53). It was not uncommon for school 
inspectors to be thrown out of some schools they visited. This had happened in 1982 and 
1984 in Juba Day Secondary School, where the researcher was a Headteacher. In the first 
instance it happened when an inspector decided to take over a lesson from the teacher he 
was to be inspecting in the middle of the session. He did worst than the teacher and the 
students shouted on him until he was forced to come out of the class. Two other 
inspectors made similar mistakes in other classes. After discussing the issue with the head 
of the inspection team the Headteacher had asked the inspectors to quit the school. 
Not all the provincial and district councils had school inspectors attached to them In the 
State of Equatoria in the Southern Sudan, which was considered a better state to the rest 
of the other southern states in terms of the number of schools and personnel, the number 
of school inspectors for the three levels of education was quite negligible. The table 5 
below shows the picture of the situation. As a result very little inspection was carried out. 
One of the interviewees,, who was once an Assistant Headteacher of a secondary school in 
the southern Sudan stated that during the five years he has been as an A41eadteacher the 
school he was in was not inspected even once (54). 
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Table 5: School Inspectors in Equatoria State, Southern Sudan (1989): 
AREA COUNCIL CADRE NO. OF INSPECTORS 
Juba Town Primary. &. Intermediate 3 
Juba Central Primary & Intermadiate 2 
Torit Primary & Intermediate I 
Magwi Primary & Intermediate 
Kapoeta Primary & Intermediate I 
Chukudum Primary & Intermediate 2 
Ikotos Primary & Intermediate I 
Terekeka Primary & Intermediate 2 
Kajokeji Primary. &. Intermediate 
Yei Primary & Intermediate 2 
Morobo Primary & Intermediate I 
Mundri Primary. & Intermediate 2 
Maridi Primary & Intermediate 2 
Yambio Primary & Intermediate 4 
Tambora Primary & Intermediate 2 
Ezo Primary & Intermediate I 
Dept. of Inspectorate Secondary 4 These were for Sec. Level 
TOTAL 32 
Source: Statistics Unit,, Equatoria State Ministry of Education, Juba, 1989. 
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4.7. CONCLUSION. 
Curriculum policy development in the Sudan has been influenced by the general policy 
trends of the national government. At the heart of this trend has been the Arab-Islamic 
orientation of the Sudanese policies. Consequently the curriculum policy has been initiated 
and developed without adequate and adequately secured knowledge of either the 
conditions for their success or their possible and likely consequences or implications. The 
reasons ranged from the absence of effective information-gathering mechanisms to the 
reluctance, on the part of the national policy-makers, of probing into the situation which 
might reveal facts that would undermine the policies held dear for political or religious 
reasons. 
There has been an apparent con-flicting conception of the objectives to be achieved in the 
development of the curriculum in terms of the south and north of the Sudan. This conffict 
of understanding was derived from what 'relevant education' means within the Sudanese 
context of education for the whole country. Because of the diversities existing between the 
north and the southern Sudan and the direction of policies adopted by the national 
government, which is geared to the Arab-Islamic World, what has been considered 
relevant education for the national government has remained irrelevant for the southern 
Sudan. Quality and relevance therefore mattered less in the curriculum policy followed in 
the Sudan in terms of the educational development of the southern Sudan. In reality the 
type of education received implied a process of alienation of the southern Sudanese pupils 
from their own society and the local environment. 
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There has been an extreme difficulty in the Sudan of reaching any agreement about the 
real aims of the curriculum that would have taken account of the realities in the country 
because of the restricted participation in the curriculum policy development. The lack of 
participation and lack of coordination of the various elements involved in the programme 
implementation had a lot to play in the deficiencies of the curriculum content. There were 
also constraints in terms of overall resources e. g. fimds. 
The ruralisation of education largely failed because the policy was not accompanied by a 
rationalization of the objectives of the primary education. Both the national and regional 
governments were not committed to the concept of ruralisation though this was the form 
of education much favoured by the Aid Agencies, e. g. the World Bank. The success of the 
IRECS projects required firstly the political will, support and guidance from the 
government and politicians, the various committees and commitments of the teachers. 
Secondly, the understanding, support and participation of the parents and the community. 
All these elements were missing. The selection bias of the education system implied a 
constant pre-occupation of the teachers and the pupils with the requirements for passing 
the examinations however irrelevant the curriculum was. 
Ile next chapter attempts to diagnose the policies on the teachers in general and the 
policies related to their training and education 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
POLICIES ON TEACHERS 
INTRODUCTION: 
The policies governing the teachers, their training and education are central to the 
development and smooth fimctioning of any educational system. In many countries such 
policies occupy a central position in the overall educational policy plans. However the 
application of the policies and their effectiveness vary according to the political persuasion 
and direction of the government in power. The stability of the teaching force and their 
effectiveness in the implementation of the educational policies depend o-n how the 
governmein applies the policies affecting the teachers and also on the prevailing 
conditions within the profession such as the salaries and promotion prospects and other 
working conditions. The basic teacher policy issues include initial and in-service training, 
appointments (recruitment) and salaries and promotion. 
The Sudanese governmen has recognized the focal role of the teachers in the mouldhig of 
the Sudanese society. In order to maintain a unified professional and Islamic ideological 
thinking or approach of educational development and to build the type of society the 
government envisaged, the Sudanese governmen was bent to adopt and maintain central 
control of the teacher training and education in the whole country. One of the factors that 
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has influenced the Sudanese educational policy trend has been its desire for the unity of 
the Arab destiny and the need for increased cooperation and movement on the path of 
complete unity as its aim of purpose (1). The policy for teacher training and education has 
therefore remained the prerogative of the Central Ministry of Education in Khartoum since 
independence (1956). The Department of Teacher Training and Education at the Central 
Ministry of Education planned and programmed teacher education and training within the 
general firamework of educational development in the country (2). The centralized 
institutions recommended to carry out the training programmes and plans of teacher 
training for the three levels of education (primary, intermediate and secondary) were the 
following (3): 
1. The College of Education, University of Khartoum, for the secondary schools. Until 
1977 . when the University of Juba was opened, this was the only institution for the 
training of teachers for the secondary schools. 
2. The Intermediate Teacher Training Institute at Omdurman for the training of teachers 
for the intermediate schools. 
3. The Institute of Education at Bakht-er-Ruda, also in the north, for the training of the 
primary teachers. 
4. The Technological Colleges (Khartoum) for the training of teachers for the technical 
secondary schools. 
According to the report of the Sudan Education Sector Review (1977), the Regional 
Institutions for Education in the Southern Sudan and other regions in the country were to 
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serve as institutions for text-book experimentation and recommendation of necessary 
modifications to guarantee their suitability for regional needs. Whether the regional needs 
were to be taken into consideration right from the initial stage of formulating policies for 
the training of the teachers were not mentioned in the report. 'Me need for wider 
representation in the planning of the policies to suit the wider national needs was not also 
indicated in the report. 
5.2. RECRUITMENT POLICY: 
The trainees for the primary teacher training institutes were recruited from among the 
intermediate school leavers and put through a four year pre-service training course. The 
selections were simply done on the basis of results in the intermediate leaving 
examinations. Pure academic courses were provided in the first year of the pre-service 
course and the professional training was introduced in the second year. Practical training 
started in the third year through to the fourth year. The courses ended with a primary 
school teacher certificate which was obtained through passing a final examination which 
was centraRy set and marked in the centre in Khartoum (4). 
The Intennediate school teachers were trained in the post secondary institutions. The 
recruitment for this level were from the students who had completed their secondary 
school education ('0' level). These were put fluough a two year course which included 
academic, professional and practical studies run concurrently. This also ended with the 
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final examinations which were centrally set and marked. ne successful candidates were 
awarded Intermediate School Teaching Diplomas (5) 
There were two categories of teachers for the secondary schools. The first were those 
who have gone through a four year training in the Faculty of Education in the university. 
These were awarded B. Ed. Degrees at the end of the four year course. The second 
category were those who attended post-graduate diploma courses for one year. These 
were awarded Dip. Ed. after passing the final examinations (6). 
The Ministry of Education had problems in the recruitment of students who performed 
very well in their final examinations in the various levels of education for the teacher 
training institutes for a number of reasons. In the first place, generally, an ordinary 
Sudanese citizen's perception about teaching profession is very poor (7). Secondly the 
government itself accorded lower status to the teaching profession. It selected students 
with lower grades in the school certificate examinations for admission into the teacher 
training institutes. One of the speeches of President Nimeiry on education confirmed this 
perception. The President had said, in the light of prospects of education in the southern 
Sudan, in 1970: "All the students who this year (1970) passed School Certificate in 
Rumbek Secondary School (these were southern Sudanese students whose gfades in the 
School Certificate could not allow them admission into the national university) have been 
appointed as Intermediate school teachers. Those who were unsuccessful in the School 
Certificate Examinations were admitted to Malakal Teacher Training Institute. Other 
southern pupils fi-om the intermediate schools who did not pass school certificate 
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examinations have been admitted to teacher training institutes"(8). This demonstrated the 
image the government showed about the teaching profession in the country which, in a 
way, made students and their parents to look down on the teaching career, despite the 
central role of the teachers in education. 
The Director for the Department of Teacher Training and Education in the Regional 
Ministry of Education in Juba, Southern Sudan, stated in one of his speeches to education 
workshops in Juba in 1989 that "we have so far failed to accept the fact that if we want to 
improve our education system, we must first and foremost insist on recruiting good quality 
students for teacher training. Until we accept this fact and cease to believe that teacher 
training is for the poorly qualified ex-inteirnediate and ex-secondary schools students, we 
cannot expect to achieve qualitative education. With the present poor selection, and 
poorly qualified teacher-trainers we will continue to have ill-prepared primary school 
teachers and finally poorly qualified students" (9). The often occurring non-payment or 
delays in the payments of the teachers salaries and the poor status of the teachers in the 
Sudanese society were further significant disincentives for students to join the teacher 
training institutes. Professions such as Medicine, Engineering and Law were placed high in 
the professional choices of students (10). It has also been pointed out that some students 
have used the acceptance into the teacher training institutes or the teaching profession as a 
stepping stone into other professions (11). This was clear from the number of students 
who got admitted into the Faculty of Education in the University with lower grades. Iffie 
lower acceptance grades set for admission of students into the Faculty of Education in the 
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national Universities in the Sudan as compared to the faculties of, say, Medicine, 
Engineering and Law, have made many students, with no teaching desire, to obtain 
university degrees. But soon after graduation many left the teaching profession and instead 
joined other professions (12). 
5.3. TEACHER, TEACHER TRAINING AND EDUCATION IN THE 
SOUTHERN SUDAN. 
After the 17 years civil war in the Sudan, which ended with the signing of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement in 1972, the Southern Regional Government was faced with a growing 
demand on education on the one hand and a dearth of facilities, materials and teachers on 
the other. T'he governmen was forced to resort to employing untrained teachers (13). This 
situation was created by the long civil war which brought about the destruction of the 
educational infiastructures and depleted the teaching profession of the needed teachers. 
One other factor that aggravated the situation was the change over of the school system 
from the 4-4-4 (i. e. four years primary, four years intermediate and four years secondary) 
school structure to the 6-3-3 system from 1972. This made the demands for the facilities, 
equipment, materials and particularly teachers more acute, especially for the primary 
school sector (14). 
The Regional Governi-nent had planned to train an estimated number of 2000 primary 
school teachers in the Six Year Development Plan for the Southern Region (1977/78 - 
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1983/83). But the actual number of teachers produced in the planned period from the 
primary teacher training institutes was only 1115, short by 885 teachers. This shortfaR had 
an impact on the rate of the primary school development and placed an ever-increasing 
reliance on the employment of the untrained teachers (15). The existence of a large 
backlog of the untrained teachers made the region continue to resort to recruiting 
untrained teachers so as to maintain the planned growth rate in the primary school 
enrollments. The target enrolment established in the Six Year Development Plan for the 
Southern Sudan was 45% of the 7-12 year age group (16). Similar difficulties existed in 
the intermediate school sector. 
Until 1983, the teacher training institutes established in the Southern Sudan were only for 
the training of the Arabic pattem primary school teachers. In 1973/74 there were only two 
such institutes in the southern Sudan, i. e. Malakal and Tonj Teacher Training Instates. In 
1982/83 the number increased to four when Mbili and Maridi Teacher Training Institutes 
were added to the two established earlier ( 17). AM of them were faced with the problems 
of overcrowded classes,, accommodation, lack of equipment, books, training aids, visual 
aids, chemicals,, lack of essential facilities such as science laboratories, Home Economics 
wofkshops and libfafies. Aff of these factofs had significant impact on the effectiveness 
and efficiency in the training and retraining of the teachers ( 18). 
The Arabic medium teachers had a better opportunity for training than the teachers of the 
English medium schools (19). This was because of the availability of the training institutes 
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using Arabic as a medium of instruction in both the north and south of the country. Tlere 
was ino single primary teacher training institute established by the government in the 
southern Sudan for the training of the English medium teachers. The only English medium 
intermediate teacher training institute was established in the town of Maridi , in the 
southern Sudan in 1983. But the annual output of this was very small indeed. For instance 
in 1985 only 12 teachers graduated from this institute out of the total of the first batch of 
the intake of 36 students (20). The causes of these high drop-outs were not questioned 
nor studied and therefore no solution was provided. One explanation given by one of the 
12 graduates of the institute in 1985 was that the conditions in the institute was not 
particularly conducive to the type of student teachers admitted in the institute at the initial 
stage (21). Tlose selected were from among the untrained teachers who were already 
teaching in the intermediate schools. The majority were married and had children to care 
for. The institute did not provide facilities, such as accommodation for the married 
students. Because of the irregularities in the payment of the teachers' salaries and the low 
salary received by most teachers at that time,, many found it quite difficult to maintain 
themselves in the institute and at the same time maintain their families at home with the 
small salaries (22). 
Faced with the problems of a lack of sufficient teacher training institutes to train the 
English pattern teachers in particular, the regional govemmen through the Regional 
Ministry of Education, with assistance ftom the Norwegian Church Aid, established a 
teacher training institute in Juba to train this group of teachers. This decision to establish 
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the institute was taken unilaterally by the regional governmen without the approval of the 
central government. As a result the national government refused to recognize the 
certificate issued by the institute. The only reason provided was that the training of 
teachers was not the prerogative of the regional government. Consequently the certificate 
awarded to the teachers from this institute did not provide the teachers with the financial 
benefit normally attached to certificates from similar institutes (2-33). This acted as a 
disincentive to those teachers who had gone through the institute. Apparently there was 
little motivation for hard work for a number of them during the whole course. 
5.4. POLICY OF TRANSFERS OF TEACHERS. 
Continuity and stability are essential components for the achievement of a healthy and 
sound growth of an institution. Frequent transfers of personnel in the institutes and 
schools were detrimental to well-being and sound progress. The Ministry of Education in 
the Sudan, in general, had a policy of frequent transfers of teachers and tutors from 
schools to schools and institutes to institutes and also from school to institutes and vice 
versa (24). This had been, in particular, a common component of the education system in 
the southern Sudan. This process had brought about undue confusions and frustrations 
among the teachers as this resulted, in many cases, in the destruction of properties on 
transit through the rough roads, interruptions of the education of the children of the 
teachers on transfers and sometimes separation of families. At the same time this caused 
discontinuity and interruption in the smooth fimetioning of the schools and institutes (25). 
Because of the poor record keeping in the Regional Ministry of Education and the 
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Provincial and District Education offices, and the lack of regular inspection of the schools 
and institutes, there were sometimes problems of keeping track of the movements of the 
teachers between the schools and institutes (26). Hence some of the schools were over- 
staffed while others remained understaffed. This was particularly so of the schools in the 
urban areas as compared to the schools in the rural areas. Some schools had more and 
better qualified teachers while others had few. Tlere were schools which were stocked 
with teachers who specialized in particular subjects and poorly catered for in other 
subjects. For instance Supiri Intermediate School (an Arabic medium intermediate school), 
in Juba town, had many trained Arabic teachers but none for English (27). Tbefe was a 
greater concentration of teachers, particularly female teachers, in the urban schools than in 
the rural schools (28). The female teachers preferred to teach where their husbands were 
wor"ig in the towns (29). 
At Ton Teacher Training Institute only one tutor had remained for four years in the same i 
institute. Apart from the principal, who had the longest continuous service of three years 
at the institute,, A the rest of the staff had stayed at the institute for a period ranging from 
a few months to two years (30). At Mbili Teacher Training Institute, in 198 1, there was no 
single tutor present who had been serving at the institute since the establishment of the 
institute in 1976. At Maridi Institute there were only two teachers who had remained at 
the institute since its establishment in 1977 to 1981 (3 1). 
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It was also a common practice in the Regional Ministry of Education to transfer long 
service and experienced teachers from the classroom work to the office desk work in the 
Ministry of Education Headquarters or to the various education offices in the provinces 
and districts. Usually such long service teachers were higher up in the promotional scales 
which were very limited in the salary structures of the schools. As stated by John 
Theakstone this was one of the problems besetting classroom teachers in the Sudan. "The 
only way in the Sudan to get a better salary was to move into the bureaucracy. Unless and 
until the government is able to provide financially attractive salary structure within the 
teaching system in the school there would always be a problenf ' (3 3). 
5.5. SCHOLARSHIEP POLICY. 
This information provided about the scholarship policy came mainly from the former 
Director General of the Regional Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform, 
Southern Region (34). 
The priorities for the offers of scholarships for training within and outside the country was 
governed by the government's policy for the development of the country's human 
resource. It was therefore dependent on the areas of priority that the government had in 
the field of development. This was generally reflected in the Central Government's 
statements to the National Parliament or in the Regional Assembly in the Southern Region 
(35). The various Mitfistries and Departments were expected to fbHow the government's 
priorities in their own training needs. But some of the Ministries and Departments in 
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certain circumstances did not follow or abide by the priorities set by the government in 
their areas of selection and areas of training. The belief was that the central government 
was not in touch with training needs of the various regions and therefore was not well 
placed to plan for the training needs or set training priorities for the regions. 
The national government had national training schemes which were centrally managed and 
administered (36). The Southern Region rarely benefited from these schemes. A number of 
reasons have been provided by the Director General of Public Service and Administrative 
Reform why the Southern Region could not share in the national scholarship schemes. 
1. The information regarding the offers of the scholarships was not easily availed to 
the regional government. If provided the information, in most, cases arrived in the region 
too late to make the necessary arrangements for taking up the offers. One of the research 
interviewees said this was a deliberate action done by officials from Central Scholarship 
Board to deny the southern. Region the opportunity of the scholarship offers (37). 
The announcement or the notification of the offers of scholarship were usuafly 
made through the Arabic news media e. g. Arabic news papers which were not readily 
available for the southern Sudanese readers. The majority of the southern Sudanese are 
not good in the Arabic language. 
There was a Department of Training in the northern Sudan where A the 
nominations were dealt with. The southern region did not have any specific department in 
the Regional Ministry of Public Service to handle the scholar ship cases. Consequently no 
proper channel existed between the centre and the region to coordinate scholarship offers. 
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4. The Regional Ministry of Public Service and the Regional Ministry of Education 
apparently did not question the scholarship policy issues of the national government nor 
followed up the cases with the central government. It was assumed that even if the south 
secured the scholarships, there would not have been enougb candidates with the required 
qualifications to take up the offers. The blame for this assumption was put on the previous 
Ministers of the Regional Ministry of Public Service, many of whom were said to lack 
proper qualifications to manage the affairs of the public service. 
The Southern Regional Government created a regional scholarship scheme which was 
intended to sponsor the southern Sudanese and to be paid for by the regional government. 
But because of insufficient fimds raised locaffy within the southern region few southern 
Sudanese were offered scholarships through the scheme (38). Instead of the regional 
goverriment pressing the national government for its share of the national scholarship 
offers it opted for a practice which it could not itself support. 
It has been common to find persons trained in specific fields in the various Ministries and 
Departments not to be assigned to the areas for which they have been trained. This is said 
to have been particularly the case with the Regional Ministry of Education. For example, 
an individual trained as a primary school teacher being made in-charge of the secondary 
education section; a sport teacherwith no training at all in the field of education appointed 
minister of education. The Regional Ministry of Public Service did not have the 
mechanism or the power to control the misuse or misplacement of manpower in the 
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various regional ministries or departments. It expected the ministries concerned to deal 
with such issues (39). The candidates selected for scholarships were expected to have 
signed contracts which obliged them to work for the particular ministry or department for 
a minimum period of five years. This policy was not strictly followed. 
5.6. IN-SERVICE TRAINING. 
The in-service training of teachers, like any other teacher training in the country, comes 
under the control of the Central Ministry of Education. The reason given for this 
centralization was to avoid the probability of duality in the programmes of the training and 
administration (40). It was not easy to judge how genuine this reason was having in mind 
the diverse conditions prevailing in the various part of the country. The main centre of the 
In-Service Teacher Training Institutes (ISETI) was in Khartoum with some subordinate 
centres established in the other areas of the country. ISETI was supported by the UNICEF 
technically and financially. Until 1975 all the ISETI activities and courses were confined in 
the northern Sudan. In 1979 there were already 29 ISETI sub-centres in the country but 
only three were in the southern Sudan (4 1). 
In the northern Sudan in-service training facilities existed in all the teacher training 
institutes and detailed programmes were worked out according to set plans to call teachers 
during sessions in batches for the in-service. The activities were of various kinds e. g. 
programmes to get the teachers acquainted with the recent developments in the syllabuses, 
text-books., teaching methods and the use of visual aids (42). TIle duration of such courses 
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varied from a few days to a number of weeks depending on the type, nature and aims of 
the courses on offer. 17here were others courses organized by the Central Ministry of 
Education for teachers, supervisors and educational administrators during vacations. 
These were intended to initiate new ideas and practices related to methods of teaching, 
supervision, feed-backs, evaluation, administrative procedures and financial measures (43). 
In the southern Sudan since the inception of the in-service teacher training programmes in 
the Sudan, there were only three sub-centres estabhshed. These were created in the three 
main towns in the southern Sudan i. e. Malakal, Wau, and Juba (44). The ISETI 
programmes in the southern Sudan were solely limited to providing two years in-service 
training courses for the untrained teachers employed in the nearby primary schools. These 
centres were supervised and directed from the main ISETI centre in Khartoum, where the 
courses and assignments were planned and produced (45). ne main reason provided for 
the difficulty of extending the system in the southern Sudan was that a sub-centre must 
have sufficient schools within a radius of a few miles to provide enough trainees to make 
the establishment worthwhile. In the southern Sudan schools were generally few in 
number and were far between. A Consultancy report (198 1) about training of teachers for 
the primary schools hi the southern region of the Sudan identified four basic areas why the 
programmes of the ISETI have not been successfully implemented in the Southern Region 
(46): 
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1. Tle expansion of the ISETI programmes has been slow partly due to the absence of a 
well formulated policy and plan of operation suited to the prevailing needs of the southem 
Sudan. 
There were acute shortages of facilities e. g. buildings and furniture. 
3. There were very few reference books or materials, apart from the assignments prepared 
from Khartoum. The books, materials and exercises prepared by the national institute in 
Khartoum took no or little cognizance of the different environmental conditions and the 
social and cultural life in the southern Sudan. 
The ISETI was not flexible enougb to respond to the language problems, cultural 
differences and the local environmental peculiarities in the southern Sudan. 
The materials and assignments produced at the centre in Khartoum in Arabic had two 
main problems for the southern Sudan (47): 
1. The southern Sudan presented completely different environmental, cultural and 
teaching situations. Therefore the relevance of such materials and assignments were 
doubtful. 
2. To many in the southern Sudan Arabic is a second language. This raised the problem of 
the level of understanding of such courses and of their applicability to the teaching 
situation in the southern Sudan. 
The language policy in the southern Sudan required that the teachers in the rural area 
schools use vernaculars as media of instruction up to primary four. This implied that 
teachers must be trained how to teach in the vernaculars, otherwise they would face some 
169 
difficulties. Some of the assignments should have been therefore in the vernaculars to 
enable them to teach their classes well and proficiently (48). 
The language problem, which was a disincentive to the English medium teachers, easily 
deprived such teachers fi-om attending the training courses provided in the in-service 
centres. For instance in Wau sub-centre, 27 trainees joined the two years course in 
1978/79. Some of these trainees had learned through the Arabic medium while others had 
gone through the English medium. This, first of all, created a problem in the running of the 
course. Secondly, most of the teachers, especially those who had gone through the English 
medium, found the course difficult to follow in Arabic and decided to withdraw from it. 
This resulted in having only ten trainees completing the whole course. Out of the ten only 
six of them passed. These were the group who had gone through the Arabic medium of 
instruction (49). 
In addition to the language problem there was the problem of the influence of town life on 
the teachers from the rural areas who were exposed to it. The policy was to have the 
selected teachers from the rural schools transferred to the schools within or close to the 
ISETI centres located within the towns. Many of such trainees did not like to go back to 
their respective rural schools but instead applied for other attractive jobs so as to remain in 
the town (50). 
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In Juba sub-centre, in the 1977/78 session, fi-om the 24 trainees who joined the centre, 
only four passed at the end of the course; thus leaving the other 20 without certificates. 
'Me major reason given for this high failure rate was that due to the remoteness of the 
places of work, they could not submit their research work in time for the examinations. ) 
which were marked in the main centre in Khartoum (5 1). 
]Fhe total number of the teachers expected to have been trained in the three sub-centres in 
the southern Sudan between 1975 and 1982 was 303. This was a smaH number compared 
to the number of the untrained teachers existing in the primary schools in the southern 
Sudan. This is clearly indicated in table 6 below. The total number of untrained teachers in 
the 1978/79 was 1873,, which was more than the number of trained teachers. In the north, 
in the year 1980, there were 5558 teachers, tutors, supervisors and headteachers who had 
gone through the in-service courses and programmes (52). 
Table 6: Distribution of Primary Teachers in the Southem Sudan (1978/79): 
Prov. Trained Trained Trained Untr Untr. Untr. Total Total Total 
Male Feml Total Male Feiul Total Male Feml Total 
E. Eq. 437 195 632 659 108 767 1096 303 1399 
W. Eq. 253 39 292 261 34 295 514 73 587 
Jonglei 120 8 128 84 1 85 204 9 213 
Lakes 125 8 133 147 12 159 272 20 292 
U. Nile 253 85 338 186 87 273 439 172 611 
B. E. G. 308 31 339 236 58 294 544 89 633 
Total 1496 366 1862 1573 300 1873 3069 666 3735 
Source: Education Statistics Unit, Regional Ministry of Education, Juba, 1978/79. 
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There were also administrative problems involved in the operation of the ISETI activities. 
The relationship of the sub-centres in the southern Sudan vis- -vis the Central Ministry of 
Education,, Regional Ministry of Education and the Provincial Administration was not 
clearly defined. Administratively the ISETI sub-centre principals in the southern Sudan 
were linked to the Regional Ministry of Education in Juba, while technicaffy they were 
linked with Khartoum. The principals normaRy corresponded directly with the ISETI 
national office in Khartoum and provided only copies of the correspondences to the 
Regional Ministry of Education in Juba (53). This caused dffficulties in the administration 
of the centres in the region. There was also no continuous feedback established between 
the centres, the Province Education offices and the Regional Ministry of Education. This 
resulted in the lack of communication and knowledge about the ISETI activities and 
programmes among the administrators. There was also no or little coordination of the in- 
service initial training courses with the other pre-service courses being organized in the 
region as was the case in the northern Sudan (54). 
One important aspect of the ISETI programmes observed by the Consultancy report was 
the high cost per unit of running the courses in the southern Sudan. This high unit cost 
was due to the smaH enrollment of about 25 teachers for 3 to 5 tutors employed to teach 
them for a period of two years. This gave a student/tutor ratio between 8.3 and 5. If you 
consider the total expenditure which included salaries of the tutors and supporting staff, 
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allowances, costs of materials and administrative costs on training only 25 teachers for 
two years, it was a very uneconomic and costly undertaking (55). 
5.7. BRAIN DRAIN. 
"A noticeable feature of the Sudanese manpower development is a large scale 'brain and 
sUls dfain' of Muslim Sudanese to the Arab countries especially Saudi Arabia, Libya and 
the Gulf States. The cumulative effect of this exodus has been damaging and remittances 
from overseas Sudanese do not compensate for the lost of skills. The government has 
adopted a complacent attitude towards what they contend they cannot control and regard 
the drift of skills as a means of 'repaying' financial support from the rich Arab donors. It is 
an unfair equation, for capital aid, however generous, cannot enhance development if the 
Sudan's absorptive capacity is constantly eroded by the lost of professional, skilled and 
even semi-skiHed manpower" (56). This statement sums up the situation caused by the 
government policy of 'loaning' or seconding teachers to the oil-rich Arab countries. The 
government gave consideration to this policy in the preparation of the programmes and the 
curriculum for the teacher training and retraining in the country. The secondment policy 
was considered, generally, an acceptable norm and a device to accommodate the pressures 
from the Teachers Trade Unions to go to work in the oil-rich Arab States (58). The 
government also considered this as a mechanism for retaining civil manpower, though a 
pattern of absences of two to five years was very hard to absorb and there was a tendency 
to leave the civil service employment on return to the Sudan which no system of bonding 
seemed to have been able to stop (59). There was the feeling that you should not have to 
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work for the sort of money and in the sort of conditions that the Sudan can provide in the 
public sector (60). 
The official trend of loaning teachers was said not to have caused much damage to the 
state schools because the selection procedures were controlled by the Ministry of 
Education and the Ministry of Public Service, which seconded teachers in the subject areas 
where there were surplus of teachers (61). There were no evidences to prove that there 
were surplus teachers during the period under review. There were however other 
unofficial streams of brain drain into the Gulf States that were not controlled by the 
government. These included the teachers who left the country on their own because of the 
poor economic situation in the country (62). The poor economic situation accounted 
largely for the great number of the Sudanese Nationals Working Abroad (SNWA). The 
estimated number of the Sudanese nationals working abroad varied from 600,000 to 
800,000 with 70% of these in Saudi Aiabia in the 1980s (63). In spite of the value of the 
largely unofficial remittance of hard currency that the SNWA provided and helped to keep 
the Sudan afloat, there were several damaging psychological influences. It has been 
commonly said that "the Sudan is a place from which to escape or to which to retire. The 
Sudan govenimen employment is so poorly paid by comparison with Saudi Arabia that it 
does not really justify much hard work" (64). Sudan is a country one cannot live in 
because of a number of reasons (65): 
1. In terms ofjobs, there are plenty ofjobs but the salary is not sufficient. 
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2. There exist social and political oppression: if one is aware of the political situation one 
finds it difficult to five there. If one is politically active, it is dangerous for one to live 
there. IT one is not politicafly active and not politically aware, one cannot live one's social 
life in peace. 
The government might not have been directly encouraging the brain drain to the oil rich 
Arab countries but the wrong policies of the government did force professionals to go 
away (66). The professionals were denied the opportunity to perform their work 
professionally because of a lack of facilities and the necessary amenities as well as financial 
incentives for hard work. In some cases however the government did encourage the brain 
drain through dismissals (67). It was also a strategy applied by the government to get rid 
of troublesome individuals in the various professions. In the whole period of President 
Nimeiryls regime there were successive purges of senior civil servants, including teachers 
and lecturers, for political reasons especially at senior levels (68). This situation created an 
expectation that if responsibility was taken and hard work noticed sooner or later 
victimization would result. The best thing was to do as little as possible and draw as little 
attention to oneself as possible (69). 
The Sudanese educational phenomenon of exporting brains to the oil rich Arab countries 
had also a fimdamental effect on the qualities of education in the country (70). The 
obvious effect of this can be seen in the difference in the teaching of the science subjects 
between the boys and girls secondary schools in the northern Sudan. In the Sudan because 
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of the Islamic sex discrimination, women science graduates or women graduates from 
other disciplines were not given the opportunity to enugrate to the oil rich Arab countries. 
So they remained to teach these subjects within the country. As a result science subjects 
were better taught in the girls secondary schools where the teachers were mainly women 
than in the boys secondary schools in the north. Consequently the examination results in 
the girls secondary schools were often much better than those in the boys secondary 
schools. For instance students in the upper top grades accepted into the universities in the 
science faculties were mainly women e. g. in the faculties of Medicine and Veterinary 
Science (71). This phenomenon had also some side effect on the women graduates 
working within the country. This was Particularly noticeable among the women Veterinary 
Doctors who had problem of utilizing their knowledge in the rural areas. In the first place 
they have the difficulty of persuading their parents to have them go to work in the rural 
areas. Secondly, if they succeeded to go to the rural areas, they usually found it difficult to 
persuade the male farmers to allow them to perform their professional fimctions in the 
field (72). These factors were sources of frustrations for the women graduates in 
particular. 
There were attempts by the Sudanese goveniment to curb the exodus of the professionals 
to other countries by offering some financial inducements but these attempts could not be 
sustained because of the poor state of the economy in the country. In the 1990, for 
example, the Education Policies Confefence fecomi-nended that "in ordef to attfact the 
best elements to improve the teaching profession and to put an end to the teachers 13 
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immigration, the teaching profession should be regarded as one of the first class 
professions such as the Medical service, the Judiciary and the Diplomatic service. The 
teachers should be provided some fiinge benefits such as free housing, transport, medical 
treatment, increments and aflowances" (73). It was easy to come up with such 
recommendations but putting them into practice remained a big problem to the 
government. 
The southern Sudan was not much affected by the problem of the brain drain to the 
Middle East until the mid- 1980s because of two main reasons. Firstly because the majority 
of the teachers in the southern Sudan were not Muslims and secondly because the majority 
could not teach through the Arabic medium. The Muslim teachers from the south who got 
into the streams of teachers going into the oil-rich countries did so through the 
government official channel. These were on secondment contracts of two to three years. 
5.8. THE TEACHERS TRADE UNIONS 
The Teachers Trade Unions had played a significant role in the formulation of educational 
policies in the Sudan during the period before the regime of President Nimeiry (74). This 
role was, to a large extent, curtailed during Nimeiry's regime. There were three levels of 
the teachers trade unions. These were the Primary, Intermediate and Secondary schools 
Teachers Trade Unions. When Nimeiry came to power in 1969 the teachers trade unions 
were expected to be the mouth piece of the govemment and were to propagate the 
philosophy and ideology of what was referred to as the May Revolution (75). They were 
no more an effective instrument in influencing educational policy development (76). Their 
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basic concern became the struggle to improve the teachers conditions of service 
particularly the teachers salaries. They became less concerned with macro-policy issues i. e. 
major issues of education such as the content of education, class size, library, laboratory 
etc. They argued that the quality of education was directly related to their conditions of 
service (77). 
The period of Nimeiry also witnessed the introduction of a new element in the Sudanese 
educational system. This was the emergence of a system of private tutoring, which was a 
feature much associated with of practiced in Egypt (78). This feature became common in 
the Sudan in the mid- 1970s. It was a practice whereby the wealthy parents engaged 
teachers to provide private tutoring to their children during the periods outside the normal 
school hours. This became an attractive phenomenon as it enabled the teachers to earn 
some extra money to add to their meager salaries (79). This feature led to the 
development of what became known as the Teachers' Trade Union Evening Schools. This 
was a system of semi-private schools, run by the teachers trade unions and provided the 
school leavers with the opportunity to continue with their education during evenings. This 
system became officially recognized by the government as a viable means of providing 
education for a great number of school leavers and school drop-outs (80). 
Because of the availability of part-time teaching and private tutoring, the teachers were 
reluctant to take up extra responsibilities in the schools. Many refused to be transferred to 
the rural schools where such opportunities did not exist (81). The result was the creation 
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of mal- distribution of teachers,, especially good and experienced science and maths 
teachers. This therefore led to the development of a trend of untrained and less 
experienced teachers flowing into the rural area schools. This had a significant impact on 
the performance of the students from the rural schools. This impact has been reflected in 
the poor results of the students from these deprived rural area schools (82). 
The active trade unions were those mostly in opposition to the governmen (83). These 
concentrated more on attempts to overthrow the government rather than suggesting to the 
government the best ways of improving the government educational policies. In acting 
thus they overlooked their important role of enhancing and improving the quality and 
standard of education in the country (84). The Trade Unions were also the channels 
through which some opportunists got into leadership positions without necessarily being 
the best or the right persons for the positions (85). For example the Minister for Services 
(the services Ministry included the Ministries of Education and Health) in Equatoria State 
in 1988 gained that post through the trade union. This Minister had no basic knowledge 
about either education or health. By the time he was appointed as a Minister he was on a 
waiting list of those to be interviewed for a teaching job in the schools in the southern 
region. 
5.9. THE TEACHERS CADRE POLICY. 
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This was a policy devised by the goveniment in 1977 to improve the teachers' terms of 
service and to broaden the base of the salary structure so as to accommodate the 
increasing number of teachers (86). The policy aimed at achieving three main things: 
To provide a better opponAmity for promotion by broadening the base of the salary 
structure. 
2. To provide better salary scales in order to prevent the outflow of teachers ftom the 
schools into other opportunities, either abroad or within the country. 
3. To cope with the new educational systerm 
There were multi-fold factors that triggered the governmen to take up this decision (87): 
1. There was a period, from the early 1970s when many teachers were seen moving away 
from the teaching profession in the country to go to teach in the Middle East oil rich 
countries. This initially affected the teachers of the primary and intermediate schools. 
2. It was also realized that teachers were moving away from the teaching profession to 
join other professions within the country. This was discovered to be due to the fact that 
the teachers were not regularly promoted or paid as compared to other professions. They 
also remained for a longer period in the same salary scale in relation to their colleagues in 
other professions who were of equal levels of education. They were as well not accorded 
the same privileges as accorded to other professions e. g. transport and housing facilities. 
In terms of prestige or status in the society the teachers faired even worst. AR these 
factors have caused many teachers to change their profession to join others which had 
relatively better terms of services. 
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I The third factor of urgency was the change of the education system from the 4-4-4 to 
the 6-3-3. This change triggered off great expansion of schools; thus requiring very many 
teachers especially at the primary and intermediate school levels. 
This situation had forced the governmen to attempt to find a means to better the teachers' 
terms of service so as to keep them in the teaching profession. The mechanism devised by 
the government was in the form of the teachers' cadre. To effect this the schools were 
classified according to the number of streams. The logic behind this was that previously, 
for instance,, all the Headteachers were accorded the same scale regardless of the size of 
the schools and the work loads involved. The cadre policy provided the opporamity for 
specific scales to be awarded, taking into consideration such criteria as qualification, 
experience, seniority and the size of the schools. A Headteacher of a three stream school, 
for example, was assumed to have more responsibilities than that of a two or one stream 
stream school. This was to be reflected in the salary scale. The other posts within the 
structure of the schools were similarly changed and the salary scales followed accordingly. 
For example a Deputy Headteacher or a Head of Department in a three stream school had 
a higher salary scale than that in a two or one stream school (88). 
The cadre policy also established a different salary range for the teachers from those of the 
other traditionaRy attractive professions such as those for Doctors and Engineers. The 
scales for the teachers were made to be higher, i. e. one step higher. The cadre policy also 
provided other privileges which by the law of the day would not have been stated 
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categoncafly e. g. the provision of housing and transport aHowances. These aHowances 
were abolished for the other professions but were included in the teachers' salaries (89). 
The implementation of the new salary structure for the teachers was done according to the 
guidelines provided by the central government which came about as a result of an 
agreement between the central government Ministries of Education, Public Service and 
Finance and the Teachers Trade Unions (90). The Regional Government did not 
participate in this agreement. The implementation of this scheme was immediate and fast 
in the northern Sudan. This was because the central Ministry of Public Service, soon after 
the passing of the cadre policy, had posted a Director of Personnel (Establishment) to the 
central Ministry of Education with a delegated authority to carry out the promotion of the 
teachers in the northem Sudan according to the new salary structure without referring the 
cases to the central Ministry of Public Service for approval. In the southern Sudan there 
was a backlog because there was no representative of the Ministry of Public Service in the 
Regional Ministry of Education with the same delegated authority as that in the north. So 
every case of promotion of the teachers in the southern Sudan had to be passed to the 
Regional Ministry of Public Service for processing and approval (9 1). It is to be noted that 
the Regional Ministry of Public Service was the only Ministry in the Southern Sudan that 
had the authority and power fi-om the central government to process and approve the 
appointment, promotions and even increments of pay to all the civil servants in the whole 
of the southern Sudan. This regional central control was one of the contributory factors in 
the delay in the implementation of the cadre policy in the southern Sudan. 
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At the levels of the provinces and districts, under whose jurisdiction the primary and 
intermediate education was placed, there were no Departments of Establishments capable 
of handling the cases of appointments and promotions. As a result there were great delays 
in the forwarding of files from the provinces to the Regional Ministry of Public Service in 
order to implement the new salary structure (92). There was therefore a delay of several 
years before the implementation of the cadre policy could fully be carried out in the 
southern Sudan. 
In general the main constraints in the implementation of the Public Service policies were 
created because of the lack of establishment offices at the province and district levels 
capable enough to deal with cases of appointments, promotions and increment of pay. 
Because of the serious need for teachers, the Assistant Commissioners for Education at 
the province levels and the Education Officers at the district levels appointed many 
teachers without following the right procedures including taking into account the 
existence of posts in the nominal rolls and without bringing the cases to the Regional 
Ministry of Public Service (93). So at the time of the implementation of the cadre policy a 
complex situation arose, not only of promotion but also appointments and finding previous 
vacant posts in the nominal roUs against which the appointments and promotions were to 
be made (94) 
A ffirther constraint was that, because the primary and the intermediate levels of education 
were wider the Local Government, under the 1971 Local Government Act, their personnel 
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budgets were prepared and approved at the provincial level by the Commissioners of the 
Provinces. Because the provincial and district offices lacked well established departments 
of establishment, they had the problem of budget preparation. Tle success for the 
implementation of the cadre policy depended very much on the availability or support of a 
budget which was to be reflected in the nominal rolls. The absence of all these factors, 
particularly at the provincial and district levels had caused the delay in the execution of the 
new salary structure and therefore brought about a lot of ftustrations among the teachers 
in the southern Sudan (95). 
5.10. CURRICULUM POLICY FOR TEACHER TRAINING AND 
EDUCATION. 
The Sudanese government maintained a close relationship between the formulation of its 
educational policies and the training and education of the teachers (96). The Sudan 
Education Sector review recommended a close cooperation between the training institutes 
in order to ensure the achievement of a unified professional thin-king and an integrity that 
would make possible the full utilization of the available resources (97). There is no 
available literature that showed that this trend was taken and from the evidence provided 
by the interviewees there was not much cooperation. Apparently the curriculum policy 
development has been confined to the inner circle within the Department of Curriculum in 
the central Ministry of Education. 
184 
During the Nitneiry's regime the programmes of the teacher training institutes were 
supposedly to be directed toward widening the bases of teachers' qualification so as to 
enable them to: 
1. Understand and apply the theories of education in such fields as pre-primary education, 
adult education, social development, social services, statistics and library science. 
2. Teach three or more subjects as a contribution to overcoming teachers shortages. 
Fuse together subject teaching and teaching methods in the institutes of education. 
4. Prepare the teachers to accept in-service training in stages. 
The curriculum policy for teacher training and education of the Sudanese government that 
came to power in 1989 was geared more towards the achievement of ideological and 
religious objectives than was the case during the Nimeiry's regime. The aims of the 
curriculum for the teacher training and education were stated as (98): 
1. Taking cognizance of the Arab strategy on education and curriculum development 
special emphasis is to be put on the professional aspects of teacher education and training 
curriculum. This aspect should equip the trainees with the basic skills which include 
continuous education and learning through the life time, and providing them with enough 
knowledge of the sciences of the Holy Koran to enable them effectively impart this 
knowledge to their pupils. The trainees should also have considerable professional 
language skills, particularly for teachers working in areas of linguistic interference, to 
enable them overcome the difficulties facing the students of those areas. 
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2. The curriculum of the teacher training be directed towards the achievement of major 
national aims, which include: 
(a) Consolidation of national unity. 
(b) Combating of divisionist and segregative sentiments. 
(c) Respect of the diverse opinions and beliefs of others. 
(d) Taking into account representation of the various environment of A the 
religions in the curriculum for teacher training, as far as it is possible. 
Creation of conducive atmosphere in all training institutions for proper moulding of 
teacher's personality as a good citizen and exemplary to his students based on religious 
values and national spirit 
5.11. CONCLUSION. 
The successive Sudanese goveniments since independence in 1956 have recognized the 
teachers as key professional group that must be managed, controlled and directed towards 
the moulding of an Arab-Islamic society. The training policies have therefore been geared 
towards the production of teachers with specific knowledge oriented to the Arab-Islamic 
world and Islamic ideologies. Tlie government remained quite inflexible in applying the 
policies related to teacher training and education. Hence its policy of centralization of the 
teacher training institutes in the country which provided very little room for any alternative 
policy fi-amework that would, otherwise, have accommodated the training needs of 
manpower resources in the whole country. One of the most powerful influences on the 
training policies in the Sudan has been the government's interest in the Aiab-Islamic 
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countriesq especially the oil-rich Arab States, who have been the country's main financial 
benefactors. 
The ofientation of the teachefs in the tfaining institutes towafds the Afab-Islamic 
background or environment has significant implications in relation to the application of 
knowledge to the reality of the educational needs of the country, particularly for the 
teachers for the southern schools. This has created a lack of awareness and understanding 
of the environmental problems in the country. The training provided made the teachers, 
especiaffy those in the southern Sudan, not to be good media for linking education and 
training they received to the practical needs and situation within the local environment. 
The govern ent's desire for Arab unity has taken priority over all other national needs of 
education. This has been one of the basic principles that also influenced educational policy 
formation in the Sudan. The government however failed to provide the right ingredients 
for the unity of the country. Hence it was dffEcult to redress the imbalances or disparities 
in the educational provision in the country. What the Sudan required was, in reality, =4 
in diversity i. e. the unity that takes account of or accommodates the diversities existing in 
the country but not simply forced assimilation. 
There is every indication that the imbalances in the provision of education in the country 
vAll persist if the trends of educational policies so far taken by the government are 
maintained. These were policies initiated and developed without adequate information that 
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would bave formed a broad base for policy decisions for a country as large and diversed as 
the Sudan. Nobody among the research interviewees was precisely aware of who, within 
the country, provided the required information or inputs to make the central government 
take decisions on educational policy issues. The most probable explanation was that the 
government did not require those inputs as there were already 'proven path' of education 
in the Islamic sense of education. 
The policies related to the teachers in general did not contribute to work satisfaction. It 
instead contributed to instability in the teaching force that led to teachers deserting the 
teaching profession or migrating to the oil-rich Arab countries. This has accounted greatly 
to the attrition ýi the profession and the loss of experienced teachers. The conditions that 
prevailed within the teaching profession such as low salaries poor promotion prospects 
and the low status in the Sudanese society were issues that caused the attrition in the 
teaching force. These factors were also the causes in the growth of the system of private 
tutoring, teachers' trade union evening schools and the brain drain to the oil-rich Arab 
countries. The government's attitudes, though not easy to concretize, have in many ways 
supported or encouraged the teachers' desertion of the teaching profession or the poor 
status accorded to the teachers. For instance by selecting students of lower grades to be 
admitted into the training institutes at all levels. Consequently many students used this 
foute as a steppmg stone to other professions e. g. for getting a university degree. 
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The policy of centralized teacher training did adversely affect the training and provision of 
teachers for the schools in the southern Sudan. The policies were generally not framed to 
suit the prevailing needs of teachers and schools in the southern Sudan. These therefore 
affected the development of relevant education in the south. These policies have been 
responsible for the large number of untrained teachers in the southern Sudan. One of the 
reasons for this, particularly for the teachers for the primary schools, was the lack of 
training institutes, both in the north and south, to train teachers using the English medium 
for the English pattern schools. The bulk of the untrained teachers in the southern Sudan 
were from the English pattern primary and intermediate schools. The policy of 
decentralization of administration of education did not correct the imbalance as it did not 
carry with it the transfer of political, legislative or legal powers that would have enabled 
the southern regional government to exercise its own independent powers to, for instance, 
establish teacher training institutes specifically to suit the southern situation. 
The next chapter looks into the language policies in the Sudan and how these have 
influenced education in the country as a whole and the southern Sudan in particular. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
LANGUAGE POLICY 
6.1. THE LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE NATIONAL CONTEXT. 
There are more than 100 languages spoken as mother tongues in the Sudan. Of these the 
Arabic language has been recognized constitutionally as the official language and the main 
medium for conduct of government in the whole country from the time of independence in 
1956. The English language has beeii acknowledged as the principal language in the 
southern Sudan since 1972 as a result of the Addis Ababa Agreement that recognized the 
Southern Sudan as an autonomous region within united Sudan (1). Despite this 
constitutional provision the language policy that attempted to differentiate the position of 
the southern region from the rest of the other parts of the country, the language issue 
remained a controversial educational matter between the north and southern Sudan. It 
remained a strongly guided political matter by the central government. In the southern- 
Sudan the language issue was considered as a sensitive area of education which was not 
subject to open debate because of the political implication it would cause in the south - 
north relation. 
The report of the Sudan Education Sector Review (1977), that was regarded as one of the 
most comprehensive government sponsored reports, recommended the use of the Arabic 
language as a language of instruction at all levels and for all types of education. But the 
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reason the report gave to support this recommendation took no cognizance of the 
multilingual nature of the country. It stated that "Arabic language is the means for the 
Sudanese child to attain knowledge and relate to life. It is also its heritage and culture" 
(2). The simplified argument put forward for the Alabicisation policy was that the 
Sudanese should study in Arabic just as the Germans study in German and the English in 
English (3). Considering the multitude of the languages existing in the country and the 
absence of proper research undertaken to come to this conclusion on the language policy, 
one could envisage difficulties in the implementation of the policy fight ftom. the initial 
stage. 
Politicaffy the apparent objective of the Arabicisation policy was stated as being in pursuit 
of national integration and national unity. T'his has been the reflection of northern 
Sudanese scholars and politicians. For them Arabic was an indispensable element in the 
national integration and unity. This is what Mohammed Omer Beshir, renowned northern 
Sudanese Educationist,, had said: "National integration cannot be accelerated if English 
continues to be accorded a principal place and the southern languages are accorded a 
minor position. In the process of national integration, English cannot play the same role as 
Arabic and a southern language" (4). Five of the research interviewees ftom the northern 
Sudan have supported the integrative element of the Arabic language. The introduction of 
the Arabic language as medium of instruction in the schools was said to be acceptable 
because Arabic is the language of the nation (5). What probably was said to have been 
lacking was the fight combination of initiative and commitment to this cause (6). The 
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approach taken was a political move with less thorough study of the technical problems 
involved in the implementation e. g. the provision of the reference materials, trained 
teachers and fimds (7). 
From the southern Sudanese point of view the enforced use of the Arabic language was 
doomed to failure because Arabic was one of the thorny issues in the south - north relation 
in the whole history of the Sudan. This was reflected in some of the responses of southem 
Sudanese to the language policy issues in the country. Francis M. Deng, in his book 
'Dynamics of Identification", for instance, questioned that "given the fact that the 
southerner is not an Arab, should Arabism be used as the foundation for national identity 
and integration or should uniting labels be explored and used" (8). Jack Ngalam said "to 
sacrifice one's mother tongue for a national language for the sake of national unity and 
integration, is stretching the point too far" (9). Soforonio Efuk stated that the national 
language policy undermined the very fabric of the southern Sudanese society (10). It was 
not in the interest of the central government to encourage the use of the local languages in 
the schools. This was indicative of the governmen 's insensibility to take account of the 
desire of the southern Sudanese to preserve their traditional cultures. Language, culture, 
identity and traditional values would be regarded as part of this preservation (11). As 
Kehnan has argued (in Watson, 1994), "although a common language would obviously 
make for a more unified and cohesive society, efforts to create such a language where it 
does not clearly exist may have precisely the opposite effect. In determining whether a 
common language would be helpful and, if so, what form it ought to take, policy-makers 
197 
and language planners must consider not only the potential of such a language in binding 
the population to the nation state, sentimentally and instrumentally but also the 
sentimentally and instrumentally based resistance that the proposed policy would call forth 
in different sub-groups within the population" (12). As far as the Arabic language was 
concerned the government was not prepared for any ideal option. 
The academic justification of the policy of Arabicisation was provided by Dr. Ali El Tahir 
Sharaf El Din of the Department of Physics, University of Khartourn, in a paper presented 
to a seminar organized by the National Council for Higher Education, where he defined 
Arabicisation as: "the transfer of knowledge from a foreign language into Arabic with the 
purpose of providing human knowledge for the Arab readers through books and for the 
Arab audience through speech, A within an authentic Arab mode of thought. 
Arabicisation within these limits should be governed by Arab cultural patterns and in 
harmony with Arab methods of education, deduction of facts and development of 
concepts" (13). This was how Dr. Ali El Tahir justified his point of view: "anyone who 
receives his education in an alien language would become unable to think in an Arab way. 
He in fact becomes a foreigner to his culture whatever superficial aspects of it he portrays" 
(14). How would Dr. Afi El Tahir justify his argument in the light of all the Sudanese 
graduates, including himselý who have gone through the universities within and outside 
the country using the English medium Until the 1990s aH the universities in the Sudan, 
except the Omdurman Islamic University and Cairo University branch in Khartouni, were 
ruming in English. Dr. Ali El Tahir did not take into consideration the multilingual and 
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multicultural nature of the Sudanese society, but regarded the Sudan as wholly an Arab- 
Islamic country. 
The teaching of the Arabic language in the schools put much emphasis on Arabising (15). 
This was clearly shown in the content of the Arabic language curriculum where the 
recommended books contained only materials from Arab backgrounds especially at the 
early stages of education. 'Me context of the books were completely removed from the 
learners from the southern Sudan (16). 
One of the primary objectives of the national language policy, focused on Arabicisation, 
was to try to detribalize the indigenous tribes in the Sudan with all their multiple languages 
(17). A sipificant detribalizing effect of Aiabicisation had already been seen among some 
of the tribes in the western Sudan e. g. among the Fur and the Nubas. The people in the 
Nuba Mountain Areas ( mainly the Nuba tribes) did not have an alternative to the use of 
Arabic language as a medium of instruction in the schools. They have been subjected to 
the use of Arabic language over many centuries by the forceful and poweiful Arabs (18). 
The imposition of the Arabic language and Arab culture on these tribes had greatly 
distorted the general lives of the people in these areas. In the schools the children were 
harshly punished for speaking their local languages (19). The success of Aiabicisation in 
these areas made the national government to assume that a similar development of 
assimilation could take place in the southern Sudan over a period of time. Hence its 
consistent and relentless insistence on the use of Arabic language throughout the country. 
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Ideally the major objective of a language policy is to maintain harmony and cohesion of 
the nation's unity and at the same time to maintain the cultures of the people which are 
best expressed through the various languages (20). This seemed not to have been the case 
in the Sudan because of the strong connection of Islam and Islamic culture to the Arabic 
language which placed no relevance to the development of local languages within the 
national language framework (2 1). The fink between Islam and Arabic language in the 
Sudanese context was accountable for the arbitrary nature of the language policy 
formation in the country without the necessary studies about its feasibility and the impact 
on education. It was assumed that there was no alternative language better or equal to 
Arabic (22). Ile implementation of the national language policy did not even take into 
consideration the ifinancial and human resources essential for implementation. This was 
more of a political expedient than a cointribution to effective education for the whole 
population in the country (23). This explicitly meant the use of political power to 
subjugate the use of the other languages in the country. There was generally a lack of 
political wiH on the part of the governmen to consider other languages in the country as 
important in the socio-economic development of the country. The real motive was 
acculturation of the whole of the country through Arabicisation (24). According to Abdel 
Mural Girshab, a lecturer from University of Gezira, Arabicisation was an emotional 
political decision rather than a decision that was to help in having an effective 
development of education (25). It was not based on a properly laid down planned 
programme that was to be implemented gradually over a long period of time (26). 
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A southern Sudanese linguist from the University of Juba stated that the language policy 
of using Arabic as a medium of instruction would not have been a dangerous thing but the 
way it was introduced and how it was introduced was bad (27). He gave three main 
reasons for the failure of the policy: 
1. Not sufficient time was provided for the training of the teachers and the phasing out of 
the English pattern teachers. There was in fact no laid out programme for the gradual 
phasing out of the English medium teachers nor their re-trabi-ing in the use of Arabic 
language as a medium for teaching in the schools. 
2. The immediate implementation of the policy triggered resistance, self-defense which 
were not conducive to the implementatioin of a language policy, however good the policy 
might have been. 'nie attitude of the people and the impression they had about Arabic was 
therefore of repulsion. 
3. The policy was imposed without proper research. 
6.2. THE LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE SOUTHERN SUDAN. 
The Southern Provinces Regional self-government Act of 3rd March 1972 translated the 
Addis Ababa Agreement into an organic law having the character of a constitution for the 
southern. Sudan. The law provided for an executive body in the form of a High Executive 
Council and a legislative body known as the Regional People's Assembly. The Act 
prohibited any prejudice of the lights of citizens resident in the southern Sudan on the 
grounds of race, tribal origin, religion, place of birth or sex. The English language was 
designated as the principal language of the southern Sudan, although other languages may 
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be used for reasons of practical necessity or efficiency (28). The reason for the choice of 
English as the principal language for the southern Sudan was explained as: 'The choice of 
English as the principal language of the south, at the signing of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement was in consideration of the fact that our background in English is stronger than 
in any other foreign language including Arabic" (29). The Addis Ababa Agreement 
enacted that: "Arabic shall be the official language for the Sudan and English the principal 
language for the Southern Region without prejudice to the use of any other language or 
languages which may serve a practical necessity of to the efficient and expeditious 
discharge of executive and administrative fimctions of the Region" (30). The terms 
'official' and 'principal' languages have not been defined in the Agreement. This was an 
ambiguous statement to which eventuaffy no serious concern was paid as it carried no 
significant weight as far as the central government was concerned (3 1). The self- 
govemmein Act moreover did not permit the Regional People's Assembly and the Fligh 
Executive Council to legislate or exercise powers with respect to economic, social and 
educational planning (32). These were areas without which the regional language plans 
were bound to fail. 
It took the Southern Regional government four years from the signing of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement before it came out with an alternative language policy for the southern Sudan. 
The general attitude of the Regional Government was that the national language policy 
issue, with particular reference to the position of Arabic, was a sensitive area because of 
its integrative element in the eyes of the central governmen . 
The politicians in the south 
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were aware of the political implications it entailed in terms of their positions in the 
government. The Regional government was also conscious of the reluctance of the central 
governiment to change the existing language policy that would otherwise unsettle the 
existing status quo. The regional government was therefore faced with the dilemma of 
maintaining national unity and at the same time securing regional loyalty. Because of this 
situation the regional government was forced to come up with a language policy which 
was intended to accommodate both the national and regional aspirations. 
The lack of unity among the southern politicians made it practically difficult for the 
regional government to have consensus on policy issues in terms of south - north relations. 
This was because of the division among the politicians especially between those who were 
outside the country during the 17 years civil war and those who stayed inside the country 
during that period (33). The conffict of interest and the lack of agreement on policy issues 
affecting the southern Sudan made it difficult for the Regional People's Assembly to make 
effective use of, for instance, the provision in the Regional self-governmen Act that 
allowed it, by a two-third majority, to request the President of the Republic to postpone 
the coming into force of any national law or policy that the members believed would 
adversely affect the welfare and interests of the citizens of the Southern Region (34). 
Hence the formation of the dual pattern of language policy for the southern schools which 
was devised in order to accommodate the northern and southern interests (35). This was a 
political decision taken by the Regional Government which was not rewarded by the 
central govemment (36). 
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The Regional Language Policy (1976) says that (37): 
1. From primary one to primary four in the rural areas vernacular language shall be the 
medium of histruction. English and Arabic shaH be taught as subjects. From primary four 
to primary six English shall be the medium of instruction and Arabic shall continue to be 
taught as a subject. In the urban primary schools the medium of instruction shall be Arabic 
and Enghsh shaH be taught as a subject. 
2. In the intermediate schools Arabic shall be the medium of instruction and English shall 
be taught as a subject. 
3. In the secondary schools English shall be the medium of instruction and Arabic shall be 
taught as a subject. 
Six of the research interviewees pointed out that the regional governmen 's approach to 
the formation of the regional language policy was similar to that imposed by the central 
government. It made the same mistakes the central government made by not having 
carried out proper research and consultation with regard to the formation of the language 
policy and without taking account of the factors that would affect its implementation. The 
regional language policy was therefore created in a vacuum in that it came out without a 
proper plan of how the implementation was going to be carried out (38). One of the main 
problems was the absence of trained Arabic and English teachers in the southern Sudan to 
teach these languages effectively (39). T'he regional government for instance did not 
provide answers to the following questions (40): 
1. Were the teachers available? 
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2. Have the teachers been trained or how long would it take to have them trained? 
3. Were the teaching materials made available? 
4. What were the aims of having the local languages taught? 
5. Were there definite plans made for the use of these local languages and how would this 
be sustained in the long run? 
The available teachers for the local languages were the few former bush school teachers 
(41). The formulation of the regional language policy that favoured the use of the local 
languages in the primary schools was not even followed by the production of reading 
materials e. g. text-books, local newspapers or programmes in the radio to listen to so that 
the language could regenerate itself (42). If the intention of having the local language was 
to make the children read and write in that language, what use were they to make of their 
reading or writing ability once they have gained it? This question was not answered. 
The regional language policy framework contained a number of confusions. In the first 
place it did not follow the national trend of language policy which was Arabic as a medium 
of instruction and English to be taught as a sub ect (43). In one way the southern j 
politicians did not like to be seen as siding with the north while on the other hand they 
would like to please the northern government so as to maintain their positions. This was 
one of the main causes of the ambiguity in the language policy (45). 
The confusion in the regional language policy was clearly shown in the schooling system in 
the southern Sudan (46). The Arabic pattern pupils were not given the minimum 
knowledge of English language until they reach the intermediate school level. At this level 
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they were expected, after three years, to have sufficient bases of knowledge of English to 
enable them go and learn in English in the secondary school, which also lasted three years. 
While the students struggled to know the language they were at the same time struggling 
to know the subject matters (47). The language teachers were also affected in their 
effectiveness in the teaching because of the lack of text-books. The few books available 
wefe shafed within schools and pupils wefe not allowed to take them home. Thefe wefe 
no schools or public libraries to which the pupils could go to read (48). Moreover many of 
the teachers were not resourceful because of lack of training. They therefore lacked 
confidence in the language teaching (49). 
The regional government's dual language policy was also a disaster for educational 
development in the southern Sudan in the sense that the compromising dual nature of the 
policy had the impact of cfeating people who wefe pfactically uneducated (50). Very few 
were able to go to the university. On average less than ten southern. Sudanese students 
were admitted into the national universities in any single year (5 1). T'he highest number of 
southern students taken in one year was in 1973, where 91 students got accepted in the 
national university. These were mainly students who returned from East Africa after the 
17 years of civil war. They were exempted from sitting for Arabic in the examination as a 
prerequisite for admission into the national universities (52). 
The Arabic language as the official language of the Sudan and the predominant language 
of instruction and the English language as the principal language of the southern region 
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had also caused a number of administrative problems in the southern Sudan. These 
included the duplication of school materials, office equipment, translation of syllabuses 
and books from Arabic into English (53). One other offshoot of the dual language policy 
was the creation of a spirit of confrontation and conflict between the students of the two 
patterns of schools. The English pattern students were often branded by the Arabic pattem 
students as foreign students (54). This sometimes created an atmosphere not conducive to 
learning as frequently physical fighting broke out between the two patterns which often 
resulted into the closure of schools. 
From early 1980s the pressure on the use of Arabic as a medium of instruction in the 
southern schools continued to increase. Fewer and fewer southern students were admitted 
into the national universities because of the poor perfon-nance in the examinations. The 
in cause for the low admission was attributed to not having passed the Arabic language 
in the examinations as a pre-condition for admission. The confusion among the politicians 
also continued to build. On the one hand some southern politicians regarded Arabic as an 
element in northern political and cultural domination. On the other hand some of the 
politicians in the central government and in the regional government (the insiders) 
considered their unfamiliarity with Arabic a handicap. This has been manifested in the lack 
of interest of southern Sudanese politicians to contest for seats in the national assembly. 
Two reasons were given for this reluctance. Firstly because the proceedings of the national 
assembly touched less on the affairs of the southern region. Secondly because the southern 
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politicians lacked confidence in participating in the debates in the national assembly which 
were conducted in Arabic (54). 
Because of the many problems and confusions enumerated, the regional language policy 
failed to be implemented. Another attempt to produce a workable language policy 
framework for the southern Sudan was made by Equatoria. State Ministry of Education, in 
an educational conference held in the town of Juba, in May 1988. The conference came 
out with the following recommendations as a basis for a regional language policy for the 
southern region (55): 
1. That fi-om primary one to primary three vernaculars be the media of instruction. English 
and Arabic be taught as subjects. From primary four to primary six English shaH be the 
medium of instruction and Arabic shall be taught intensively as a subject. Tle vernacular 
language shall continue to be taught in these stages as a subject. 
2. That in the intermediate and secondary schools English shall continue to be the medium 
of instruction with A. 1abic taught intensively as a subject. A vernacular language shall 
continue to be taught as a subject and to be examinable. 
3. Vernacular languages shall be included in the curriculum of the primary teacher training 
institutes in the southern Sudan. 
These recommendations were approved by the Equatoria State government but their 
implementation was halted by the military coup of 1989 which brought a new Islamic 
goveniment in powef. The new fegime came up with a new language policy which 
emanated from a 'national' education policies conference held hi Khartoum in September 
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1990. The new National Language Policy demanded that Arabic be the medium of 
instruction,, without exception, throughout the Sudan (56). This policy therefore crippled 
the attempt of the regional government once again. 
6.3. THE INSTITUTE OF REGIONAL LANGUAGES (IRL). 
Resolution No. 247 (1975) of the Regional High Executive Council instructed the Regional 
Ministry of Education to re-introduce the teaching of local languages in the southem 
schools while at the same time aiming to enable the children to become proficient in 
Arabic and English (57). As a result the Regional Government established an Institute of 
Regional Languages (IRL) in the town of Maridi in 1977. The institute was originally 
meant to be a research centre for the study of the regional languages. It was to engage in 
the development of the southern languages through linguistic research, the training of the 
FR, L staff and teachers and it was to develop mother tongue literacy materials and graded 
materials for translation to English or Arabic (58). The IRL received assistance from the 
American-based Summer Institute of Linguistics. The SIL was basicaRy a religious 
organization, and its original objective was to translate the Bible into as many languages as 
possible. This primary objective was not stated in the organization's later contract with the 
regional government for fear of incrimination as a Christian religious organization. They 
were even prepared to wTite the materials in the local "Juba Arabic" if this would enable 
them to reach their primary objective, provided that the features depicted showed the 
southern characteristics (59). They were not prepared to come to direct confrontation 
with the central government (60). The SEL fh-st came into the southern Sudan in 1974, 
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two years after the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement. When the Institute of Regional 
Languages was formed in 1977 SEL took the opportunity to make an agreement with the 
regional government of the South to assist in the local language project. 
The Institute of Regional Languages however failed to live up to its primary objectives for 
a number of reasons: 
1. The central government was not in favour of the centre because it believed that the 
institute would work against the policy of Airabicisation of the southem Sudan (6 1). As a 
result the expected fimds from the central government were not provided. 
The ML was linked to the Curriculum Development Centre at Maridi but there 
were no southern Sudanese trained in curriculum development to run the Curriculum 
Centre (62). 
The Regional Goverment did not do much to have the regional languages 
implemented. It did not put in the meager financial resources to develop the institute. The 
language policy issues were considered 'sensitive areas'. The regional government did not 
therefofe avail the funds fof the tfahiing of the teachef s. The few old village school 
teachers were the only ones being trained by the SEL (63). 
4. The majority of the southern Sudanese, including the politicians, have a low 
opinion of the local languages. The local language officer s themselves felt too low or 
down graded for being called local language officers. They did not like to be identified 
with local languages. As a result several of them sought for further training in other fields 
and so left the job of being local language officers (64). 
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5. Leaming the local language was not a prestigious form of learning because of the 
belief that its acquisition did not take one anywhere and no job opportunities were at hand 
for it and moreover it was not financiaUy rewarding (65). 
6. There was a lack of consistency in the application of the policy of the local 
languages. Though the regional government language policy advocated the use of the local 
languages, it did not emphasize or encourage their use. As a result no value was put on the 
learning of the local languages by the students, parents and teachers because these could 
lead to no useful ends. The English and Arabic languages were considered the only 
avenues fof highef leanling and employment in the ufban centres (66). 
The IRL could have produced some materials in the local languages with the 
assistance provided by the SEL, but it lacked the means or outlets of enforcing the 
implementation. There was no political will or the mechanisms, on the part of the regional 
governmen to distribute the materials to other schools other than the pilot schools in 
Maridi (67). 
6.4. THE LANGUAGE POLICY AND UNIVERSITY EDUCATION. 
Until the late 1980s all the higher institutions of learning, except the Omdurman Islamic 
University and the Cairo University branch in Khartoum, were using English as the 
medium of instruction. But the talks about changing the medium into Arabic had started as 
early as 1970. A Ministerial and Technical Committee on the University of Khartoum had 
in 1970 expressed the view that the use of English as a medium of instruction in the 
university education reflected a kind of cultural dependency. It recommended that Arabic 
211 
should be given its proper place as the main language of instruction. It also recommended 
its adoption as the official language of communication in university meetings (68). The 
attempts were met with mountains of difficulties including the lack of resources for 
translating the huge volumes of English reference books and materials into Arabic, and the 
. C--- imancial resources to buy alternative Arabic books from the other Arab countries (69). 
Moreover, despite the international character of the modem Arabic, its usage varies from 
country to country (70). All these factors made the earlier attempts to change the medium 
of instruction from English into Arabic in the University abortive. 
According to Yusuf Fadl Hassan, a lecturer at the University of Khartoumý there was no 
doubt about the value, validity and urgency of Arabicising the curriculum without 
undermiiiiiig the role of English: what probably was lacking, he stated, was the right 
combination of initiative and commitment to this cause (71). Yusuf Fadl Hassan, like many 
other northern Sudanese intellectuals,, did not take account of the complexity of Sudanese 
society and the implications the changes in the language policy might cause to university 
education. The Arabicisation of the university education could not be accomplished during 
the whole period of President Nimeiry's regime though Arabic language remained a 
prerequisite for acceptance into the national universities. 
The fuR weight of the Aiabicisation policy on the university education was felt from the 
year 1989 when the current Islamic Fundamentalist government took over power in the 
Sudan. The prospect for its success is not easy to assess since the original factors that 
prevented the earlier implementation attempts are stiR in place. The importance of 
212 
Arabicisation to the new government regime, in higher education, was summed up by 
Dr. Sharaf El Din (72) as follows: 
1. It would make it easier for the teacher to express himself accurately and for the 
student to absorb and understand the subject. 
It would strengthen the link between the students and the university and their 
community. Self-esteem and self-reliance would be encouraged and greater scope 
offered for intellectual inquiry and debate. 
3. In economic term, Arabicisation will save money as locafly produced books are 
less costly than imported ones. 
4. The use of Arabic for teaching is a means of promoting the national identity and 
unity and ending dependence on foreign cultures. 
There will be a return to Arab cultural origins and roots. 
6. Arabicisation can provide a powerful factor in promoting cultural and national 
unity among the Sudanese in all their diverse ethnic groups. 
These academic arguments by Dr. Sharaf El Din were ideals which realistically did not suit 
the complex situation in the Sudan. The argument provided by Dr. Sharaf El Din totally 
disregarded the existence of the Afficans in the Southern Sudan, in particular, whose 
cultufal ofigins afe quite distinct from those of the Aiabs in the northem Sudan and who 
regard Arabic as an alien language. All that he has stated suited the northern Sudan but 
not the south. Tle University of Juba, in the southern Sudan, for instance, was established 
with the pfincipal objective of taking account of the Southein Region's needs and to 
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respond more quickly and sensitively to the environment in the southern Sudan (73). Dr. 
Sharaf was not in any case concerned about the impacts the policy he advocated would 
have on those who were not Arabs. 
The response to Dr. Sharaf s justification for using Arabic as a language of instruction in 
the national universities has been provided by Sibrino B. Forojalla in the fight of the 
position of the University of Juba. Sibrino B. Forojalla, a lecturer in the University of Juba, 
stated that the same reasons or arguments put forward by Sharaf could equally be the 
arguments that the African Sudanese in the southern Sudan could put in regards to being 
subjected to A-fabicisation by the Arab dominated northern goveniment. Besides the basic 
differences between the north and the south, there were a number of difficulties in the 
implementation of the Arabicisation policy in the universities (74) which included: 
1. The lack of text-books and other reference in Arabic for the use of students and 
lecturers in the range of subjects. 
2. The lack of a sufficient number of lecturers able to teach the range of subjects 
offered in the universities in Arabic. 
The lack of adequate fimds from which to meet the needs for the required books 
and other materials and teaching staff 
4. The lack of sufficient time aflowed between the commencement of the policy and 
the expected commencement of its implementation. 
Other related factors included: 
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I. T'he variation in the Arabic language usage among the various Arab countries 
which would present some problems in the use of the imported books without 
revision to suit the Sudanese situation. 
2. The ability of the academic staff to lecture in Arabic varied widely. A typical 
example was that of the academic staff of the University of Juba who could be 
divided into four groups according to their knowledge of and ability to lecture in 
Arabic (75): 
(a) There are those who could teach in Arabic without too much difficulty 
given adequate supplies of text-books and reference materials and sufficient 
time to prepare. 
(b) There are those who have some knowledge of Arabic but would require at 
least one or two years of special training to enable them teach properly. 
(C) Tbere are those who only have knowledge of spoken colloquial Arabic. 
(d) There are those who have no knowledge of Arabic at all, spoken or 
otherwise. 
Apparently the government did not have a definite planned programme of how to deal 
with the multitude of difficulties in the implementation of the Arabicisation policy in the 
university education. There were, for instance, no planned phases of the implementation 
and how the English lecturers were going to be phased out. What was practically taking 
place was the dismissal of lectufefs who could not cope with the Arabicisation policy (76). 
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The Arabicisation policy had also caused some confusion in the learning ability of the 
students. The students were lectured in Arabic, given notes in Arabic but when they go to 
the library they only got English reference books or materials, which many found difficult 
to comprehend (77). The students had difficulties of connecting what the lecturer gave in 
Arabic and what were contained in the library books in English. Therefore converting the 
cognitive processes so that listening was translated into reality when the student read in 
English became a problem (78). One of the offshoots of this problem was that the 
lecturers began to print their own notes in A-rabic and sold them to the students. So there 
grew up a sort of profit making market for the lecturers in the university. The notes were 
printed with the promise to the students that the examinations would come out of the 
notes provided. Consequently the students only concentrated on the limited amount of 
notes printed by the individual lecturers. The knowledge acquired in the various disciplines 
was therefore most probably limited to the notes provided (79). 
Most of the universities in the Sudan were 50% understaffed and were overloaded. 
Introducing further difficulty in the form of the Arabic language as a medium of 
instruction caused an additional problem (80). The political nature of the introduction of 
the language policy was a characteristic of the approach of the government that came to 
power in 1989. The policy was seen by many academics as part of the cultural "siege" 
being tighten around the country (8 1). For instance, the Central Distribution House, 
originafly established by Nimeiry in 1970, was made to censor all overseas publications 
before aHovAng them inside the country (82). 
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6.5. CONCLUSION. 
In talking about education, it is inevitable that the language question come to the front line 
because it is the medium through which knowledge is transmitted. In the Sudan the 
language policy has been focused on Arabicisation of education. This has been consistently 
and relentlessly pursued by the various governments in the Sudan since independence in 
1956. The Sudanese government's pre-occupation with the policy of Alabicisation was 
based on the conception that Arabic was the only channel for forging oneness of the 
country, though apparently there was no nationwide sentiment of belonging together 
created. A final analysis of the language policy aimed at imposed linguistic uniformity 
Shows clear ideological and religious justification based on Islamic religion. From the 
government's point of conception Arabicisation was synonymous with breaking down 
ethnic loyalty and destruction of multilingual characteristics of the Sudanese society. It 
associated multilingualism with divisiveness which, it assumes, works against the intended 
form of identity envisaged by the governmen . But all the 
indications were that this was 
simply a convenient scapegoat for the real causes of divisiveness. It did not, for instance, 
take into consideration the historically entrenched cultural, linguistic and religious 
differences between the north and south Sudan. 
From the national government's perception multilingualism was a barrier to national 
integratioti and unity and that allowing linguistic diversity in the country would preclude 
political unity. In coming to this conclusion the goveniment disregarded the important 
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element of carrying out a thorough study to assess the suitability and impact of the 
language policy that it decided to adopt in the country. Neither did it make any reference 
to linguistic experts who might be in a position to give advice on the language. The only 
explanation that could be advanced was that such a study was not necessary and relevant 
because,, from the government stand, the importance of Arabic could not be equated with 
any other language. The position of Arabic was not subject to public debate or public 
opinion. 
There was a complete lack of political will on the pail of the government to search for 
othef alternative language of significance to education. It was not pfepared to harness 
whatever positive advantages of the phenomenon of multilingualism were there. There 
were some living examples from other countries that proved that multilingual policy did 
not work against national unity e. g. in Kenya, Ghana , 
Switzerland and Belgium. A 
Nigerian linguist, Ayo Bomgbose, for instance stated that "a common language is not a 
necessary condition for a unified state and that one or more major language groups can 
coexist with minimal conflict between thern7'(83). However coping with the consequences 
of multilingual policy was a thing that the national government was not prepared to face. 
The subordinate position of the Southem Regional government, in terms of the national 
policy issues, and the constitutional and political constraints that controlled its fimctions,, 
forced the Regional Government to make a language policy pronouncement that was 
prone to failure. This was a language policy which was intended to accommodate the 
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national interest and contain the regional sentiments. This compromising approach 
manifested itself in the general attitude by the regional government that the language 
policy issue in the Sudan was a sensitive matter. This attitude was based on the 
assumption that the unity of the country anchored on using Arabic language nationwide. 
But another hidden element in this attitude was the fact that the politicians in the regional 
governmen feared loosing their positions which were dependent on their allegiance to the 
national policies. This sensitivity was, in many ways, a hindrance to positive language 
policy development in the region. 
The deliberate enforcement of the Arabic language as the medium of instruction in the 
schools and university education had a disastrous effect on education in the southern 
Sudan. It apparently worked against the attainment of meaningful education in the 
southern Sudan and was accountable for the low standards of education and the great 
number of failures and drop-outs. It denied the majority of students from the southern 
Sudan the opportunity of entering the national universities. Another anomaly in the 
language policy, in terms of employment in the southern Sudan, was that the graduates of 
the universities who expected to work in the south were to work through English as the 
principal language in the government in the southern Sudan. In the final analysis the 
regional govenitnerit was left in a state of total dilemma and a lack of definite direction. 
The next chaptef analyses the policies applied to the f1igher Education in the Sudan. it in 
particular high lighted the effects of the higher education policies on the southern Sudan. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7. HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY 
7.1. THE NATIONAIL POLICY TRENDS: 
The expressed philosophy, objective and orientation of higher education in the Sudan was 
intended to relate the university education to the needs and demands of the Sudanese 
society with a view of assuring 'national identity' and 'originality'. Its basic role, as 
expressed by the national governmen , 
besides playing a greater part in serving the needs 
of the community, was to demonstrate a greater interest in the social and cultural life and 
problems of the community (1). The basic pre-occupation of the government was how to 
devise the means and approach of achieving these goals which it had set itself 
Soon after President Nimeiry came to power in the Sudan on the 25th May 1969 he 
directed changes of the university in accordance with the philosophy of his new 
government. The university was to be guided by the ideology of the new political systern, 
the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) (2). This was a new political organization created by 
Nimeiry after he banned A the political parties in the country. A Ministerial and Technical 
Committee, constituted on the 4th November 1969, was to review the fimctions, 
structures and the laws of the university of Khartoum. This Committee focused its 
attention on two main areas: 
1. The need to link up the university to the state so that it became an inseparable part of 
the government's machinery, geared towards the interests of the Sudanese people. 
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2. The need to link up the university with Sudanese society so that it could meet its 
intellectual and scientific needs. This was to be resolved through changes in the content of 
the University education (3). 
'Me Committee, in its recommendations, criticized the university for having continued to 
exist ahnost like an isolated foreign institution. This was a type of phrase that had been 
commonly used to attack most universities in the Aftican countries especially those with 
Western basis of foundation. The recommeiadations that the Ministefial and Technical 
Committee provided were embodied in the National Council for Higher Education Act, 
1972. The National Council for Higher Education (NCHE) was given quite substantial 
powers over institutions of higher learning in the country. It was supposed to be in a 
position to coordinate the activities of the higher education institutions and their 
development in so far as this was required for meeting national needs and for getting full 
value for Government money (4). The fimctions of the National Council for Fligber 
Education included the following: 
Surveillance over the planning and coordination of general policy of higher education 
and setting plans for projects for their execution. 
2. Defining the role of every institution of higher leaming within the ftamework of its 
plans and programmes. 
3. Specifying the number of students admitted annually, the standards and ratio of those 
admitted to enroll in the academic and technical education, including the ratio of admission 
to each discipline. 
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4. Determining the appointment qualificatious for each member of staff and other terms of 
service. 
5. Reviewing budget proposals submitted by the governmental institutions of higher 
education and itemizing the amount of grants to be paid before recommending it to the 
President of the Republic. It is worth noting that the President of the Republic was also 
the Chanceflor of A institutions of higher education in the country 
6. Assessing the performance of the institutions of higher education and reviewing their 
annual reports. The scale of the review was influenced by a number of considerations 
including the amount of money that can be made available. 
The National Councit chaired by the Minister of Education, included in its membership 
five other Ministers and twelve other members holding positions of responsibility in higher 
education institutions (5). The presence of the Ministers in the Council was basically to 
guard or guide the government policies regarding higher education and to see to it that the Cý-- 
higher education institutions operate within the policy ftamework set for them by the -4: 7- 
government. This was indicative of the governmen plans to have control of the higher 
education institutions. But to what extent the Ministers in the National Council or the 
National Council as a whole influenced the activities on higher institutions of learning was 
not easy to determine. The composition of the Council itself was an indication that it could 
not be able to meet oftener than perhaps three or less times a year. Its functions were, of 
necessity, con-fmed to matters of policy (6). 
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The 1973 Permanent Constitution of the Sudan, under the Chapter entitled "Ile 
Directives principles of the State Policy", specified that the State "guarantees the 
academic independence of the university and safeguards freedom of thought and scientific 
research". It also stated that it was incumbent on the state to "direct academic learning 
and scientific research towards the service of the society and development requirements" 
(7). A similar principle was stated in the 1985 Provisional Constitution after the overthrow 
of President Nimeiry. Both of the constitutions contained elements of freedom and 
control. Clause 6 of the 1973 University Act defined the meaning of autonomy of the 
university and the relationship of the university with the law of the country and the 
national policies as thus: 'Vithout prejudice to the laws for the time being in force or any 
national policy for the coordination of higher education, the university shall be 
independent body in which the members of the academic staff shaR enjoy freedom of 
thought and scientific research" (8). In the course of time during President Nimeiry's reign 
the academic freedom and freedom of thought became graduaUy eroded because of 
continuous political interference in the activities in the university. 
Tle period of President Nimeiry witnessed a great deal of interference and interruption in 
the activities of the universities in the country (9). This period saw quite a substantial brain 
drain away from the academic work in the universities to political organizations and to 
secondment to the oil-rich Arab countries. About 25% of the university staff were 
seconded to the Gulf States and between 10 to 15% were on secondment to the political 
organizations inside the country, mainly the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) (10). During 
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the 16 years of President Nimeiry's reign 19 of his Ministers were university lecturers 
(11). Although the effect of this brain drain was not measured, the fact that the most 
experienced lecturers were the ones being taken away meant that the impact on the 
universities must have been significant. The introduction of the branches of the SSU in the 
universities also meant the involvement of the students in the politics of the country. 
Though the various political parties were banned when Nimeiry came to power, they 
featured within the universities,, although much underground. The positions in the SSU 
organization within the universities were contested on the basis of former political 
groupings (12). The results of all these involvement have been reflected in the frequent 
factional friction among the students which often brought about disruptions in the 
academic work because of frequent closure of the universities. It was a common feature of 
the universities in the Sudan to have on the average about four months of effective 
university teaching instead of nine (13). 
7.2. INDIGENIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION. 
Indigenization of higher education was a concept that surfaced more prominently from 
1989 when the fimdamentalist Islamic government of Prime Minister General Omer El 
Beshir took over power in the Sudan. This concept was in existence during the previous 
regimes in the country but was not openly manifested as during this peiiod. T'his was 
conceived with the intention of footing education in the 'culture' and 'tradition' of the 
Sudan. The government's declaration about this policy trend stated that the first aim of the 
goverriment was the "indigenization of higher education so that it can express adequately 
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the distinctive traits of the Sudanese people which originate fi-om. their Islamic Arabian and 
Affican beliefs and heritage" (14). One of the reasons for this move has been the fear of 
foreign influence on the Sudanese students. Mazrui (1978) presented similar argument. He 
argued that modem African universities are the pinnacle of cultural dependency, because, 
apart from their language of instruction, which is usually a European language, they train 
students in Eurocentric models values, knowledge and understanding. The result is that 
the educated elites become perfect conduits for Western intellectual penetration (15). The 
only means put forward for the implementation of this policy was througb the use of 
Arabic as the medium of instruction in all the institutions of higher education in the 
country. It was therefore declared that no students would be enrolled in an institution of 
higher education unless he secured a pass in both Arabic language and religious studies 
(16). 
The government of El Beshir placed university education at the top of its educational 
agenda. This was evident from the number of decisions taken in connection with higher 
education, the speed with which they were being implemented and the patterns of 
appomtments to top posts in the higher education sector (17). A number of decrees were 
passed by the Prime Minister at the end of 1989 which related to the development in 
higher education. 'Mree of the decrees were for: 
1. The creation of five new universities to be situated in Bain El GhazaL Upper Nile, 
Kordofan,, Dar-fur, and Port Sudan. 
The doubling of the number of admission to the older universities. 
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3. The use of Arabic as a medium of instruction at the higher education levels (18). 
The government also formulated a new ffigher Education Act 1990 which contained the 
powers of the National Council for Higher Education. Section 6 of the 1990 Higher 
Education act charged the National Council for Higher Education with the following 
responsibilities: 
1. The formulation of general policy on higher education. 
Planning and programming of higher education within the framework of state 
poficy. 
Supervising its plans, coordinating and defining the roles of all institutions of 
higher education within the specified policy, plans and programmes (19). 
The seriousness that the govemment attached to the control of policies on higher 
education has been reflected in the type of persons placed in charge of the policy organ of 
fligher Education Council. The overall supervision of the National Council for Fligher 
Education was entrusted to Brig. General Zubair Mohammed Saleh, Deputy Chairman of 
the Revolution Command Council (RCC) and Deputy Prime Minister. The Chairmanship 
of the National Council for ffigher Education was given to Dr. 1brahim Ahmed Omer who 
was said to have beeii a high ranking National Islamic Front (NIF) member of long 
standing. He was later appointed the Minister of Higher Education and Research (20). 
One of the reasons that the governinent provided for the expansion of the number of the 
universities was to prevent the students fi-om going outside the country for their studies. 
The hidden agenda of Islarnisation was not mentioned. The UNIESCO report of 1973/74 
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reported that 4,286 Sudanese undergraduate students were enrofled in universities outside 
the Sudan (2 1). These were on scholarships allowed by the Ministerial Council for Human 
Resources. They were held in 36 different countries, 37% of them in Egypt and 32% in 
Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union (22). In 1981/82 there were 21,916 Sudanese 
students who were studying abroad (23). Table 7 below show this according to the areas 
of specialization: 
Table 7: Number of Sudanese Students Studying Abroad by Specialization for 
the Academic Year 1981/82. 
SPECIALIZATION NO. OF STUDENTS 
1. Medicine 2266 
2. Pharmacy 467 
3. Dentistry 185 
4. Veterinary Science 420 
5. Agriculture and Forestry 2500 
6. Engineering 1699 
7. Economics and Political Science 554 
8. Science 1032 
9. Arts 1303 
10. Law 836 
11. Commerce 1860 
12. Journalism 39 
13. Statistics 12 
14. Education and Psychology 618 
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15. Religious Studies 247 
16. Translation and Linguistics 754 
17. Technical Institutes 3440 
18. Tourism 86 
19. Archaeology 30 
20. Other Studies 3568 
21. TOTAL 21,916 
Source: IUC Report to the Sudan National Council for Higher Education, March 1984. 
One other basic justification for the expansion of the universities was to increase the 
number of available places in higher education (24). This argument was based on the study 
which was said to have been carried out by the National Council for Higher Education in 
1990 which showed that the total number of students admitted into higher education 
institutions annually, over the past decade remained at about 5000 although the number of 
students eligible to receive higher education had increased (25). The study was said to 
have established that the number of students studying abroad privately was greater than 
those being educated in the country. The annual average amount remitted to support such 
students was estimated at between 25 million to 45 million US dollars (26). The 
government therefore argued that the basic determinant of who got higher education and 
who did not was no longer academic qualification but the ability to pay (27). Hence, one 
of the finidamental considerations, from the government's point of view, in embarking on 
the expansion of highef education was to colTect this imbalance and to "ensufe justice and 
democratization of Education" by enabling those who qualified to enter universities and 
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other institutions of higher education get the opportunity to do so, instead of being 
frustrated by the lack of fimds required to study abroad (28) 
The government's policy of expansion plus the policy of enforcing the policy of 
Arabicisation in university education was seen by the academics of the universities as part 
of the 'cultural siege' being tighten around the universities (29). A Report by the World 
University Service about education in the Sudan revealed that the regime's decision to 
increase enroRment at a time of dire economic crisis in the Sudan was designed to broaden 
the National Islamic Front's base in the higher education system and increase its share of 
adherents among the future members of the elite in the country (30). According to a senior 
lecturer at the University of Gezira, the expansion of the universities in the Sudan was 
simply political propaganda designed to gain popularity (3 1). He pointed out that the 
haphazard expansion of the universities was done without taking into consideration the 
plans the universities had already in the pipeline for implementation. A typical example he 
provided was that of the Faculty of Medicine in the University of Gezira. The intake into 
the University of Gezira for the Faculty of Medicine was 50 students when the 
ftmdamentalists took over government in the Sudan in 1989. The plan of the university 
was to increase the number graduaRy with a corresponding increase in the number of the 
teaching staff, equipment and premises. The university was in fact working with only 50% 
manpower of the required teaching staff (32). These were genuine difficulties that 
warranted the gradual expansion of the university. The government ignored this situation 
and went ahead to double the intake to 100 students without any increase in staffing or 
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equipment. The following year (1990) the number was double again to 200 students. In 
1992 the number reached 500 students i. e. a tenfold increase from the 1989 intake (33). 
The actual amount of the teaching was practically decreased because of dismissals during 
the same period. There were 15 lecturers dismissed from the University of Gezira alone 
between 1990 and 1992. Other universities in the country also faced the same fate of 
dismissals. 28 lecturers were dismissed from the University of Miartoum, 48 from the 
University of Juba, and one from the Ahlia University in the same period (34). 
According to Sibrino B. Forpjalla, a lecturer from the University of Juba, though the new 
policy of the expansion of the universities apparently attempted to ameliorate the existing 
inequalities in higher education opportunities in the country, it practically served to 
exacerbate them, particularly in relation to the southern Sudan and other peripheral 
regions (3 5). This was because no prior studies were conducted to ascertain the country's 
needs for educational expansion at the higher education level and how best it could be 
organized (36). For the Southern Sudan there were apparently very few secondary schools 
which were fimctioning to warrant the establishment of the two new universities ýi the 
region i. e. Wau and Malakal. Most of the secondary schools in the southern Sudan were at 
this time closed because of the war. But even during the peaceful period there were very 
few southern students who managed to be admitted to the only university in the south, 
Juba University. 
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7.3. THE UNIVERSITY OF JUBA. 
In accordance with the Provision of Article 106 of the National Constitution, the President 
of the Republic of the Sudan, Jaafar Mohammed Nimeiry, issued a Provision Order cited 
as "I'lie University of Juba Act, 1975" (37). This Provision established the University of 
Juba as a corporate body with perpetual succession and a common seal. Under the 
Provision, the University of Juba was to have the foRowing fimctions bounded by the 
general policy of the state and the programmes prescribed by the National Council for 
Higher Education (38): 
I. To study and search for the natural resources with the object of promoting and 
developing the same, and to prepare qualified cadres in the sciences pertaining to 
such resources for the purpose of promoting the rural environment in the southern 
region and such similar regions all over the country. 
2. To prepare assisting cadres of technicians and advisers and open doors to such 
rural citizens and blend experience with knowledge. 
3. To undertake such sociological studies as may be necessary for environmental 
promotion and to graduate qualified cadres in the sciences of economics, public 
administration, business administration and community development. 
To inculcate the aims of national unity and diversified culture through sociological 
studies and any other means. 
The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the Commission of the 
European Communities held discussions in April 1976 on the possibility of fimding by the 
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Commission of a programming study of the University of Juba in the southern Sudan (39). 
This was to be done through the European Development Fund. The study agreed upon 
was conducted by a team of International Consultants under the umbrella of the Inter- 
University Council (IUC). The team was made up of the follolAing persons: 
1. Professor J. D. Turner, University of Manchester, Leader of the team. 
Dr. W. J. Boebnan') Institute of Social Studies, The Hague. 
3. Professor M. W. Danby., University of Newcastle Upon-Tyne. 
4. Professor M. J. Delany, University of Bradford. 
5. Professor R. R. Hofinann, University of Giessen. 
Mr. D. H. G. Lamb,, University of Bimingham. 
7. Dr. C. J. J. Richter, Agricultural University of Wageningen. 
Professor L. Roche, University of Wales. 
9. Mr. R. S. Taylor, University of Reading. 
10. M-i. J. M. Theakstone,, Head of the East and Central Afirican Division of the IUC, 
who acted as the Coordinator of the Team and the Editor of the Report. 
The study focused on six main areas: 
1. Description of the objectives and fimctions of the planned university according to 
the development policy of the Sudanese government. 
Working out the structure and organization of the university. 
Presenting models of the teaching programmes of the various subjects taking into 
account the particular economic, social and cultural context of the southern Sudan. 
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4. Determining the location and architectural outline of the university as well as the 
necessary buildings. 
5. Presenting the list of the necessary equipment. 
Determining approximately the costs for the implementation and operation of the 
university and work out a consistent plan for the financing of the university. 
The team of the International Consultants provided the following comprehensive 
justification and advantages of opening of a regional university in the Southern Region on 
the Sudan (40): 
1. It would make it possible to prepare the people for the development situations in 
the Southern Region within a development oriented environment. 
2. It would be able to respond more quickly and sensitively to the rapidly changing 
needs of the region undergoing rapid transformation. 
3. It would operate with greater economy than one placed elsewhere. 
4. Special account could be taken of the region's needs in allowing entry to the 
miversity. Thus, the Senate of the University was to retain control over the entry 
of a proportion of the students so as to ensure that the Region's relative lack of 
opportunity for secondary education will not place the school-leavers at a 
disadvantage in seeking access to higher education. 
Ile natural resources of the southern region are quite different from those of the 
north. The region has the possibility for the production of such tropical crops as 
rice,, coffee,. tea and cassava. Cattle raising is also one of the major activities in the 
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south. Training is more meaningfid, they said, if undertaken in the areas where the 
natural resources exist. 
6. The programme of the College of Education w-M enable teachers for the secondary 
schools to be more rural- oriented. The assumption was that the teachers produced 
would be able to introduce courses of immediate relevance to the local situation. 
'Me researches to be undertaken in the university were to be directed to the needs 
of the region. 
From the policy framework regarding the opening of the University of Juba and the points 
presented by the team of consultants, one would surely assume that the University of Juba 
was meant to serve the needs of the Southern Region of the Sudan. The primary objective 
could be interpreted to meant that the university was intended for the development of the 
natural resources in the southern Sudan and to the production of its people well fitted to 
provide services in the rural areas. 
According to John M. Theakstone, the Coordinator of the International Team of the 
Consultants, the team who studied and thus recommended the establishment of the 
University of Juba, believed strongly that the university was genuinely a regional university 
to serve the southern region (41). This was what was contained in the legislation drafted 
for the opening of the university. But within the first year of the opening of the university 
the original objective of having a recrional university was changed into a national university 2: ) 
(42). The change over was very quick and the reasons for this, as provided by T'heakstone, 
were connected to the f6flowing: 
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1. The national politics, based on the northern view of building on the Addis Ababa 
Agreement and to go for national unity by making the university a national rather than a 
regional university. The intention was to make the university a symbol of national unity. 
The number of qualified secondary school leavers from the north of the country 
was too great for the capacity of the University of Khartoum. Very few southern students 
qualified for admission into the university. This was therefore a mopping-up exercise to 
accommodate the northern students. So the equity argument went by the board. 
3. In terms of academic staff there were very few southern staff who were wiffing and 
able to work as university staff especially the range of senior southerners available for the 
job. At this initial stage there were already a sufficient cadre of northern staff who could 
not go weU with Nimeiry's regime in Khartoum, who felt more at home in Juba. These 
were the cadre of lecturers who filled the University of Juba initially. This recruitment of 
the initial lecturers for the University of Juba were done without due consideration of the 
proposals made by the International Team of Consultants that the first staff to be 
appointed to the university should be aware of the nature of the institution and the type of 
persons it has been set up to produce. 
The former President of the Southern Regional Goverinmeii and Vice President of the 
Republic of the Sudan stated that though the establishment of the University of Juba was 
not discussed at the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, he knew that the university 
was established specifically to build manpower for the development of the Southern 
Region (43). It was later on that the Khartoum government con-u-nandeered it and made it 
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an extension of the University of Khartoum to take the surplus students fi-om the northern 
Sudan (44). The national government saw the university as an important instrument for 
sustaining national integration and national unity of the country (45). When the 
machination of the national govermneii became clear the university became a focal arena 
for north-south political controversy and conflict (46). This sudden change in the 
development of the University of Juba as was envisaged by the International Team of 
Consultants was detrimental to manpower development meant specifically for the southern 
Sudan. The motives of the national government to involve the international body was 
simply to obtain the ftmds for the establishment of a univefsity (47). Once that objective 
was achieved it decided what was considered politically best in the national interest. The 
International body had no legitimate power to decide what was politically correct for a 
sovereign country however bad the policy was for one section of the society in question. 
The only option left could have been to withheld the fimds for the completion of the 
project. 
7.3.1. THE MODELS OF THE TEACHING PROGRAMMES IN THE 
UNIVERSITY OF JUBA. 
The original concept of establishing the University of Juba as envisaged by the planners, 
particularly the international planners was neither introduced into the system nor attempts 
made to do so (48). The International Donors were pushing for a form of education that 
was terminal and basically oriented to producing middle cadre professionals (49). This 
was based on the assumption, in the 1970s and 1980s, that higher education had a low rate 
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of return. As a result basic education plus technical and vocational education gained 
credentials for international support. But was that the type of education the southern 
Sudanese required at this time? Tlis question was not seriously taken account of The 
International body had the money and they were the ones to decide where the money 
should be spent. In this pailicular case of the Sudan they did not succeed. One of the 
fimdamental problems regarding the vocationally oriented education as envisaged by the 
international donors was the conflict between the parental push where the parents wanted 
their children to advance up the academic ladder because they saw the future income tied 
closely to academic qualification and the planners pushing for the vocationally oriented 
qualification (50). "You cannot force parents into a kind of education where there are 
limited horizons" (5 1). Incidentally one of the features in the Sudan was the fact that the 
Sudanese government itself accorded greater status to the university education and this 
level of education received greater government support than was the case in the other 
African countries further south (52). 
The basic problem of the University of Juba was the question of the implementation of the 
policies related to it (53). According to the programme worked out by the international 
consultants, no student was to register direct for a degree programme on a first admission 
into the University of Juba. The objective was for the university to produce people of 
middle caliber at the diploma level. But this objective was aborted right from the initial 
stage of the opening of the university. The first intake of the students into the university, 
the majority of whom where from the northern Sudan, revolted against the diploma 
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programme to be offered in the university (54). Tle northern students, in particular,, 
devalued the diploma courses as meant for the southern students and not for them. This 
became politically volatile situation for the university administration in terms of who 
should be offered degree course and who should be offered the diploma course (55). To 
offer the diploma courses for the southern Sudanese and degree courses for the northern 
Sudanese was seen as politicafly unwise under the existing situation when the memory of 
the 17 years civil war was still fresh in the iminds of most of the southern Sudanese. The 
university administration therefore yielded to the pressure of the students and the whole 
set up of the programme was changed into degree programmes instead of diploma (56). 
7.3.2. THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE UNIVERSITY OF JUBA. 
The Regional Government had no influence over the policies and development of the 
University of Juba though it was aware of the original objectives of the opening of the 
university. According to the former Minister of Education of Equatoria State, who later 
became the Governor of the same State, the Regional Government did not have a say in 
the central government policy issues (57). The Southern leaders, including the President of 
the Region, were just nominal heads and the south was literally run from Khartoum (5 8). 
The appointment of the Vice Chanceflof for the University of Juba was done by the 
President of the Republic of the Sudan without consultation with the President of the 
Southern Regional Governmeii . 
All the Vice Chancellors, so far appointed for the 
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University of Juba, had come from the northern Sudan (59). The Chairman of the 
University of Juba Council, who was a southerner, was also a nominal central government 
appointee (60). He apparently had only a ceremonial role with not much influence on the 
policy and administration of the university (61), despite the fact that the University Act 
granted him substantial powers over the policy issues of the university. According to the 
University Act, the Chaii-man of the University Council was responsible for presiding over 
and leading the University Council. He had the right to initiate such plans as might be 
necessary to ensure the implementation of the policy prescribed by the state and the 
National Council for Higher Education (62). 
The general attitude of the Regional government was that of fear of confrontation with the 
central govemmen on national policy issues and attitudes of apathy about policy matters 
related to the Univef sity of Juba (63). 'Me attitudes of the central government and the 
general political trends of the Khartoum government were not to allow any opposition to 
the national policies by any appointee of the central government (64). The government of 
Nimeiry was well known for purges and dismissals of those who showed signs of dissent 
of his policies. This had cowed most of the southeim political and constitutional post 
holders. 
'Me Council of the University of Juba, as the top administrative organ for the university, 
had a number of technical problem that made its functions ineffective. The first problem 
was the composition of the Council itself From the list of the members as shown below, it 
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was clear that the convening of regular meeting was not practicable. Secondly the 
southern representatives who were supposed to be in the Council could not take up their 
positions. It was assumed that there were no capable southern Sudanese to take up the 
positions assigned for the south in the University Council (65). As such the positions were 
either left vacant or taken up by the northern staff. This meant that the influence of the 
Southern Sudanese in the University of Juba Council was very minimal. The Vice 
Chancellor of the University of Juba was the most powerful figure of the university (66). 
The implementation of the university policies depended very much on how he interpreted 
them (67). The University of Juba Council was to compose of the following persons: 
1. The Chairman. 
Six members experienced in and devoted to higher education representing the 
Provinces of the Southern Region. 
3. Two members representing the People's and Vocational organizations in the 
Southem Region of the Sudan. 
4. Five members weH versed in higher education. 
5. The Vice Chancellor, University of Khartoum. 
6. The Vice ChanceHor, University of Gezira. 
The Vice Chancellor,, Khartoum Polytechnic. 
8. The Dean, Faculty of Veterinary Science, University of Khartoum 
9. The Dean, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Khartoum 
10. The Vice ChanceHor, University of Juba. 
11. The Secretary General, University of Juba. 
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12. The Deans of Colleges, University of Juba. 
13. ne Dean of Students, University of Juba. 
14. Two Students Representatives, University of Juba. 
The Regional Government apparently did not question the discrepancies in the application 
of the policies for which the University of Juba was established. It did not press for the 
implementation of the original objectives for the university and never bothered to fill up 
the vacant posts for the southern Sudanese within the University Council. The Regional 
government also did not constitute a body that could have, for instance, worked closely 
with the University Council in the issues related to intake into the university and to 
determine the priorities in terms of manpower training for the southern Sudan (68). In 
othef wofds thefe was no diirect link between the Univefsity of Juba and the Regional 
government for the development of manpower for the southern Region of the Sudan. 
In the absence of the regional governmeii 's inputs into the university, the university was 
producing people at the whims of the respective Deans and the Chancellor of the 
University. For instance when a particular Vice Chancellor saw a particular area as 
'relevant% he went ahead in executing the plan, although this may not have been hi the 
university's policy plans (69). For example, the Vice Chancellor, Dr. Abdel Al, in 1982 
believed that to improve the educational quality in the southern Sudan, emphasis must be 
put in the training of the primary school teachers (70). T'llis programme was not within the 
policy of the university. In any case a one year Certificate course was eventually started in 
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the university for teacher in-service training. The College of Education was however ill- 
prepared for this course as the whole college did not have a single person qualified for the 
primary teacher trahiing (7 1). So the materials provided to the teacher, substantially, had 
no practical relevance to the teachers in that level of training apart from broadening their 
academic horizon. There was nothing in the way of improving their skills and knowledge 
relevant to the primary school classroom teaching (72). 
The question of whether the University of Juba was a national or regional institution was 
not resolved. The southern politicians did not apparently care whether the majority of the 
students were from the north or south (73). What was relevant to them was the presence 
of a university in the southern Sudan. One of the reasons given why the regional 
government could not pressure the central government to maintain the University of Juba 
as a regional institution was the fear of lack of fimds. The region was severely 
handicapped by uncertainties of financial resources which it could not raise autonomously 
in the region. Such finances were uncertain both in terms of quantity and timing of the 
flow (74). Any project in the southern. Sudan that was not within the framework of the 
national government plan was not fimded (75). 
7.4. ADMISSION TO THE UNIVERSITY. 
The admission of students into universities in the Sudan formed part of the fimctions of 
the National Council for Higher Education. Under the Organization of Higher Education 
Act, 1975, the determination of the number of students to be admitted every year to the 
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institutions of higher education in the country, the minimum requirements for admission 
and the ratio of students admitted to the different disciplines, were the responsibilities of 
the National Council for Higher Education (76). The International Consultants that 
recommended the opening of the University of Juba, proposed that a high proportion of 
students admitted to the University of Juba, at least in its early years, were to come from 
the southern Sudan (77). It was necessary, they advised, for the National Council for 
Higher Education and the University of Juba to device an arrangement to ensure a high 
proportion of southern students admission. The team also suggested that the National 
Council build into its admission system an allocation procedure to enable it to give priority 
to students from the southern Sudan, where it is desirable, to ensure equity of placement 
in higher education (78). The inclusion of such an escape clause like 'where it is desirable' 
was indicative of the consultants' awareness of the trends taken by the national 
government that were not in agreement with the recommendation of the consultants. This 
escape clause suited the national government's plans very well. This had manifested itself 
clearly by the fact that the national government never paid heed to the advice of the 
consultants. The students' admission continued to be based on the achievement in the 
Sudan School Certificate Examinations. This was based on the aggregate marks in the 
three best relevant subjects taken and no exceptions were given to the students from the 
southern Sudan (79). Very few southern students therefore managed to be admitted in the 
universities through the 'national pool' (80). For instance in 1979, the University of 
Khartoum admitted no students with an aggregate below 216. The Central Admission 
Office in Khartoum in that yeaf admitted only 8 students from the southem Sudan (81). 
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The University of Juba had to go down to 157 to ensure an adequate intake ftom the 
south. This was intended to appease the southern politicians (82). 
The trend of passes of the southern students and the rate of their admission into the 
universities had remained wichanged for most of the years, as shown in tables 8,9 and 10. 
There were several factors that contributed to the poor performance of the southem 
students. These included the poor quality of teachers, lack of appropriate text-books, the 
Arabic language which was compulsory for admission into the universities, the lack of 
teaching and learning equipment and the poor socio-economic backgrounds of the 
southern students (83). Because of all these disadvantages, the University Council of the 
University of Juba instituted a policy of 'Special Intake' for the southern students' 
admission into the University of Juba. So there were three types of intake into the 
University of Juba (84): 
1. The National Intake: This intake was done at National Admission Office and the 
students competed at the national level. At this level, a maximum of 8 students from the 
south Sudan qualified for admission to the University of Juba annuafly. 200 students were 
taken into the University of Juba annually through this national pool. 
2. The Special Intake: This intake was for the southern students who might have 
narrowly missed admission through the national pool. This was to balance the number of 
the northern students in the university. 100 students were taken through this channel each 
year. 
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The Mature Intake: T'his was the intake from the working people who possessed 
good previous certificates for entrance into the university. About 92 were admitted 
through this channel each year. 
The following Tables 8,9 and 10 below explains clearly the extent to which the students 
from the Southern Region have been taken into the national universities through the 
national po ol. 
Table 8: Admission to University of Khartoum: 
Faculty Central Khart. Northern Eastern Kordofan Darfur Southern Total 
Arts. 64 40 24 13 24 6 - 171 
Econ. & 
S. Stud. 
46 57 37 15 25 11 1 192 
Law 27 35 9 9 6 4 3 93 
Medicine 39 92 15 10 9 5 - 170 
Dentistry 3 18 - 2 - I - 24 
Pharm. 20 17 9 1 1 - - 48 
Agric. 109 77 42 7 17 4 - 256 
Vet. Sc. 35 41 5 3 6 - 1 91 
Engin. 53 125 16 14 16 4 - 228 
Archtec. 3 18 - 1 1 2 - 25 
Maths. 8 24 3 3 1 2 - 41 
Science 48 69 13 9 8 6 - 153 
Educat. 186 116 68 29 60 47 1 507 
TOTAL 641 729 241 116 174 92 6 1999 
Source: Department of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1983. 
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Table 9: Admission to University of Gezira: 
Faculty Central Khart. Northern Eastern Kordofan Darfur Southern TOTAL 
Medicme 29 18 6 3 1 3 60 
Agric. 21 16 1 8 3 - - 49 
Science 
& Techn. 
14 11 3 4 2 2 4 40 
Econ. & 
R. Dev. 
17 19 2 2 5 3 - 48 
TOTAL 81 64 12 17 11 8 4 197 
Source: Department of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1983. 
Table 10: Admission to University of Juba: 
Faculty Central Khart. Northern Eastern Kordofan Darfur Southern TOTAL 
Medicine 6 5 3 2 1 - - 17 
Educ. 18 8 6 2 - 6 5 45 
Nat. Res. 
& Env. St 
12 23 7 5 3 7 2 59 
Soc. & 
Econ. St. 
19 12 2 4 3 5 1 46 
TOTAL 55 48 18 13 7 18 8 167 
Source: Department of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1983. 
7.5. CONCLUSION. 
Although the Sudan government has recognized the importance of higher education in the 
socio-economic development of the country it did not do enough to provide the most 
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acceptable policies that answered the question of the over-all societal goals and needs 
nation-wide. This has been mainly because of the inflexible policies that the government 
adopted which were directed to the achievement of the prescribed objectives of the 
national governmen . The rigid policies did not take into serious consideration the relevant 
needs of the population all over the country. The assumed philosophy and policy 
orientation of higher education was to assure 'national identity' and 'originality' geared 
more to the northern Sudanese societal norms. The government's definition of the phrase 
relevant education or relevant needs have always reflected the northern background. 
The national government has not been in a position to establish a clear sense of direction 
that would have avoided the planning failures of the past. New policies on higher 
education that came up have not taken account of the past policy failures and therefore 
remained not reliable instruments of educational development and effective guides to 
actions. The basic problem has been the reluctance of the governmen to take the trouble 
to identify all the factors militating against policy formation and policy implementation and 
to weigh them in specific case studies. There was therefore a lack of valid information on, 
for instance,. economic, demographic and political conditions affecting planning of the 
location of the institutions of higher education. The policies were initiated without 
adequately secured knowledge about either the conditions for their success and the likely 
consequences. This was not entirely because of lack of information-gathering mechanisms 
but because of the reluctance of the government to probe into situations which might 
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reveal facts which might undermined the policies held dear by the central government for 
maintaining and sustaining its political, ideological, cultural and religious objectives. 
Ideally major policies such as those related to higher education, where the interests of 
greater sectors of the society were focused, should be subjected to systematic policy 
analysis which required the identification and measurement of the impacts of competing 
options and procedures for implementation, thus helping to rationalize the desirability and 
feasibility of the policies. But apparently the formulation of policies on higher education in 
the Sudan remained largely secretive, without the involvement of the academics and were 
often announced abruptly as decrees. Consultations with experts and debates in open 
forums were not normal procedures. These made implementation of policies difficult 
because of lack of commitments of the policy implementers. 
The university's autonomy and academic freedom were at the discretion of the national 
goverDmeii depending on the ideological out-look of the government of the day. Because 
of the fluid political situation in the country which had been responsible for the state of 
political instability, the government was not in a position to tolerate criticism from 
autonomous institutions endowed with public fimding. The university on the other hand 
tried to maintain that criticism of the government of the day was a legitimate fimction and 
moral duty of the tmiversity. This has been one of the bases of the systematic dismissal of 
university lecturers on political ground during both the Nimeiry regime and the period 
thereafter. This had the effect of depriving the universities of the most experienced staff. 
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Indigenisation of higher education institutions has been one of the features of the policies 
for higher education in the country. In the Sudanese context, indigenisation concept went 
beyond Sudanization of the staff It involved the need for identity and continuity of the 
Sudanese 'heritage' which embraced mainly the Arab-Islamic culture and tradition. The 
concept was conceived with the intention to root education in the 'culture' and 'tradition' 
of the Sudan. This conception seemed to have not taken notice of the fact that the 
supposed implementers of the policy i. e. the teaching staff were mostly western-minded 
individuals with varied ideological affiliations. How effective these were as instruments of 
implementing the policy of indigenisation have not been studied. 
The basis of the indigenization policy has been mainly through Arabicisation and 
Islamisation of knowledge. This had in all aspects disregarded the indigenous elements in 
the southern Sudan and their potential for development. As noted by Affica Watch, the 
indiscriminate application of the policy was not only a breach of academic freedom but 
also part of a wider cultural strangulation. Seen from this prospective the goal of 
indigenization of the higher education could be assumed to merely 'pacify' the institutions 
of higher education or to control them so as to achieve the desired aims. The intention, 
especially firom the period starting in 1989, was to structure and mould the institutions to 
fit the 'Islamization of knowledge' concept. 
253 
The fact that the Arabicisation policy of the Institution of Higher Education proved largely 
abortive in the past was an indication of lack of commitment to the policy and the 
difficulties involved in its implementation which included financial, human and material 
resources. The fact remains that the attempts to introduce Arabicisation policy had been 
done without proper studies before putting it into practice. There were no sufficient and 
convincing justifications for its acceptance and implementation. This had been clearly 
shown by the lack of the instruments for implementation, for example, the needed ftmds 
and lecturers. Because of immense prestige of the Arabic language to the national 
governi-nein it had blinded the government of the importance of the other languages in 
education. Political expediency dictated the whole educational policy development in the 
country. The whole exercise has therefore been directed at assimilating the other 
languages and cultures in the country. 
Part of the reason for the expansion of universities in the Sudan has been related to the 
policy of indigenisation. This was intended to prevent students Erom the country going to 
study abroad. It was what has been referred to as 'cultural siege'. 
The history of university education in the Sudan has showed continued discrimination 
against students from the deprived regions particularly those from the southern Sudan. 
This had been reflected in the regional disparities in the distribution of institutions of 
higher education and quite disproportionate enroflment into them. Tlle southern Sudan 
had remained a passive recipient of national policies and not active participant in the policy 
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formation. Hence southern politicians were generaUy said to have lacked motivation to 
form their own visions and means of achieving them. T'hough these politicians were quite 
aware of the southern situation and southern needs in terms of higher education, they 
lacked the legitimacy of using their own strength and potential for creating a better life for 
the southern Sudan. Besides this factor, there was a lack of unity and cohesion among the 
southern politicians which made them ineffective force against the northern intransigence. 
They remained objects to be manipulated by the central government. A further obstacle 
that handicapped the southern regional government from making autonomous policy 
decisions in the south was the uncertainty of financial resources which could not be 
estimated autonomously in the region. It has not been therefore possible, for instance, for 
the regional government to take control of the University of Juba in order to achieve the 
objective for which the university was initially established. Instead the University of Juba 
was commandeered by the central government to achieve it political objectives and to 
accommodate the surplus students fi-om the northern Sudan. It was a question of 'who 
owns and controls what'. 
The next chapter deals with the regional educational policy issues and how they relate to 
the national educational policies. It analysis how the decentralization policy affected the 
development of education in the southern Sudan and how much did the regional 
govenu-nent benefited from this policy. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
8. THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DECENTRALIZATION 
POLICIES OF EDUCATION. 
8.1. THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT. 
The Regional Government was created as a result of the Addis Ababa Agreement signed 
between the Sudanese national goverinmen and the Southern Sudan Rebel Movement 
(Anyanya) in 1972. This Agreement resulted in the establishment of an autonomous 
Southern Regional Government in the Southern Sudan within a united Sudan. This trend 
was taken in recognition of the 9th June 1969 Declaration by President Gaafar 
Mohammed Nimeiry which recognized the Southern Sudan as having distinct 
r CM , baracteristics from the rest of the country. The Declaration stated that: 
"Southern Sudan is geographicaRy a distinct region in the country; the inhabitants 
are ethnically and culturally different from the rest of the Sudanese; they therefore 
have the right to home-rule within the one Sudan" (1). 
This declaration became part of the organic text of the Sudanese constitution as the "self- 
government Act, 1972". Article 6 of the 1973 Sudanese national constitution provided for 
the administration of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan to be based on a system of 
decentralization in accordance with what was specified by law. Article 7 of the same 
constitution provided for the division of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan into 
regions with the view to achieve popular participation in the government through the 
application of policy of decentralization which shall be specified by law (2). 
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Three of the research interviewees, former cabinet ministers in the central government of 
the Sudan, stated that the Addis Ababa Agreement was not a comprehensive agreement 
especially in terms of policies of education for the southern Sudan. For instance the former 
Minister of Education in the southern regional government (1985), who later became the 
Governor of the State of Equatoria (1988) and also held the portfolio of the Minister of 
Labour (1987 in the central government, had this to say: 
"The Addis Ababa Agreement embodied nothing in a way of developing education 
in the southern Sudan. Hence the creation of the ten years of confusions and 
contradictions in the education system in the southern Sudan. There were no 
provision made in the agreement for giving, for instance, ftmds to bring the level of 
education in the southern Sudan to that of the northern Sudan. ne southern 
politicians did not realize that the north had a hidden agenda in the discussion of 
the Addis Ababa Agreement especiaRy in the direction the Sudan was to take in 
regards to Islam and Arabic" (3). 
This statement was similar to that made by the leader of the 17 years civil war and the 
architect of the Addis Ababa Agreement on the side of the rebel movement. He stated that 
the Addis Ababa Agreement did not come up with a concrete educational policies for the 
southern Sudan (4). According to the agreement the southern Sudan was to lay its own 
educational policies within the fi-amework of the national policies of education. The 
southern regional government failed to implement this due to a number of reasons which 
shall be specified later in this chapter. A specific area which he said was made clear in the 
261 
agreement was the regional language policy for the southern Sudan where: 'English was 
agreed to be the principal language in the southern Sudan i. e. a language of instruction in 
education and for use in government offices in the southern Sudan. The local languages 
(vernaculars) were to be used as media of instruction at lower levels of primary schools in 
the rural areas" (5). The Regional Government language policy, which was produced in 
1976, was a departure from the agreed language policy in the Addis Ababa Agreement 
(6). There was no mention in the agreement that Arabic was to become the main language 
of instruction for the southern Sudan. It was agreed for it to be taught as a subject in the 
southem schools (7). 
What complicated the educational policy issues in the southern Sudan as revealed from the 
responses of three quarters of the research interviewees was the lack of direction and 
cohesion among the southern politicians and the lack of legitimate powers to 
independently govern the southern Sudan. This lack of cohesion was clearly specified by 
the former President of the Southern Regional government, who pointed out that: 
"At the initial stages of the regional government there were 'tag-of-wars' between 
the southern Sudanese who came firom exile, referred to as returnees (outsiders) 
and those southern Sudanese pohficians who remained inside the country (insiders) 
during the 17 years civil war. The ýisiders sided with the Khartoum government 
and branded the returnees as separatists. This atmosphere created tensions among 
the members of the regional goveniment and therefore worked against any 
legitimate interests of the southern Sudanese. Suitable educational policies which 
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would have been relevant to the southern Sudan could not therefore be developed" 
(8). 
This statement agreed with the statement made by another former Minister of Labour in 
the central governmen (1989) about the effect of the Addis Ababa Agreement on the 
southern leadership. According to him: "T'he Addis Ababa Agreement brought about 
power struggle among the southern politicians. Tle power struggle was between those 
who came from East Affica and other neighbouring countries and those who remained 
inside the country during the 17 years civil war. It was difficult to reconcile the two to 
agree on common policy strategy of education for the southern Sudan. For those who 
remained inside the country, President Nimeiry symbolized a 'miraculous' leader and using 
him to change the past war situation was important. Those who came from outside 
thought differently. So education suffered for lack of direction and for lack of fimds for 
rehabilitation and reconstruction. Those who remained within the country were inclined to 
accept the policies derived fi-om the central government wholesale. Educational policies or 
policy plans initiated in the southern Sudan were therefore dishonoured by the central 
government and were as a result not implemented, for instance, the regional language 
policy. This disunity was effectively exploited by the central government to achieve its 
cherished educational objectives. This was clearly demonstrated in the central government 
appointment of southern leadership of its choice to administer the goverm-nent in the south 
in total disregard of the opinions of the southern Sudanese. Bribing of the southern 
Ministers was a common practice. As a result the north was able to block any viable 
policy for educational development of the southern Sudan" (9). 
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T'here was therefore confficting allegiance to the national and regional policies. The 
concept of maintaining national unity and regional loyalty became central in the creation of 
ambiguity and contradiction in the implementation of the national and regional policies of 
education. The Southern Regional Government could not therefore establish a workable 
formula to implement any educational policy planned by the regional government without 
the interference by the central government. For instance in 1979 the central Minister of 
Education,. on a visit to one of the secondary schools in the southern Sudan which was 
using English as a medium of instruction, ordered the Regional Minister of Education to 
have the students who so requested be taught in Arabic. This request came about when 
one of the students who came from the Arabic pattern intermediate school expressed to 
the central Minister of Education the difficulties the Arabic pattern students were facing of 
learning through the English medium. The Regional Minister of Education accepted the 
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change without reference to the regional language policy which stipulated that English was 
the language of instruction in all the secondary schools in the Southem Regional of the 
Sudan (10). 
The forraer Minister of Education in the State of Equatoria also recalled another instance 
where the regional governmejit failed to implement regionally initiated education policy. In 
1974 the Southern. Regional Government had planned to develop Maridi Teacher Training 
Institute as a Curriculum Development Centre as well as a Teacher Training Centre (11). 
This plan was fi-ustrated because of three main reasons: 
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1. Lack of fiwds from the central government in Khartoum 
2. The project was ill-started. There was lack of planning in the Regional 
Ministry of Education for effective use of the ftmds that the Regional 
Government could raise locally. 'Mere was a general feeling of scepticism 
among the southern leadership about the possible reaction of the northern 
government to the project. 
There was lack of coof dination of the bodies involved in the execution of 
the project ( 12). 
There was also no consistency or coherence in the policy implementation basically because 
of the conflicts of interest among the regional government cabinet. For instance, in the 
1985 Education Conference,, contrary to the Regional Language Policy, the Regional 
Minister of Education recommended the implementation of the national language policy in 
the southern schools. This was opposed by the Deputy Governor of the Regional 
Government as being contrary to the regional language policy (13). 
Changes in the regional education policies and the Regional Ministry of Education 
structures and personnel were at the discretion of the central Ministry of Education. 
Frequent changes of the regional governmen and subsequent changes in the persons 
holding the portfolio of the Minister of Education was a common feature of the 
government in the southern Sudan. This created an atmosphere of uncertainty which in 
turn affected continuity in the policy trend and policy implementation. The implication was 
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that the regional government was not free to make and implement its own policies of 
education. 
The southern Ministers in the central governmein were also ineffective in influencing 
policies in the centre that affected the southern region (14). One of the reasons has been 
the distmity that existed among them that made it not possible for them to present a 
concerted influence. The former Minister of Labour (1989) had this to say: 'Trivately the 
southern Ministers in the Central Government or the MPs in the National Assembly did 
talk about the needs of the south Sudan and they tried to attract individual Arabs in the 
government and outside the government to the needs of the south. Publicly some 
Ministers or MPs made alliance with different political parties in the north through whom 
they expressed their views of the south to the central authority. But it was in the interest 
of the northern politicians to make sure that the southern politicians did not present a 
united ftont or views regarding the needs of the south. So each 'father head' provided 
contradictory views on the different policy issues regarding the southern Sudan" (15). The 
Minister further stated that the fight of the north against any development in the southern 
Sudan succeeded because the southern leaders avoided responsibilities in order to satisfy 
their personal needs or interests and so destroyed the priority needs of the south which 
they represented. 
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8.2. DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATION. 
Article 6 and 7 of the 1973 Sudanese Constitution provided for the application of 
decentralization system of administration in the Sudan (16). The indications from the 
research interviewees pointed to the fact that this pledge for decentralization remained 
largely on paper and was not properly implemented to realize the benefits normally derived 
from the system of decentralization as described by Rondinelli. According to Rondinelli 
(1981), "decentralization is necessary to increase the scope of decisions and thus 
incentives available to local participants, as well as to build institutions and to encourage, 
structure, focus and stabilize such participation" (17). This requires certain pre-conditions 
and supporting policies and changes in attitudes and behaviour on the part of the central 
government. These elements were missing in the case of the Sudan. As also stated by 
Balado Ruiz-GaRegos, decentralization entails the transfer from the centre to the regional 
authorities all those powers and responsibilities necessary to satisfy the interests within the 
ambit of its authority and which at the same time would make provision for transfers of 
fimds necessary to make the decentralization policy viable, without which the entitlement 
to facilities transferred to it would not be developed for want of vital economic support 
(18). The facts revealed by this research showed that all these elements were missing in 
terms of the southern Sudan. 
According to a lecturer in Political Science in the University of Khartoum, the 
decentralization policy for the southern Sudan was "a mythical dream because the south 
had no power in the first place related to national policy issues. It was not a participant of 
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the central goveniment's machinery of administration and policy-making for the country. 
It had neither wealth nor institutions. Ile decentralization policy was never meant to 
devolve administrative powers from the centre. It was simply an attempt to bring the 
people closer to the government in the centre" (19). This policy was the basis of the Local 
Government Act, 1971 (20). The Local Government Act, 1971, was a constitutional legal 
action of the government that brought the use of the local people of the various regions in 
the country as instruments of administration. But the needs of these local people were to 
be met by the centre in the north. The north remained firmly the master and controller of 
everything including education and finance (21). Incidentally the Local Governmen Act, 
1971. ) was the 
Act upon whicli the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement was based. The only 
protocol that constituted a new element in the Agreement from the 1971 Act was the 
military protocol that permitted equal representation of the military personnel in the 
southern Sudan fi-om both the south and north (22). Chapter III of the People's Local 
Government Act, 197 1, Article 11 (1) stated that: 
"The Regional 11igh Executive Council shall in general be responsible for political 
enlightenment, people's mobilization, economic and social development and 
consolidation of national unity in accordance with the objectives of the May 
Revolution. The People's Province Executive Council (PLC) shall ensure that 
services rendered by the PLC's are directed towards the benefits of the citizens of 
the area at the highest standards and are in conformity with the national policy" 
(23). 
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It is to be noted that one cannot have power that has no context. The lecturer in Political 
Science pointed out that 'the southern Sudan lacked the context of sovereignty to decide 
to have independent choice and to have the capacity to enforce. The main controffing 
factor of inaction among the southern politicians was the lack of power to transcend the 
northern pofiticians who had both power and in-fluence on the southern Sudan. What was 
existing in the southern Sudan was the politics of survival. The southem leaders were 
afraid of confrontation with the north because they believed conftontation would be costly 
(24). This fear of confrontation was attributed to repeated purges during President 
Niiineiry's regime of those who could not conform with his policies. This state of affairs 
was noted in the report by Dr. G. W. Glentworth, ODA/BC Adviser in Public 
Administration and Management Development, on a visit to Sudan in 1987. This report 
stated that 'the repeated purges and the use of presidential directives in appointments 
destroyed even the stability and self-confidence that reliance on seniority produced. It was 
better on the whole to do nothing, or at least to look after yourself before the inevitable 
axe fefl" (25). 
Under the 1972 Act the Regional Minister of Education, who was a member of the 
Regional High Executive Council, held the portfolio for the Minister of Education and was 
responsible to the Southern Regional Government. This responsibility, under the terms of 
the Act, was to be exercised within the ftamework of the national policy of education 
(26). This binding to the national educational policies and educational planning rendered 
the Regional Minister of Education practically ineffective and powerless. Section Six of 
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the 1972 Act specifically stated that "neither the People's Regional Assembly nor the 
Regional High Executive Council shall legislate or exercise any power on matters of 
national nature which among other matters include educational planning" (27). More than 
that the Regional Government had no control over financial resources with which to carry 
out whatever regional plans it had. For instance a Committee of the People's National 
Assembly in its 1976 evaluation of the result of the Local Government Act of 1971, 
concluded that "the insufficiency of funds was the basic cause of weakness in the 
institutions of the People's Local Government and of running them into empty skeletons" 
(28). The Central Ministry of Education was entrusted with all the following fimctions: 
1. Planning for the educational development in accordance with the overall 
national plans for socio-economic development. 
2. Setting the goals and objectives of national education in the light of policies 
approved by the state. 
3. Drawing the curricula for the achievement of the set goals and objectives. 
4. Teacher education and training. 
5. Technical and vocational education. 
6. Adult education and functional litefacy (29). 
In a national report presented to the 37th Session of the International Conference of 
Education (1979) by the Sudanese Minister of Education, the Minister stipulated that the 
Regional Ministry of Education in the Southern Sudan was entrusted with the same 
ftmetions which were to be executed in full coordination with the Central Ministry of 
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Education and in accordance with the national policy (30). This statement contradicted 
what has been stipulated in Article 6 of the Local Government Act which practically 
paralyzed the entire machinery of the southern regional government. It allowed little room 
for the regional government to handle the affairs of the region without seeking approval 
from the central government (3 1). Such approval was never granted. AJI major educational 
matter s had to be referred to the Centf al Ministry of Education for decision making. Ilere 
was therefore no possibility for the regional government to confidently manage its own 
educational plans or programmes (32). The reliance of the regional government on funds 
fi-om the central government was one of the main controffing factor. 
The national policy-making structure provided no opportunity for southern participation 
and there was no effective coordination mechanism established. There was no well defined 
responsibilities and areas of control that the regional government would rely on for 
effective educational development in the southern Sudan. One critical disadvantage 
concerned the formulation of educational objectives and aims which remained the sole 
responsibility of the central government. The members of the central government tended 
to neglect major cultural aspects of the southern Sudan and instead emphasized on 
national integration and unity (33). The point that related to the lack of participation by 
the southern Sudanese in the national policy issues was made clear by the former 
Governor of Equatoria State who pointed out that: 
""The President Nimeiry's policy of decentralization relegated the southern 
Sudanese to positions in the southern Sudan. They were not taking part in the 
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formation of national policies in the central governmen . The President of the 
Southern Regional Government, who was also supposed to be a Vice President of 
the whole country, was not part of the central government system IFEs fimctions 
and authorities were entirely limited to the southern Sudan. He had no defined link 
with the centre in Khartoum despite his position as a Vice President of the 
country" (34). 
Another important point in the south-north relation which the former Governor pointed 
out was the channel through which the central governme-D dealt with the regional 
government. In terms of fimds and policy issues the southern regional government was 
approached through the Central Ministry of Local Government (35). This clearly indicated 
that the regional government was not part of the main central system and this was also 
indicative of subordinate position of the regional goveniment in the central government 
structure. 
A further lack of clarity in the channel for implementation of the educational policies was 
shown in the roles given to the Province Education authority. According to the 1971 
People's Local Government Act, the Province Education Committee, chaired by the 
Assistant Commissioner for Education, was responsible for the following tasks: 
1. Formulation of provincial education policies. 
2. Administration and supervision of primary, intermediate and secondary schools. 
3. Supervision of adult education. 
4. Fon-nulation and implementation of educational plans. 
272 
According to the same Act the three levels of schools were not directly under the control 
of the Regional Ministry of Education but that of the Regional Ministry of Administration 
which falls directly under the Central Ministry of Local Government (36). 'Me delegation 
of the said responsibilities to the provinces had several set backs. Firstly in practice liaison 
between the provinces and the central Ministry of Local Government was difficult because 
of communication problems and distance. Secondly the powers supposedly given to the 
provinces were not clearly defined and besides that the province offices did not have 
sufficient resources to fulfiR the fimctions transferred to them (37). 
The effects of the divisions of responsibilities in education between the various 
administrative organs were clearly demonstrated in the areas of accountability. According 
to the Province Inspector of Schools (primary and intermediate) many problems were 
created for the Assistant Commissioner for Education especiaHy in regards to issuing and 
taking of commands because of the lack of clear cut areas of accountability (38). The 
Assistant Commissioner in this case received orders from three sources: 
1. The Regional Ministry of Education ftom where most of the manpower for 
the province were obtained. 
2. The Regional Ministry of Provincial Administration through which the 
fimds for the province were received. 
3. The Commissioner of the Province who was his immediate boss. 
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As a result administrative tasks such as school inspections, distribution of services, and 
provision of facilities tended to be discontinued; the administrative machinery thus lost 
cohesion and the functions became duplicated uneconomicaRy (39). 
The decentralization policy did not have significant educational impact in the southern 
Sudan except in the area of quantitative expansion of the schools and in the opportunity 
provided to the regional government to recruit its own teachers, although the training of 
the teachers remained the prerogative of the central government (40). The regional 
government was obliged to work within the framework provided by the national 
govemment. One of the main reasons provided was because 'the Sudan was playing to the 
tunes of its financiers i. e. the Arab World" (41). It was this external political pressure that 
acted against the national government providing leeway for the regional government to 
introduce alternative educational policies that could, otherwise, have been relevant to the 
southern Sudan. For instance,, although the regional government was allowed, to a certain 
extent, to manage and administer the schools at the primary, intermediate and secondary 
levels. 
) 
it was not permitted to develop or to participate in the development of relevant 
curricula for the southern Sudan or to establish its own teacher training institutes. The 
national government, for example, refused to recognize a teacher training institute jointly 
established by the Norwegian Church Aid and the Southern Regional Government in 1983 
to train the untrained English pattern, teachers for the primary and intermediate schools in 
the southern Sudan (42). This demonstfated the powefs the national govemment had ovef 
development of education in the southern Sudan. 
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The constraints that inhibited more rapid development of educational fimetions and 
powers in the southern Sudan, particularly during the earlier stages of the period under 
review,, had been vividly summaii ed by John Glover (1973) as follows: 
1. Considerable unevenness in development as between the provinces, 
indicating a lack of planned development. 
2. The provincial efforts have necessarily been concentrated upon daily 
administration with little spare capacity being made available for planned 
change and improvement. 
A period of rapid expansion has similarly absorbed administrative staff and 
has coincided with the particular problems arising from the structural 
alteration, economic variability and political uncertainty. 
Staff development has not kept pace with administrative needs; 
decentralized departments of education lacked sufficient staff with suitable 
training and experience at executive and organizational levels. 
5. A somewhat cumbersome system of financial allocation and control 
remained centralized in Khartoum and tended to act as a brake upon 
mitiative and enterprise, whether in connection with a large-scale project or 
a relatively minor development (43). 
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8.3. CONCLUSION. 
The Addis Ababa Agreement did not provide the Southern Regional Government with 
sufficient ground and freedom to make and implement its own educational policies. The 
southern politicians apparently did not carefully study the implications of the agreement 
and how the policies agreed upon were to be realized and sustained for the development 
of education in the southern Sudan without undue interference from the central 
government. The power structure between the national and regional governments 
remained ambiguous and subject to central governmen interpretation in a way that suited 
the northern objectives. There were no defined powers and responsibilities that enabled 
the regional government to manage educational development programmes in the southern 
Sudan without the interference from the central governmen . Apparently the southern 
politicians, at the time of the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, were more interested 
in bringing about the end of the civil war and were less prepared to tackle the intricacy of 
a government and to deal with the task of reconstruction and development. In general 
there was a lack of long term vision for the development of education in the southern 
Sudan. 
The Addis Ababa Agreement did not also seriously examine the financial implications of 
the Agreement i. e. in terms of clear sources of fimding which would sustain an 
autonomous educational development in the southern region rather than the complete 
dependence on grant-in-aid from the central goveniment, which remained uncertain 
throughout the period under review. Bereft of fimds the Regional Government could do 
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little in the way of educational development or creating its own educational development 
plans. The national government on the one hand was prepared to thwart any autonomous 
educational development attempts by tighter financial control to the region and to maintain 
the unity of the country through any means including constitutional and legislative control. 
The Regional governmen had no control over financial resources with which to carry out 
its own educational plans. The regional revenue base was too small to provide adequate 
taxes to carry out decentralized fimctions. The widely dispersed population in the southern 
Sudan who were largely rural oriented was too small to support productive or service 
fimctions of the region. Not only that but the region also lacked adequate legal powers to 
collect and allocate revenues within its own local jurisdictions. 
Some of the causes for the abandonment of the policies agreed upon in the Addis Ababa 
Agfeement lay in the confficting allegiance of the southern politicians to national and 
regional policies. The concept of maintaining national unity and regional loyalty was one 
of the central factors in the creation of the ambiguity and contradictions in the policy 
issues. The atmosphere of confrontation among the politicians worked against any viable 
educational policies for the southern Sudan. This led to the general lack of insight and lack 
of clear policy direction as to what and how education was to be developed in the 
southern Sudan within the framework provided by the national government. The real 
educational problems in the southern Sudan was not therefore seriously addressed because 
of the need to maintain national unity. There was therefore no consistency in policy 
approach and policy implementation. TIe educational needs of the south was as a result 
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sacrificed for political interest. The national government exploited the southern division 
well to achieve national interest and thus strangled educational development in the 
southern Sudan by making the southern policy-makers ineffective. The regular changes of 
the regional goveniment and threats of dismissals or purges created an atmosphere of fear 
and therefore inaction and apathy within the regional goveniment. 
The policy of decentralization had no significant impact on the development of education 
in the southern Sudan. The whole decentralization system instead created a state of 
institutional confusion especially hi terms of delegation of powers. It did not provide a 
clear mandate and a clear set of responsibilities. The constitutional provisions effectively 
prohibited the regional government fi-om managing its own educational affairs. Major 
educational matters were therefore referred to the central Ministry of Education for 
decision-making. This created a state of uncertainty in institutional context. 
The decentralization provisions were also quite vague about the extent and forms of 
decentralization, 
) 
for instance, in terms of the roles and relationship between the north and 
south and between the provinces and the regional government. This was indicative of a 
lack of national government's political commitment to decentralization which was, if 
anything, generally super-ficial. It did not, for example, allow for the development of 
regional capacity in terms of funds and human resources to realize the benefits of 
decentralization. It did not create an alternative means of decision-making for the regional 
goveniment, neither was there proper coordinating body established. 'Me administrative 
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linkage between the central and the southern regional government was very weak and was 
mainly 'top-down' control procedures rather than channels of mutually beneficial, 
cooperative and reciprocal interaction. 
The next chapter deals with the general educational policy framework at the national level. 
It reflects on the broad bases of educational policy development in the whole country. it 
also depicts the way how and why the national government wanted to follow the particular 
policy of education throughout the country. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
9. THE NATIONAL EDUCATION POLICIES: 
9.1. THE NATIONAL TRENDS: 
The national education policies in the Sudan were in line with how the national 
governmen defined Sudanese society. The trends of policies adopted projected the Sudan 
as an Arab-Islamic country despite the unique situation of the Sudan in terms of the great 
ethnic and cultural diversities existing in the country. This approach was manifested in 
practical terms by having Arabic as the official language and medium of instruction in 
education, Islam as the official religion of the country and the curriculum oriented towards 
the Arab World and the northern Sudan. These were also reflected in the policy statements 
of the national leaders since independence of the Sudan in 1956. 
The overriding issue in the Sudan has been the basic constitutional question of how the 
Sudan defined itself legally and politically and how it balanced the majority and minority 
rights and representation in the country (1). The policies adopted tended to disregard the 
complexity of the p olitico- cultural diversities in the country. The national leaders had 
sought no alternative legislation other than the Islamic one. These were clearly shown in 
the statements of the political leaders at various periods of the regimes in the country since 
independence as illustrated by the following. In 1956 the Grand Gadi (Chief Justice), 
Sheikh Hassan Muddathir, proposed that the Sudan should be governed by an Islamic 
283 
Constitution because "the Sudan is an Islamic country; its social organization is built upon 
the Arab customs and Islamic ways" (2). The first Prime Minister of the Sudan, Ismail al- 
Azhari, put the matter starkly enough when he stated that: "This is an Arab country. it will 
remain an Arab country. Those who do not like it are free to leave it and go to where they 
like". This in general reflected the view of most of the northem Sudanese in the 1950s. 
Islam is,, in the Sudanese context, regarded both as a creed and regulation in the sense that 
religion and the state are inseparable (3). In 1957 a joint statement by the leaders of the 
Mahdiyya (UMMA) and the Khatmiyya (DUP) political sects was issued calling for the 
Sudan to be an Islamic Parliamentary Republic with Sharia as the source of legislation 
(4). These two parties were the two religious sects that formed the basis for the political 
parties that emerged in the 1940s and have continued to play a dominant role in the post- 
independence period (5). In 1958, the priority of the military governmen of General 
Ibrahim Abboud was to "unify" the country through Islam and Arabic language (6). The 
spread of Islam and Arabic language became the official policy of Abboud's government. 
This period was generaRy considered a period of forced Islamisation and Arabicisation 
through forced mental change and psychological tortures (7). "You can only be the light 
of your society if you read in Arabic, speak in Arabic and preferably if you are a Muslim" 
(8). This forced policy was implemented through the establishment of many 'kalwas' all 
over the country. A department for Religious Affairs, started in 1955 within the Ministry 
of Education, was charged with the extension of Islam in the southern Sudan. This 
Department established 12 Islamic schools of elementary level in the southern Sudan. This 
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development came out clearly in the statement of President Abboud in the Parliament in 
1958 where he stated that: 
It is my government Is concern to support religious education and that is clearly 
shown by the progress made by the Department of Religious Affairs and the 
development of the 'Mahads' under its aegis" (9). 
Ten years after independence, Sayed Sadig El Mahdi (then a Prime Minister) declared in 
his first address to the Constituency Assembly that "the dominant feature of our nation is 
an Islamic one and its overpowering expression is Arabic and this nation will not have its 
entity identified and its prestige and pride preserved except under an Islamic revival" (10). 
There was apparently very little substantive change in theory and practice in the Sudanese 
laws until the peliod of the military rule of President Jaafar Mohammed Nitneiry in 1969. 
The 9th June 1969 Declaration, made by the President, marked the beginning of the policy 
for regional autonomy for the southern Sudan. The Declaration in principle acknowledged C? --- 
the ethnic and cultural diversities in the country. In practice however the Declaration was 
cosmetic in its implementation. The focus of the laws continued to favour the northern 
Sudan. The Constitution adopted in 1973 stated that "Islamic law and custom shall be the 
main source of legislation. Personal matters of the non-Muslims shall be governed by their 
personal laws" (11). President Jaafar Mohammed Nimeiry had this to say in his first 
address on the 'ýnew educational policy": 
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"In its zeal to widen, improve and systematize the field of education, the 
Revolution has given special consideration to the establishment of the College of 
Islamic and Arabic Studies,, which is to concern itself with the study of the 
intellectual and spiritual heritage of the Sudan. It is to enable the Sudanese nation 
to play its historic role in diffusing Arab culture and principles of Islamic faith 
tin, oughout the Affican continent. The educational programme of the Revolution is 
to stress the social and cultural importance of Arabic which is to be an obligatory 
subject in the school certificate curriculum" (12). 
In the same address on the new educational policy the Minister of Education stated that 
the pattern of the education system was the type recommended by many Arab Education 
Conferences, particularly by the Conference of the Arab Ministers of Education in 
Baghdad in 1964. The same recommendation was put forward by the Conference of the 
Arab Ministers of Education and Planning held in Tripoli in 1966 and in Morocco in 1970. 
It was strongly felt that a common pattern of educational organization would facilitate the 
interchange of teachers and educational ideas throughout the Arab World. This 
standardization of the education system emanated from the earlier agreements among 
some of the Arab countries. The 1957 Agreement on the Cultural Unity signed by Syria, 
Jordan and Egypt and the Cultural Charters signed by Iraq and Egypt in 1958. These two 
agfeements sought to stfengthen the feelings of Arab unity by eliminating the vafiations in 
education witItin and between the Arab States (13). Joseph S. Szyliowicz clearly described 
the approach in the Arab countries as fbHows: 
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"Administratively the structure of education in all the Arab States is practically 
identical. Apart from some variations of details, the common pattern is one of 
extreme centralization. The Ministers of Education exercising almost dictatorial 
control over all aspects of education" (14). 
This was reflected in the Sudan where the Central Ministry of Education in Khartoum was 
responsible for educational planning, drawing up of the curricula and syllabiý setting 
examinations, training of teachers and maintaining control of the smallest points of 
execution of educational policy (15). 
Two main features of the May Revolution (the Nimeiry Revolution), in the field of 
education, as outlined by the Minister of Education, also showed some of the 
inconsistencies in the education policies as far as the whole country was concern. The 
Minister stated that: 
1. 'Education is essentially a democratic and political right available to every 
citizen without exception and without conditions. The only limiting factor is the 
individual's own ability. 
2. The Arabic language is to be the medium of instruction throughout the vaiHous 
stages of education. Special emphasis shall be given to Arabic studies and to the 
spiritual legacy of our past" (16). 
The fact was that the emphasis placed on the use of Arabic language as a medium of 
instruction throughout the country was a fon-n of condition or control which alienated the 
southern Sudanese from the main stream of the Sudanese education. At the time of the 
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introduction of the policy the language of education in the southern Sudan was English. 
The ability of the southern Sudanese students were therefore limited by the language 
difficulty. 'Be educational development was not democratic in the sense that participation 
in the educational policy formation was limited to the northern Sudanese. ]Fhe few 
Southern Sudanese in the National Assembly were ineffective in presenting the needs of 
the south because of two main factors. In the first place because the proceedings of the 
National Assembly touch less on the affairs of the Southern Region. Secondly because the 
southern representatives in the National Assembly are said to be less confident in 
participating in the debates which are conducted in Arabic (17). According to the former 
President of the Southern Regional Goverriment the southern Sudanese did not participate 
in the national policy making and were not consulted on national policy issues. They could 
not therefore influence the central goverment policy fonnation (18). A factor that eluded 
the southern politicians at the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement was the fact that 
they did not realize that the north had a hidden agenda in the discussion that led to the 
signing of the Agreement in regards to the direction the national government intended to 
take as far as Islam and Arabic was concern (19). The Addis Ababa Agreement relegated 
the southern Sudanese politicians to positions in the southern Sudan and were not taking 
part in the formation of policies in the centre including those that affected the southern 
Sudan directly (20). The Vice Presidents of the Republic of the Sudan fi-om the southern 
Sudan stationed in Juba were not part of the system in the centre. Iley had no defined 
links with Khartoum despite their positions as Vice llý-esidents of the Sudan (2 1). 
288 
Chapter 11, Article 14 of the 1973 Constitution stated that: "education is an investment for 
good citizenship and production as weR as a service for the individual and the society and 
thus it must be under complete supervision of the State which directs and plans for it 
according to set policies" (22). The moulding of the particular type of the Sudanese 
society as defined by the northern leaders entailed central control. A former Central 
Minister for Labour stated that the needs of the southern Sudan have been an appendage 
in the national government's educational agenda (23). In the northern Sudanese 
prospective, if you do not want to be an Arab you must be confused (24). What was 
regarded as relevant education for the southern Sudan were therefore irrelevant as far as 
the educational priorities of the central government were concerned (25). The southem 
leaders had no choice and were not free (26). The southern Sudan as well lacked the 
context of sovereignty to decide to have independent choice and to have the capacity to 
enforce. The leaders lacked the power to transcend the northern leaders who influenced 
the policies for the whole country (27). 
The former Minister of Labour in the National Government had this to say about the 
govemment policy trend: "ne policy of Arabisation and Islamisation of education is not 
strictly a religious conception but a racial and cultural conception. It is a process of 
transformation of the whole person or society. It is a process of becoming a Sudanese. 
There is no time limit for this process to be accomplished" (28). Islam is used as an excuse 
with which to disguise Arab racism (29). Various approaches were employed by the 
government m an attempt to indoctrinate the southern Sudanese to adapt the Arab culture 
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and the Arab life-style. For instance between 1970 and 1974 about 400 southern Sudanese 
students were provided scholarships for studies in Egypt, despite the fact that their 
performances in the Sudan School Certificate Examinations were poor, with the intention 
that they would later contribute to change the society in the southern Sudan in the image 
of the Arabs (30). This approach apparently failed to achieve the intended objectives. 
Arabic is quite intimately related to a culture which is mucli connected with Islam in the 
Sudanese context (3 1). The assumption is that the moment one is indoctrinated in this 
language related culture one is most likely to adopt the culture of the religion (32). The 
Arabic language always evokes the idea that you are a Muslim or aspire to be a Muslim 
because only then wiH you be raised to a full human being (33). 
The national policy trends did not provide the possibility for free choice. The Regional 
Government in the southern Sudan, that was created as a result of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement, could not therefore legislate its own independent educational policies despite 
the President Nimeiry's policy of decentralisation of education. It was deprived of the 
legitimate power to legislate by the central government. There were two provisions which 
controlled positive actions by the Regional Government. Section Six of the 1972 Act 
stated that: 
"Neither the People's Regional Assembly nor the Regional High Executive Council 
shall legislate or exercise any power on matters of national nature which among 
other matters include educational planning" (34). 
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Section Ten of the Act stated that: 
'The People's regional Assembly shall legislate for the preservation of public 
order,, internal security, efficient administration and development of the southern 
Sudan in cultural, economic and social fields and in particular in the establishment 
and administration of public schools at A levels in accordance with the national 
plans for education and economic and social development" (35). 
From these provisions there is a clear indication that the legal boundaries between the 
national and regional planning has not been clearly defined. It is not clear what the phrase 
"other matters" in Section Six of the Act meant. Whereas the regional government 
appeared to be the sole responsible body over the education in the southern Sudan after 
the Addis Ababa Agreement, the central government controlled the structures, the system 
and the policies of educational development through constitutional provisions which 
prohibited the regional government from managing its own affairs (36). What the central 
government expected from the regional government was for it to become simply a replica 
of the national government and to function in the same way. So it could not have the 
validity of independent development (37). The transferring of the administrative fimctions 
to the regional government without adequate legal powers, including financial powers, 
undermined the benefits of the Addis Ababa Agreement. The southern Sudan was not 
directly considered as part of the central government's machinery to which specific 
budgets were directly apportioned (38). It was dealt with through the Ministry of Local 
Goveniment (39). 
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What has been clear from the interviews conducted in this research was that the inner 
process of educational policy-making in the Sudan was not much known to the majority of 
the public including even those close to the policy-making body. This was mainly because 
of the lack of involvement of the wider representation in the policy making processes 
especial. ly firom the regions outside the centre. The divorce between the policy statements 
of the national leaders and their practical application and the concentration of powers in 
the central government was an issue which prevented genuine contribution to the decision 
making process and the subsequent isolation of the political and legislative iristitutions, 
especially ftom the southern Sudan. The discussions of the Council of Ministers were kept 
confidential and the minutes, resolutions etc. were not exposed to the public; neither were 
they quoted (40). Tle bribing of the southern Sudanese Ministers in the central 
government was a common feature of the central government and consequently inany 
were forced to accept the policies emanating from the centfe though these might work 
against the needs of the southern Sudan (4 1). The centre as a result was in a position to tie 
the south to impfacticable and iffelevant education, stfangled the south and made it 
ineffective; thus retarding the development of education in the southern Sudan (42). 
9.2. EDUCATION AND NATIONAL UNITY: 
One of the important components of the Sudanese educational policy objectives was to 
bring about national unity. '17his component was important because it was tIffough it that 
the diffusion of the Arab culture and Islamic faith could be achieved. The importance of 
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this objective was mentioned in most of the policy statements of the national governments 
in the Sudan since independence. The government's sponsored Sudan Educational Sector 
Review (1977), for instance, stated that "the Sudan has its ethnic affiliations and its 
regional responsibilities and all these must find their places in education to confirm the 
links of the nation with both the Arab and Islamic heritage and the heritage of Africa (43). 
In order to achieve this aim maintainirig the unity of the country was required. The main 
instrument chosen was education. One of the statements directed towards this objective 
reads: "In conformity with the constitution, the general education aims to create a healthy 
socialist community, promote national unity and respect for the country's heritage and 
values" (44). In the 1990 educational policy statement of the government, one of the 
objectives of education in the Sudan was the stfengthening of the spfiit of national unity in 
the young and developiiag in them the sense of belonging and loyalty to the nation (45). 
All these statements which expressed the desire for national unity were indicative of the 
existence of some elements of disunity that affected the implementation of the national 
education policies. What was missing was the right choice of the means and methods to 
bring about this unity without encroaching on the rights of other groups in the Sudan. 
Apparently the government did not seriously take into account the complex Sudanese 
society and the difficulties of imposing the views of the rulers at the centre on such a vast 
country as the Sudan containing a heterogeneous population. 
The implementation of the educational policy to achieve national unity in the country was 
affected by a number of factors. Tle basic factor was the failure of the national 
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government to transform the realities of the cultural, religious and ethnic diversity existing 
in the country into factors of strength for consolidating the unity of the Sudan and its 
peoples (46). The rulers lacked the kind of ethnic and religious links that could spread 
their influence widely into the Sudanese society (47). From the interviews conducted it 
was clear that the approaches used to bring about the implementation of the policy were 
those that worked against achieving the objective. One of the northern Sudanese 
intellectuals (a politician) stated that the problem of the Sudan, in essence, was a crisis of 
governance that emanated from a crisis of identity. The north, represented in its political 
parties, always looked for its identity beyond the boarders of the Sudan i. e. either to the 
Arab World or to the Islamic World (47). "The 'unity' of the Sudan was basically a 
northern banner under which all the political parties in the north marched. To them the 
word 'unity' meant nothing else than denying the south its political rights" (48). Another 
northern Sudanese intellectual (university lecturer) stated that there has not been an 
integrated mechanism for educational policy-making in the Sudan that enhanced national 
unity. The lack of involvement of a wider representation from other regions in the 
formation of educational policies in the centre was a contributory factor. Consequently the 
policies developed were always partial and worked for the interests of the northern Sudan 
(49). Most of the policy decisions were taken by the individual Ministers in the central 
government; e. g. the decision to make religion compulsory in the Sudan School Certificate 
Examinations (50). 
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The government's policy of the Arabicisation and Islamisation of education also worked 
against national unity because it practically alienated the soutli from the political system in 
the country. These trends showed the ambiguity of the Sudanese educational policy 
applications in terms of the government's policy pronouncements. For instance the 
National Charter,, which was the principal manual for the Sudanese Socialist Union (the 
only political organ of President Nimeiry's regime), stated that: 
"Education is a right for all citizens who must benefit from it as a duty. It must be 
democratic in practice, fimctional in nature and closely related to socio-economic 
development plans. It must bring about qualitative, ideological and vocational 
changes on its recipients to renew the society and build for the future" (5 1). 
The southern Sudan did not benefit from the education provided since the goals were set 
to serve only the needs of the northern Sudan. Clear indications of this were found in the 
content of the curriculum where, for instance, such disciplines as History, Geography, 
Civics, Sociology were written in such a way as to depict the northern background and 
features only (52). The curriculum content was not designed to fink the individual to his 
local environment . It was unproductive in the sense that the needs of the children, 
especially those at the primary level, were largely disregarded. The children therefore 
derived very little ftom their schooling that was of real benefit to them in their future lives 
(53). 
The key to an understanding of the contemporary Sudanese educational problems 
therefore fies with the p olitico- cultural diversity which have been overlooked by the 
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national goveiniment of the Sudan. Though President Nimeiry's government recognized 
the ethnic and cultural differences existing between the north and the south, these 
differences were not accommodated within the educational system befitting the southern 
backgrounds and cultures. Instead the government continued to enforce the Arab-Islamic 
culture on the Sudanese people. Ile government's strong belief in the unity of the Arab 
destiny and in increasing cooperation and movement on the path of complete Arab unity as 
its aim and purpose (54) was a contributory factor in this approach to education. To 
maintain and spread the dominant Arab culture and Islam in the Sudan it was necessary 
that the political, legislative, economic and administrative control remained in the hands of 
the ruling Arab groups in the northern Sudan (55). The laws of the country were oriented 
towards this end. This was,, for instance, reflected in statement of the Vice President of 
President Nimeiry's ruling Revolutionary Command Council (1970), Babiker Awadala, 
himself a former Chief Justice who stated that: 
"The law must be in conformity with the social life of the people for whom it is 
promulgated. This is because it is impossible to find a law of one nation that is 
suitable to a different nation. Now the difference between the Sudanese community 
and Anglo-Saxon society is very clear. But the preceding governments and leaders 
did not take these differences into consideration. ) 
but they foUowed the British and they 
neglected the danger of tying us to the laws of colonialization in the courts" (56). 
President Nimeiry on one hand, after signing the peace agreement with the south, also 
reaffirmed the special position of Islam in the Sudan and recognized the Sharia as the 
source of all legislation (57), thus effectively continuing to subject the southern Sudanese 
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to the laws that apparently brought about the civil wars in the Sudan in the first place. The 
legislation that was eventually applied was based on the Islamic law and customs as 
stipulated in the 1973 constitution of the country. All indications showed that the Islamic 
leaders in the Sudan were not prepared to part ftom having the Sharia and Customs as the 
two main sources of legislation of the country. The 1990 National Dialogue Conference 
on the Political System in the Sudan made it abundantly clear that Islam was both a 
worship and social dealing and it was the right of the Muslims to observe the legislation of 
their religion in various fields of life; and that the Sharia and Customs shaR be the two 
main sources of legislation in the Sudan (58). 
From the southern Sudanese perspective the central government's educational policies 
weire policies of expedience designed to satisfy the northern Arab-Islaimic educational 
objectives without considering other factors, like broad based participation in policy 
formation, the ethnic and cultural diversities, the economy, and all other factors to sustain 
the policy in the whole country (59). The basic problems, according to this perspective, 
that posed a threat to the unity in the Sudan, were attributed to three main causes: 
1. The dominance of one nationality over the others. The policies adopted were 
meant to enhance the legitimacy and control by the regimes in the northern Sudan. 
2. The sectarian and religious bigotry that has dominated the Sudanese political 
scene since independence. 
3. The unequal development in the country (60). 
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Two speeches made by the leader of the Sudan People Liberation Movement and Sudan 
People Liberation Army (SPLMJSPLA) on the 3/3/84 and 22/3/85, on the occasions 
marking the I Ith and 12th anniversary of the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, 
described the national crisis afflicting the Sudan since independence as a crisis of identity 
emanating ftom the inability of the Sudanese to reconcide themselves with the cultural and 
ethnic realities that make them a nation (6 1). This factor was also expressed in the 
National Dialogue Conference on the Political System in the Sudan in 1990. The 
Conference pointed out that the Sudan's major political parties were facades of sectarian 
formations and were not parties in the contemporary sense of the word, i. e. with respect 
to organization, ideology and practice; their sole objective was power (62). The national 
government has failed to design suitable mechanisms that would have reinforced the 
sentiments of oneness such as broad based participation in the national issues, power 
sharing, and multi-ethnic base for political parties. Instead it invoked the Islamic and Arab 
symbolism that had an impeding influence for national integration. 
The Addis Ababa Agreement provided an important landmark in the approach to 
accommodating ethnic and cultural diversity. But for technical, constitutional and 
economic reasons this has not been practical to implement. Constitutionally the Addis 
Ababa accord contained some escape clauses that made it easier for the national 
government to avoid the implementation of the terms of the Agreement. For instance the 
Agreement specified that the local languages in the south Sudan "pLay serve a practical 
necessity for the efficient and expeditious discharge of executive and admittistrative 
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fimctions of the Region" (63). In the first place this contradicted one of the policy 
statements of the May Revolution which said that A-rabic language was to be the official 
language of the country and the medium of instruction throughout the various stages of 
the state education: "special emphasis should be given to the Arabic studies and to the 
spiritual legacy of our past" (64). Secondly although the Regional government has been 
ccempowered" to promote the local languages and cultures, educational planning remained 
a prerogative of the central government. The President of the Republic continued to retain 
the veto power over regional legislation. The regional government was obliged to operate 
within the policy framework set by the central government. The national government 
provided no budget for the implementation of the local languages and the region itself had 
no alternative source of fimds to execute the plan (65). 
A national political conference on the Political System in the Sudan (1990) stated that 
cultural,, language, historical and environmental diversity in the Sudan could be a factor of 
strength. It identified education as the means to express these diversities in harmonious 
ways so as to bring about unity of the people in a spirit of fraternity and equality (66). But 
the method it employed amounted to lack of recognition of the diversities in the country. 
For instance to achieve the above ob ective, it stated that the government was to be j 
pided by the past experience, which was to maintain the status quo in favour of the north. 
It stated that : 
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I. "Arabic language is the official language of the Republic of the Sudan. This is 
what has been agreed upon since the Legislative Assembly of 1948, and stated in 
the successive constitutions. 
2. Languages, culture and history of the Sudan are characteristics of the country. 
The State should curtail any inclination to give any privileges to any specific 
culture, language or historical heritage". 
It added that educational planning, in this context, should consider the historical 
experience of the Arabic language as a mother language of a big Sudanese group, as well 
as being the official language since the time of independence (1956), and employ it in 
education to the extent which may serve well these roles (67). This was tantamount to 
discarding all other languages and associated cultures. A former Vice nesident of the 
Republic of the Sudan and President of the Regional Government in the southern Sudan 
(1978) stated that since the Regional government was not part of the policy making body 
in the central government it could not influence such policy trends that emanated from the 
centfe. The implementation of any regional educational policy that originated from the 
southern Sudan was dependent on whether the policy fitted the framework of the central 
goveniment. The idea was to integrate the overall educational system in the country for 
effective control by the central government (68) 
Education, in the bfoadest sense,, became a part of an ideological battle gTound that the 
northern parties wanted to hold to. For the regional govenimen , 
it was not clear as to 
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where the point of convergence of the national and regional policies was and it was 
difficult to pin-point which policies were binding and which ones were not binding (69). 
The fimetionality of the education provided depended very much on the outlook of the 
national policy-makers in terms of what society the country wants to produce through 
education. The southem Regional Governmen 's assertion to develop southem identity did 
not therefore agree with the perceived identity of the northern leaders and consequently 
the central government applied all means at its disposal to retard education in the south 
Sudan (70). For instance the former Governor of Equatoria State in the southern Sudan, 
who also earlier held the portfolio of the Minister of education in the same State, stated 
that there were no provisions made in the central government for giving fimds for 
education in the southern Sudan to bring it to the level of education in the northern Sudan. 
The Regional Minister of Education in the Southern Sudan continued to apply for fimds 
fi-om the general pool of the reserve fimds in the central government in Khartoum (71). 
"The linear expansion and improvement of the quality of education in the southern Sudan 
was therefore made difficult mainly because of the financial difficulties and the northern 
government's determination to deal with the ways in which the southern Sudanese wanted 
to go in the field of education. This was a fimdamental issue in the development of 
education in the southern Sudan. As far as the south wanted to go in their own way, the 
liorth was deterniined to keep luke-warm in the way of the development of education in 
the south. They were determined to have the education of the south channeled through 
Khartoum so as to develop the Arab system of education" (72). 
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The former Minister of Labour (1989) in central government of the Sudan on the other 
hand stated that the educational policy strategies in the Sudan provided two options to the 
southern Sudanese i. e. either one becomes part of the Islamic society and Mows that 
educational system or one remains outside it and no concern was taken of one's education 
(73). In general, the central government had interfered very much in the educational 
development in the southern Sudan by taking measures that disrupted the objectives of the 
regional government. 
9.3. CONCLUSION: 
The dominating feature of the Sudanese politics during the period under review was the 
concentration of the actual powers in the centre. The fimdamental reason for this central 
control apparently emanated fi-om the national government's desire to have the 
government policies guided by Islamic ideologies and Islamic educational policy trends. 
Tlefe has been a pefsistent innate fecognition by the national leadefs in the Sudan fof an 
appeal to Islam as a guiding basis for national policy development. Islamic State is guided 
by three basic principles (74): 
1. Koran is the fimdamental constitution, 
the Government is to operate on the basis of the Shura (Consultation); 
3. the Ruler is to be guided by the teachings of Islarn. 
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One ftmdamental requirement of an "Islamic Order" is that the Sharia (Islamic Laws) will 
have to be implemented in the Islamic State (75). The Islamic laws (Sharia) and customs 
have remained therefore the only source of legislation in the country despite the complex 
p olitical- cultural, ethnic and religious diversities in the country. The government 
consequently failed to provide an answer to the basic constitutional question of how the 
country defines itself legally and politically and how it balances the majority and minority 
rights and representation in the country. This is not that the national leaders were not 
conscious of the complex society, but simply because of their conviction of orienting the 
policies on the Islamic principles. This conviction took precedence over all other 
considerations. 
Although the national leaders have been inclined to impose their powers on such a vast 
country as the Sudan with a heterogeneous population, they lacked the kind of ethnic, 
cultural and religious links that could have spread their influence widely into the Sudanese 
society. This apparently was due to lack of wide participation hi the national policy 
development. The policies developed have therefore been considered as policies of 
political expedience designed to satisfy the northern Aiab-Islamic educational interests or 
objectives. 
What was considered as one of the main factors that shaped policy development in the 
country was the identity issues. The identity ciisis which emanated from the government's 
inability to take into consideration the cultural and ethnic realities in the country affected 
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the general education policY framework in the Sudan. From the southern Sudanese 
perspective the central government is not prepared to concede anything approaching 
equality to the south. The policies and the legislation subjected the southern Sudan to the 
national policy framework oriented largely to the Muslim north. The central goveniment's 
policy was apparently not to develop a distinctive southern culture or identity but to 
assimilate the south into what is commonly referred to in the northern intellectual circle as 
ccore culture' i. e. Islamic Afro-Arab culture. All indications were that the educational 
policies were geared towards the achievement of this goal. The central policy 
development, and central legislation tended to be directed towards thwarting any attempt Z: ) 
by Southern Regional Government to develop any alternative educational policy or 
programme outside the national fi-amework. 
Although the Regional Goveinment had a legislative body hi the form of the People's 
Regional Assembly, its power were severely restricted by the National Constitution. The 
President of the Republic had a veto power over all legislation emanating from the 
regional government that were assumed to be outside the national framework. The 
regional government therefore had no effective means of influencing national policies. The 
southern fepfesentatives in the national Assembly have also not been effective catalysts fof 
the southern interests because of two factors. In the first place the regional issues feature 
less in the national assembly and secondly the use of Airabic in the national assembly 
effectively depfived them fi-om effective participation. 
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The insistence of the national government on the policy of national unity had also much to 
do with the government interest to spread the Islamic faith throughout the country. The 
policy had less chance of success because the main factors that divide the south and the 
north were not addressed by the central government. The factors that threatened national 
unity were the very ones being used to bring about the unity of the country e. g. Arabic and 
Islam The government's external interest for the Arab unity and its interests in the Arab 
and Islamic Worlds overrode the national interests especially in terms of accommodating 
the southern Sudan within the national context. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
10. CONCLUSION 
The limited scope of this study in terms of accessibility to primary and secondary 
resources meant that it was not possible to undertake more than a partial analysis of the 
extent of educational policy issues in the Sudan. This has been particularly the case in 
terms of the imbalance of the respondents to the interviews from the northem and 
southern Sudan. The analysis may not therefore be a definitive answer to the complex 
educational policy issues for the whole country but has value as a basis for the future 
policy development in the Southern Sudan as it provides important knowledge of 
educational policy issues which were not documented before. The study, to some extent, 
mirrored the complex educational policy issues in the country in general and the southern 
Sudan in particular and has a definitional purpose for the future policy-makers, particularly 
for the Southern Sudan. A more complete study would have included, as essential 
element, detailed analysis of documentation on education policies vvithin the country and 
extensive interviews of education policy-makers and other individuals connected with 
education within the country. However as stated in the introduction to this study, the 
empirical study could not take place within the country for practical and security reasons. 
The Sudanese government would not have permitted the research to be carried out. 
However the respondents to the interviews available within the United Kingdom included 
individuals with very high and valuable knowledge of the Sudanese educational policies. 
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T'he information they provided would not have been easily obtained if the study was 
conducted within the Sudan. 
The researcher was also aware from the initial stage of the shortcomings of the study 
particularly because of the antagonistic situation existing at the moment as a result of the 
present on-going civil war in the Sudan between the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (a 
southern based liberation army) and the Khartoum government. This situation might have 
influenced the individual respondent's perception of how the information gathered was 
going to be used. This factor might have also restrained some respondents, particularly 
those from the northern Sudan from releasing all the required information that they know 
of the Sudanese education policies that they could easily provide under a normal situation. 
The researcher was also aware of the advantage of carrying out the study at this moment 
mainly because of the possibility of obtaining information that would not otherwise be 
obtainable within the Sudan because of the Sudanese government's policy on censorship 
on research on pohcy issues. 
The answers to the interviews obtained through the open-ended questions had one 
particular disadvantage. It did not provide sufficient opportunity for the participants to 
reflect, on their own, on the questions as could have been the case with the use of 
questionnaires. But the use of the open-ended approach proved beneficial in that it enabled 
the interviewees to reveal more complete information they know about educational 
policies in the country than they would if questionnaire approach was used. The interviews 
312 
progressed smoothly and to a great extent achieved the intended objective. The valuable 
information obtained could form a basis for future education policy development in the 
Southern Sudan. 
Evidences derived ftom the historical and political development particularly during the 
colonial period in the Sudan point to unevenness in the handling of racial or ethnic issues 
in relation to the southern and northern Sudan. There have also been clear indications of 
uneven distribution of the economic and educational opportunities and an apparent lack of 
interest specifically focused towards bridging the development gaps that existed between 
the southern and northern Sudan. Based on the fact that the motives for the British 
occupation of the Sudan was not geared to economic or other forms of development of 
the country, but for their strategic security interests in Egypt, it is not to explain the 
colonial administration's reluntance to develop what was called unproductive Southern 
Sudan. The policies that the colonial administration and national government opted to 
pursue tended to perpetuate the ethnic, political and educational differences between the 
two parts of the country. The headstart advantage the northern Sudan had in relation to 
the southern Sudan was reinforced by the reluctance of the colonial govemmeii to directly 
get involved with the education of the southern Sudanese while at the same time imposing 
policies for stringent control over the education provided to the south by the missionaries. 
As a result the southern Sudanese were left by the British relatively as backward as before 
(1) at the time of independence in 1956. 
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Ile evaluation of the educational policies within the period under review points to a 
policy of domination and the difficulties in policy implementation which could be 
attributed to two main factors: firstly, the policy of centralization with lack of participation 
by a large spectrum of the population in the different parts of the country which was aimed 
at protecting the Islamic educational trends and secondly, most of the p oficy- decisions 
were apparently taken without acknowledged implications of those policies and the future 
development needs of the majority of the population in the country. This implied a lack of 
continuity in the government policy directions. The southern Sudanese participation in the 
policy process was severely restricted and little recognition is provided for their rights and 
needs in the country's Islamic law and in education. The Regional autonomy provided to 
the Southern Sudan as a result of the Addis Ababa Agreement was largely superficial in 
importance. The powers of the Regional People's Assembly and the Regional Executive 
Council were fimited by the provisions in the constitution. For instance, Section Six of the 
self-governmen Act, 1972 which stated that "neither the People's Regional Assembly nor 
the Regional High Executive Council shall legislate or exercise any power on matters of 
national nature which among other matters include educational planning". The Regional 
Executive Council was responsible to Khartoum for almost all its fimctions. The central 
government was also successful in exploiting the differences that existed among the 
southern Sudanese politicians and so successfully reduced the pressure the southern 
Sudanese could have exerted as a united block. 
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There are two significant factors that tended to govem all the policy development in the 
Sudan. These are the Islamic religion and the Arabic language. These factors have 
appeared in A the policy areas researched into in this thesis as conspicuous components of 
the Sudanese government educational policies in the country. To borrow the words of 
Horowitz as applied to countries trying to build a homogeneous society, the determination 
of the government of the Sudan to pursue Islamic policies is to create a homogeneous 
identity in the Sudan and to compel acknowledgment of pfominence of Afab cultufe and 
Islamic religion. As stated by Horowitz acknowledgment of prominence implies 
destruction of the evidence of diversity (2) which the southem Sudanese persistently 
resisted. The difficulty in the achievement of the national government policy for national 
integf ation and national unity lies within this appfoach to cfeate homogeneity. 
The education system has been the main instrument employed by the government to try to 
create a homogeneous society in the country. The government assumed that the most 
effective measures to achieve national unity and to build a homogeneous identity was 
through the use of curriculum and syllabuses, developed nationally, which were reinforced 
through central control of the examination system. The general view as expressed by 
Watson clearly depict the situation in the Sudan. It is generally believed that schooling can 
be used effectively to bring about assimilation because not only does the curriculum 
largely ignore different facets of minority rights but there is usually official insistence on 
teaching through one national language medium (3). 
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As has been expressed by a number of the interviewees and in some of the national 
conferences, for instance the 1991 National Dialogue Conference on the Political System 
in the Sudan, Islamic religion is not a matter of faith for the national government in the 
country but an integral part of "national identity" and in fact an inextricable part of sense 
of peoplehood or nationhood in the eyes of the govemment. These features clearly ignore 
the Christian and animist Africans in the southem Sudan. The education system has been 
used to control and direct social aspirations with the aim of preserving and promoting the 
interests of the Muslim groups in the northern Sudan. This has been reflected in the 
have, 
specific educational policy areas investigated in this thesis. One would said that the policy 
of assimilation through the school system, a common language and school curriculum is 
not only unique to the Sudan. Precedence had already been set in some of the developed 
A 
countries like the USA, UY, Canada and Australia (4). The main difference the methods of 
approach of the development of the policy to bring about w-iiformity and the 
characteristics of the population that make up the country. 
One could easily equate the conflict relationship in the Sudan to that in the former 
apartheid South Affica. In both cases the policies pursued advocated segregation and 
political and economic discrimination against non-European (in the case of South Africa), 
non-Aiab (in the case of Sudan) groups. But there is one big difference between the two in 
that whereas in former South Affica the policies pursued emphasized complete 
separateness, including intennairiages between the whites and other ethnic groups, in the 
Sudan separate development for the Southern Sudan was not an option of the central 
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government. The objective of the central government is not to develop a distinctive 
Southern Sudanese identity but to assimilate or if possible to destroy the southern identity 
so as to create what is called a core Islamic culture or identity. The main objective of the 
policies, as reflected in the findings of this research, was to create a situation where the 
Southern Sudanese distance themselves from their cultures - to become detribalized. The 
subjection of the students in the southern Sudan to the prescribed curriculum, syflabuses 
and textbooks that endorsed official central governmen policies is a clear indication. 
The following section of the concluding chapter looks into the future development of 
education in the southern Sudan in the fight of the findings revealed by the analysis of 
existing education policies. There are assumed to be two possible prospects for the future 
development of education in the southern Sudan; one is the prospect that the Southern 
Sudan will continue to exist within a united Sudan, and the second prospect is that the 
Southern Sudan might become an independent entity. 
10.1. THE FUTURE PROSPECT FOR EDUCATION IN THE SOUTH SUDAN 
WITHIN A UNITED SUDAN. 
Educational policy, like any policy in genefal, ideally feflects the political options of the 
society concerned. It is ideally based on the kind of society or the kind of manpower the 
society or government wants to build in order to realize the development of that society or 
government. In the case of the national government of the Sudan, as has been revealed by 
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this research, the educational policies largely reflected Islamic educational values and 
ideals. It is not difficult to see in the very consistent educational policies development in 
the Sudan a consistent intention of the central government to build an Arab-Islamic society 
and to uproot the other cultures in the country, particularly the southern Sudanese 
cultures. The education provided as such did not result in a sound pattern of education in 
the Southern Sudan especially among the rural population. It did not stimulate the building 
up of a system of general education attractive to the majority of the rural population 
whose social and cultural patterns did not fit the trend of education emphasized by the 
central government. 
In order to have the national education policies guided by the Islamic ideologies and 
principles the government persistently maintained the system of centralization of the 
development of education policies for the whole country regardless of the diversities in the 
country. There was an apparent innate recognition by the national government leaders of 
an appeal to Islam as a guiding basis for national policies of education. The apparent 
inability by the central government to take into consideration the cultural and ethnic 
realities in the country in the general policy framework acted as a disincentrve to the 
education provided by the government. The central control of education policies enabled 
the govenimen , 
for instance, to censor the content of the curriculum for A forms of 
education including teacher education and training. The curricula at all levels of education 
in the Sudan have been considered as a repository for worthwhile Islamic activities and 
values into which all the Sudanese children needed to be initiated. This had a far reaching 
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adverse effect,, as regards relevance of education, on the southern Sudanese. It provided 
no alternative framework to accommodate the training or educational needs of the 
southern Sudan. 
One of the confficts in educational policy development in the Sudan, particularly in 
relation to northern and southern Sudan,, was related to the definition of what was relevant 
education for the Sudan. From the researcher's point of view, relevant education could be 
that kind of education that has an interplay with the learner's environment and which can 
prepare the individual adequately for tomorrow's life. In order to come to terms with what 
was relevant education in the Sudan one needs to ask such questions as relevant education 
to whom and for what end in view? Who determined the needs of the society and on what 
criteria? Whatever educational policy was envisaged for the Sudan it remained largely 
irrelevant to the southern Sudan because the answers to the questions above were 
provided by the central government without any relevant inputs by the southern Sudanese. 
The educational policy objectives were consciously directed towards the achievements of 
values., ideals, attitudes and aspirations based on Arab-Islamic backgrounds. The national 
policy fi-amework therefore never contributed to the achievement of educational 
development objectives fof the southern Sudan. The basic pfoblem has been the feluctance 
on the part of the central government to take the trouble of identifying all the factors 
militating against sound policy formulation and implementation that could realize 
sustainable development in the various parts of the country. 
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The consistent trend of educational policies development in the Sudan over the decades of 
Sudanese independence is indicative of the continuation of the same policies in the future 
united Sudan. This projection is based on the uncertainties that the southern Sudan had 
continued to face,, such as institutional uncertainties emanating from a lack of political and 
economic stability and frequent changes of government and the personnel. There are no 
apparent indications that the central government would abandon its previous central 
control over the activities of the regional government in the southern Sudan such as: 
1. the power structure remaining subject to central government interpretation and 
suiting the central govenimen objectives; 
2. the thwarting of any autonomous educational development attempts by financial 
control; 
3. the lack of adequate legal powers to collect and allocate revenues within the 
regional local jurisdictions. 
These inadequacies were compounded by the confficts and lack of unity among the 
southern politicians in terms of national and regional policies. This worked and is likely to 
continue to wofk against the achievement of any viable educational policies felevant fof 
the southern Sudan. 
The relative strength of the central goverriment's control over all political, economic and 
educational structures in the country would make matters difficult for whatever 
government would be fonned in the southern Sudan within a united Sudan. Genuine 
educational development in the southern Sudan would be feasible only to the extent that it 
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acquires genuine autonomous legal power that could enable it to take independent policy 
decisions on education and other development sectors Phtliout undue interference from the 
central government. What can be deduced from the central government's previous 
reactions is that the central government is quite certain that effective participation by the 
south in national policy-making processes, if allowed, could become an important factor in 
the political control of education in the southern Sudan. Besides, education could make a 
considerable contribution to the political maturity of the people of the southern Sudan and 
the development of its capacity for active and responsible participation. Having this in 
mind, despite the economic and financial constfaints the centfal govemment faced, it was 
not and may not be prepared to relinquish certain prerogatives over central control of 
educational policy matters. 
The gesture shown by President Nimeiry by the introduction of the policy of 
decentralization was quite superficial and had no significant impact in terms of relevant 
educational development in the southern Sudan. It was practically an evolvement of an 
administrative system devoid of power to the regional government in the south and 
without the understanding of the social and cultural structures and political system within 
which that administrative system was to operate. The decentralization policy, for instance, 
did not allow for the development of regional capacity in terms of fimds and human 
resources in order to realize the benefits of the decentralization policy. It did not therefore 
act as a source of solution to the education policy crisis. 'Mis was indicatives of the lack of 
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political will on the part of the central government to depart fi-om, the basic Islamic policy 
orientations. 
The government's educational policies provoked skepticism among the southern Sudanese 
intellectuals because the policies were perceived as irrelevant to the needs of the southern 
Sudan. The education provided was seen as a tool of repression. There was too much 
interference in the political activities of the southern regional government. This prevented 
sensitive educational issues, such as language and the content of the curficulurn, to be 
effectively addressed or discussed by the southern regional government. The southern 
regional government occupied a subordinate position in terms of the national policy issues 
and the constitutional and political constraints controlled its fimctions. The majority of the 
southern politicians were moreover excluded from power and influence in the central 
government because of lack of access to the language of power and government i. e. 
Arabic. The positions occupied by the southern politicians in the national and regional 
governmeii were dependent on their allegiance to the central government policies. As 
such the southern politicians were permanently placed under fear of purges or dismissals. 
Tle maintenance of the unity of the country was an important and indispensable 
component of the central government's educational policy drive. This was enforced on the 
population of the country regardless of the great cultural and enviromental diversities 
prevailing in the country. What was overlooked by the central government was the fact 
that unity based on a 'national culture' required a degree of social communication as 
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regards language, ideology, common interests and acceptance of common heritage. All 
these elements were missing in the case of the Sudan in terms of the south and north 
relationship and have been difficult to achieve through the instruments chosen by the 
central government, for instance through the means of Arabisation and Islamisation. The 
intention was to create a situation where education provided the means by which the 
southern Sudanese would distance themselves from their cultures and the southern 
environment. These were means to break down ethnic loyalty and the multilingual 
characteristics of the country. The attempts to create greater cultural uniformity by the 
central government in such areas as language, historiography and education in general 
created considerable resistance by the southern Sudanese who feared that the centrally 
engineered policies would destroy the fabric of the southern cultures. But, despite this 
awareness by the southern Sudanese of the negative impact of the policies emanating from 
the north, the regional government was powerless to provide an alternative solutions 
because of the central control. 
However this policy of uniting the Sudan through a centrally controlled system of 
Islamization has not proved successful. In the 339 years of the Sudan's independence the 
state has experienced two major civil wars, the first lasting 17 years while the second, 
which began in 1983, has so far continued for 12 years. This is hardly evidence of a 
successful strategy of unity. The huge national resources which have been wasted in 
prosecuting the war in the south have surely held the Sudan back in its efforts to develop 
its economy and its civil society. In addition, the militarisation of society and politics 
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caused by the ongoing war effort has made more remote any final aim of developing a 
pacified and developed community in the whole of the country. In recent months some 
dissatisfaction with the current Sudanese state of affairs has been noticeable in 
neighbouring Arab countries. It is therefore not impossible to posit a situation where the 
Northern Sudanese are persuaded that for the good of their entire state (and its 
acceptability within Islam) they have to live at peace with their Southern provinces in a 
culturafly diverse nation. 
In order for the southern regional govenimein to realize the finidamental right to 
education within a united Sudan there are a number of general pre-conditions which 
cannot be neglected without risking the success of the intended actions. In the main there 
is the problem of overcoming the economic, technical, political and cultural dependence 
on the northern Sudan. Unless real decision-making as well as effective means of 
implementation are fully in the southern regional government's hands, any educational 
policy and programme initiated by the regional goveniment would remain only a paper 
exercise. The extent to which and the manner in which educational policies and 
programmes could be implemented with success would depend therefore upon the 
economic, political, social and cultural context within which they would operate in the 
country and the political will on the part of the central government to bring about the 
necessary transformation in the education system. This political will, of necessity, need to 
open up the structures of the economic, political and educational opportunities to the 
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southern Sudanese and appropriately re-define and re-organize the value system 
accordingly in the light of the complex Sudanese society. 
The future development of education in the southern Sudan, of whatever level, would be 
dependent on the availability of resources, financial, human and material. These are 
necessary for a successful implementation of educational policies and programmes 
j -* -- unected towards achieving sustainable educational goals in the southern Sudan. These 
resources have not in the past been made available to the southern regional government 
and the southern regional government has been denied the possibility of mobilizing the 
resources in the southern Sudan. Future educational financing in the southern Sudan 
within a united Sudan will therefore depend on the southern government's ability to make 
or obtain an adequate budgetary provision for education. It is possible that due to 
budgetary constraints the government may not be able to make additional allocations 
which may be required for improved development of education in the southern Sudan. In 
the absence of adequate data on the proportion and consistent pattern of expenditure 
incurred on education, it is difficult to determine what the impact of plan-outlays would be 
on the development of the different levels and types of education in the southern Sudan. 
But one abnost certain effect of stabilizing the situation in the Southern Sudan would be 
access to multi-lateral and bi-lateral fimds which would then become available (as they are 
not at present) to assist in the development of the country. 
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In summary any reformation of policy for a unified but culturally diverse Sudanese state 
should overcome the following weaknesses of past strategies: 
1. The neglect of regional, local and institutional planning in national policy- 
making. The lack of southern regional government participation in the national 
policy formulation must be avoided. 
2. 'Me inadequate political commitment of the central government to educational 
policies derived fi-om the southern regional government. 
3. T'he uncertainties of long-term planning caused by the political instability and 
the frequent changes in the government and the personnel involved. 
4. The inadequate involvement of educational planners in the implementation of 
educational policies or plans. The educational policy-planners in the central 
government were generally quite detached fi-om the grassroots activities. 
5. The over-rigid character of the educational policies and plans. Educational 
planning hi the Sudan has not been a continuous process which permitted flexibility 
and did not evolve in response to changing of needs in the various parts of the 
country. 
Retrospectively it would be correct to say that the effects of the educational policies in the 
Sudan were marginal in the southern Sudan. The policies were unable to ensure major 
progress in education in the southern Sudan. The main reason was the manner of the 
policy-making process without the needed information as bases for the policy-making. 
There was under- estimation or disregard of the coordinating role of educational policies 
and plans where the southern Sudanese could play important role. 
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10.2. THE FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR EDUCATION IN THE SOUTHERN 
SUDAN IN AN INDEPENDENT SOUTHERN SUDAN. 
It is clear that future educational development in the southern Sudan will depend first and 
foremost on the ending of the present civil war in the country and the relinquishing of 
power over the southern Sudan by the present central goverment of the Sudan. It is 
possible that this dispensation could occur within a multi-cultural but federated united 
Sudan. It seems at present more likely that there would occur a complete constitutional 
separation of the Aiabized and Islamic north and centre of Sudan from the Affican and 
Christian or animist south. A future education in the Southern Sudan would then entail the 
re-adaptation and re-organization of the education system to meet the realities and 
objectives for education in the southern Sudan. '11-iis would imply a critical review of the 
system in existence, its policies and goals, and its relevance to meeting the development 
objectives of the southern Sudan. Education has to be conceived as integral part of the 
future of the southern society. In the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 there 
was an apparent lack of clear vision for the educational development in the autonomous 
Southern Sudan. Hence the several years of confusion and contradiction in the direction of 
education in the southern Sudan. There were several other inadequacies, most of which 
were related to the equality of access to education and the internal disagreement and 
conflicts among the southern politicians as well as external pressures oii the southem 
327 
politicians from the central government in terms of allegiance to the central government 
poficies. 
The reassessment of what has happened in the past as revealed by this research, a 
diagnosis of the current situation and the determination of a future plan of action with 
clearly defined objectives to be achieved in a projected time perspective would be a 
prerequisite for creating a favourable context for educational development in the southern 
Sudan. This implies political commitment and a clear sense of direction on the part of the 
southern government and the evolution of appropriate administrative structures and 
procedures that would facilitate educational development. What would influence of 
determine the pace and pattern of the educational development would be the interplay of 
the political, economic and cultural factors within the south. This is likely to be influenced 
by the attitudes that the southern politicians would develop and the value system they 
would absorb today either within the country or outside the country in the countries of 
their exile. It would be possible for the conflicts and the lack of agreement that afflicted 
the politicians after the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement to surface again, perhaps in 
a different fonn in the politics of the government in the Southern Sudan. The form of 
confrontation may be different because, in an independent Southern Sudan, the element of 
northern Sudanese would not anymore directly influence policy issues. But the fact that 
presently the southern Sudanese politicians are being exposed to varying value systems is 
likely to affect their future outlook. 
328 
The reform of the education system would involve taking options and necessary measures 
for carrying out political intentions. In ideal circumstances this political intention would 
represent the will of the people. Before the southern Sudan can hope to discover the 
directions in which solutions might be found, it must first be aware, accept and understand 
the score of southern problems and their human and institutional causes. It must also be 
aware of the limits within which a future south will operate so that, at least, it can have 
some ideas of whefe its development effofts should lead to. This would fequife unity of 
purpose and consensus among the southern pohticians. 
There are lessons to be learned by the politicians fi-om the earlier attempts by the southern 
regional government to rehabilitate the education system after the signing of the Addis 
Ababa Agreement. As revealed by this research the regional government had failed to 
properly worked out plans to rehabilitate education in the south. Though much of the 
obstacles were attributed to the central government control over the political activities in 
the southern Sudan, the southern politicians had a lot to be blamed for. The conflicts 
among the southern politicians accounted greatly for the lack of direction in the 
educational system in the southern Sudan. They could not, for instance, take advantage of 
some of the provision in the constitution that allowed the Regional People's Assembly to 
halt or prevent the execution of the national policies that had adverse affect on the south. 
The atmosphere was not therefore conducive to establishing the right profile for enacting 
suitable educational policies for the southern Sudan. Political instability and uncertainty 
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did not encourage the Regional leaders to look beyond short term concerns. The Regional 
Government did not, for example, take due consideration for: 
(a) coffect identi-fication of the educational needs of the southern Sudan; 
(b) correct analysis of the problem areas; and 
(c) elaboration of the appropriate solutions to the problems. 
The lack of unity among the southern politicians meant that the system was torn from 
within by arguments over specific policy matters where any one answer or group of 
answers affected the prospect of attaining the educational objectives envisaged as suitable 
to meet the educational needs of the southern Sudan. The arguments were over priorities 
in policy matters particularly in setting the priorities in operational terms that were clear 
and meaningful, for instance on the curriculum, language of instruction and other fields of 
trahiing. The result was confusion and the lack of policy direction. This lack of direction 
and the lack of effective coordination mechanisms in terms of educational programmes led 
to delays and waste of resources. Individual foreign organizations, for instance, were left 
on their own to decide and promote what in their own view was relevant education. The 
southern politicians were, to some extent, able to point out what was irrelevant in the 
education provided but were unable to say what would be right and better. 
One of the problem areas the Southern Regional government faced within the united 
Sudan was the policy of centralization of educational policies development and total 
disregard of the complexity of the p olitico- cultural diversities in the country. The coming 
of the Southern Sudan as an independent sovereign state may not automaticaUy remove 
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the problems caused by the complex elements of the society. The Southern Sudan, with its 
numerous tribes, will present similar complex features and similar problems that would 
require careful approach to deal with. Some of these problems have already manifested 
themselves within the Southern Sudan rebel movement against the central government of 
the Sudan. Apparently the movement has been divided up into factions on a more or less 
tribal basis. This phenomenon calls into question what form of government the future 
government of independent Southern Sudan would take in order to accommodate the 
different interest groups. Avoidance of concentration of power of policy-making in the 
central government of the Southern Sudan would be healthy to a large extent. This would 
avoid the previous intrigue of maintaining unity with the objective of domination. 
Concentration of power in the central government will prevent a genuine contribution to 
the policy-making process and the subsequent isolation of local institutions. This would 
cause disgruntlement and disillusion which could be possible causes for conflict. The real 
task for the future government of the Southern Sudan wifl be to find the right choice of 
means and methods to bring about southern unity without encroaching on the rights of 
groups of the population in the Southern Sudan. A decentralized form of government 
might be the most appropriate. 
The task of managing educational development does not end with the decision to 
introduce it as has been the case, for instance, in the introduction of the policy of universal 
primary education. The entire process must be carefully planned, supervised and 
monitored. This is an important point to note in the future development of education in the 
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Southern Sudan especially hi terms of the rural population. Primary education will 
continue to be the terminal stage of schooling for most children for a long period to come 
in the southern Sudan. Hence the needs for its Proper policy and plans. For various 
economic,, social and cultural reasons in the past a majority of children have not been 
enrolled in the schools. If they enrolled, not all of them continued through the prescribed 
period of the courses. There would be a need to know about the links between enrollment 
and retention patterns and the economic situation of the parents as well as their socio- 
cultural based attitudes towards schooling especially as regards the pastoralists. At the 
present moment it is not quite clear to what extent the parents, the majority of whom are 
poor and live in the rural areas and consider their children who help them from the age of 
seven or eight as economic assets, are prepared to wait for six to eight years for their 
children to become productive members of the family. A thorough research is essential in 
this field before setting a time scale for such a policy as that related to universal primary 
education. This would enable the design of appropriate measures to promote enrollment 
and retention of children in schools for the appropriate duration of schooling. 
Another difficult issue that the future government of the Southern Sudan will face after the 
war will be the accommodation of the different age groups in the schools. Circumstances 
for formal education would have altered. These would produce a situation in which adult 
education will be likely to play a more prominent role in the education system in the 
Southern Sudan. This wfll take account of the large numbers of people who would not 
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have the opportunity for formal education during the long period of the civil war. This 
would require a clear policy direction suitable for the target groups. 
The required re-orientation of the educational system in the Southern Sudan towards 
fimctional education and training and for productive service in the rural areas prescribe, no 
doubt, a thorough revision of the curricula. Ile research provides a number of lessons that 
can be learned from the past failures in the development and implementation of the rural 
development programmes, for example, the integrated rural education centre projects. Any 
form of development, especially that related to rural development, calls for members of the 
community to reach a certain degree of awareness and a capacity for active commitment. 
Such awareness was not cultivated among the rural population in the southern Sudan 
where the pioneer IRECs projects were established. Basically the reasons for the failure of 
the rural education projects were attributed to the following: 
1. There were principal differences in the concept and practice of the 
integrated rural education centres. 
The rural development programmes were unable to mobilize political 
support and economic resources necessary for the structural reforms and 
implementation. 
3. The administration at both the headquarters of the Regional Ministry of 
Education and at the location of the rural education projects were not so 
much designed to produce innovations essential for the rural transformation 
and to motivate the rural population. Many of the parents were not 
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prepared to send their children to the school to learn skills which they 
considered they could teach their children much better than a teacher in the 
school. 
The success of the integrated rural education projects depended, to a great 
extent,, on the relative intensity of skilled manpower devoted to 
organization, management and technical assistance. These elements were 
apparently missing in the case of the rural education development in the 
southern Sudan. 
Policies related to secondary education is another important educational issue that the 
future Southern Sudan will have to deal with. The ten years of experience of the 
researcher as a Headteacher of secondary school in the Southern Sudan had shown him 
clearly the picture of what the government, the parents and even the teachers expected 
from a secondary school education. All of them expected the secondary school to provide 
an education that was to take the students to the university. This stage of education was 
therefore considered transitional to tertiary education, particularly university education. 
Unfortunately, as revealed by the study, very few students managed to get into the 
universities. Since the secondary education curficuluni, which was centrally developed, 
was not employment- oriented, the majority of the students who could not get access to 
the universities were not also easily employable in either the urban or rural areas. They 
largely became misfits hi the southern environment in particular. 
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The question that the future Southern Sudan government wiU have to address is what 
education should be provided at the secondary school level that would be useful to the 
majority of the students within the southern environment especially those not able to get 
admission into the university. It wifl have to determine either to continue to have the 
secondary stage of education as a preparatory stage for university education or to have it 
as a terminal education or to have a balance of the two. it has also to address the question 
of parental push for their children to progress up the academic ladder. To provide terminal 
education at the secondary stage will entail taking measures to reform the curriculum and 
to provide adequent facilities and basic inftastructures of the schools. Whether such 
measures can be accomphshed wiH depend upon the nature and pace of socio-economic 
progress of the Southern Sudan. 
An important element in the policy-making process that must be noted is that educational 
reform should not merely be a political process, but also a comprehensive long-term 
project implementation which will require consideration of all the technical instruments 
such as future research into the relevant fields of education. The danger, as revealed in the 
study, will be the failure to establish clear priorities and the lack of political will and 
support on the part of the government. It will be essential for the govemmen to consider 
educational reform as a broadly based process of ascertaining and influencing public 
opinion at all levels of the society and this has to be a gradual process if the reform is to be 
accepted or understood. 
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Terminal secondary education would require the diversification of the courses at this level 
of education which should be directed to promoting employability and productivity of the 
students once they complete their secondary school studies. The likelihood is that the 
Southern Sudan will continue for sometimes to admit a relatively greater percentage of the 
secondary students into the university in order to meet the badly needed high level 
manpower for the development of the Southern Sudan after the long period of 
deprivation. In any case educational planning at the secondary level, as in the other levels 
of education,, should be integrated with the general policy of socio-economic and cultural 
development of the Southern Sudan. Decisions of a political character relating to priorities 
and purpose must be tied with the solution of administrative and practical problems. 
One of the burning issues that the southern Sudanese have been facing was access to 
university education. Several factors, as revealed in the research, contributed to this lack 
of access to higher education institutions. The ultimate objective of university education in 
the Southern Sudan would be to prepare the southern people for the development 
situation in the Southern Sudan. This will entail the determination of priorities in terms of 
manpower needs. It needs to be underlined that estimates of manpower needs, particularly 
as regards skilled personnel, are useful in guiding educational development, at least for 
short term. There has to be prior study to ascertain the country's needs and how best to 
organize them 
336 
Vocationafly- oriented university education in the Southem Sudan will be effective only if 
it is promoted within the context of the development background of the southern Sudan. 
The recommendations by the International Consultants for the opening of the University 
of Juba would be an ideal framework for university education in the Southern Sudan. The 
question will really not be whether there should be a place for vocationally- oriented 
university education in the Southern Sudan but how the vocational education is to be 
fashioned to meet the intellectual. ) social and cultural needs within the southern 
environment. This requires political will and commitment which had been missing among 
the southern politicians. The government will have to provide a clear and unambiguous 
policy direction to avoid planning and fi-nplementation failures. It will also have to provide 
possible answers to the fimdamental question regarding parental push where the parents 
require their children to advance up the academic ladder because they see the future 
hicome closely tied to academic qualification. The governmeW will have to convince the 
parents as well as the students of what the future holds for the vocationally- oriented 
graduates. A study will have to be carried out to identify all the factors that militate 
against this form of education and what practical solutions could be provided. 
One of the main dffficulties that would affect the development of university education in 
the Southern Sudan would be the financing of the univefsity education. Fofeign aid would 
be an important source of finance. But what the govertiment of the Southern Sudan must 
be aware of is the fact that reliance on foreign aid for launching new educational 
programmes and substantially improving on the existing ones presents serious problems, 
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mainly because the terms of foreign aid do not always take cognizance of the behaviour of 
recurrent educational expenditures. The government will have to be in position to mobilize 
local resources to balance tbis. 
There may be no relatively long-lasting solutions to educational development in the 
Southem Sudan unless the whole of the southem society, particularly the southem 
politicians, are shifted to new tracks. There are enough lessons in the past to learn from 
and from which the light bases for proper education in an independent Southern Sudan 
could be established. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: The Main Participants to the 1990 Education Conference on the Policies 
of Education in the Sudan: 
NAME ROLE RACE/RELIGION 
Lt. General Omer El Beshir Prime Minister Arab/Muslim 
Major Gen. El Tijani El Tahr V/P. M. & Chairman Arab/Muslim 
Prof D. A. EI-Turabi Main Participant Arab/Mushm 
Mr. Toufik A. Suleiman Main Participant Arab/Muslim 
Dr. Al-Tayeb Z. Al-Abdin Main Participant Arb/Muslim 
Dr. Abdel Rahman M. Said Main Participant Arab/Muslim 
Dr. Taj El Sir Mustafa Main Participant Arab/Muslim 
Saffia A. Al-Tayib Main Participant Arab/Muslim 
U. Col. A. Nur El-Din Main Participant Arab/Muslim 
Dr. Shams El-Din Z. Abdin Main Participant Arab/Mushm 
Yassein A. A. Wahaab Main Participant Arab/Muslim 
DrJaleb Mahmed Main Participant Arab/Muslim 
Pi of. AI-Muniam H. AI-Nadi Main Paticipant Arab/Muslim 
Source: The Education Conference Paper, Khartoum, September 1990. 
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APPENDIX 2: Time Table Distribution for the Primary Education in the Sudan, 1977: 
SUBJECT IST. YR. 2ND. YR 3RD. YR. 4TH. YR. 5TH. YR- 6TH. YR- 
Rel. Educ. 4 4 4 4 5 5 
Arabic 10 10 10 9 9 9 
Maths 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Science - 2 3 3 4 4 
S, Studies - 2 3 3 4 4 
P. E. 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Art 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Rural St. - - - 2 4 4 
Home Ec. - - - 2 4 4 
TOT/WK 24 28 30 31 40 40 
Source: Sudan, Ministry of Education, "Sudanese Education: Report of the Sudan 
Education Sector Review", (1977). 
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APPENDIX 3: Time Table Distribution for the Intermediate Education in the Sudan, 
1977. 
SUBJECT I ST. YEAR 2ND. YEAR 3RD. Y]FAR 
RetEducation 4 4 4 
Arabic 8 8 8 
English 7 7 7 
Mathematics 6 6 6 
Science 4 4 4 
Social Studies 5 5 5 
Art 2 2 2 
Industrial or Agric. 
Arts 
4 4 4 
P. E. 2 2 2 
Home Economics 4 4 4 
TOT/WEEK 42 42 42 
Source: Sudan, Ministry of Education, "Sudanese Education: Report of the Sudan 
Education Sector Review", (1977). 
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APPENDIX 4: Time Table Distribution for the First and Second Year Secondary 
Education in the Sudan, 1977: 
SUBJECT FIRST YEAR SECOND YEAR 
ReI. Education 3 3 
Arabic Language 6 6 
English Language 6 6 
Mathematics 6 6 
Biology 2 2 
Physics 2 2 
Chemistry 2 2 
French Language 4 4 
Geography 3 3 
ffistory 3 3 
Art 3 3 
Physical Education I I 
Civic I I 
TOTAL/\VEEK 42 42 
Source: Sudan, Ministry of Education, "Sudanese Education: "Report of the Sudan 
Education Sector Review", (1977). 
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APPENDIX 5: Time Table Distribution for the Third Year Secondary Education in the 
Sudan,, 1977. 
Compulsory Subject No. of Periods/Week Optional Subject No. of Periods/Week 
Rel. Education 3 Grogp (AY 
Addition Maths or 4 
Biology. 4 
Arabic Language 8 Group (B): 
Physics or English 4 
Literature 4 
English Language 7 Groqp (C): 
Chemistry or 4 
History 4 
Elementary Maths. 7 Group 
Geography or 4 
French Language 4 
Group. 
-(El-. 
Art 4 
TOTAL/Vv`EEK 25 Depended on the 
number of Options 
taken. 
Source: Sudan, Ministry of Education, "'Sudanese Education: Keport ot tne Nuctan 
Education Sector Review", (1977). 
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APPENDIX 6: LIST OF THE RESPONDENTS TO THE INTERVIEWS: 
1. Mr. Soforonio Efuk (Interviewed on 10/2/94): He was formerly an Assistant 
Headmaster of a Secondary School in the Southern Sudan (1986); currently a 
Joumalist. 
2. Mr. Ezbon Yombek (interviewed on 11/2/94): A Lecturer, University of Juba. 
Mr. Vigil Jima (interviewed on 15/2/94): He has been a Cooperative Development 
Officer (Head of Cooperative Department). He was an active participant in 
political debates in the Southern Sudan 
4. Miss Sekina Darious (interviewed on 1/3/94): A Tutor at Ah-fad Univef sity for 
Women. 
5. Mr. Peter Kur Riak (interviewed on 3/3/94): An Assistant Lecturer, University of 
Juba., College of Education. He was formerly a teacher of English in the Secondary 
School. 
7. DrJustin Yonama (interviewed on 10/3/94): A Lecturer University of Juba. 
8. M-i. Henry Wani (interviewed on 10/3/94): A Lecturer, College of Education, 
University of Juba. He was formerly a teacher of English in the Secondary School 
in the Southern Sudan (1977/79). 
9. Mr. Ahmed Abdel Muniem (interviewed on 10/3/94): A Lecturer, University of 
Gezira. 
10. Mr. Santino Loro (interviewed on 11/3/94): A Lecturer, University of Juba where 
he also acted as an Assistant Academic Registrar of the University. He was 
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formerly an Assistant Coordinator of NCA Cooperative Development Project in 
the Southern Sudan. 
11. Dr. Martin D. Ettore (interviewed on 11/3/94): A Pharmacist and was one time 
( 1979) a part-time teacher in a secondary school in Juba, Southern Sudan. 
12. MrJohn M. Theakstone (interviewed on 12/3/94): He was formerly the Head of 
the East and Central African Division of IUC and acted as the Coordinator of the 
International Team of Consultants for the establishment of the University of Juba 
in the Southem Sudan and was the Editor of the Consultants' Report. 
13. Mr. Lawrence Modi Tombe (interviewed on 22/3/94): He is a fonner Ministef of 
Education in EquatOria Region (1985/86); a former Minister of Labour in the 
Central Government of the Republic of the Sudan (1987); a former Governor of 
Equatoria State (1988); and a former Sudanese Ambassador to Rumania 
(1991/1993). 
14. Mrs. Josephine L. Yanga (interviewed on 24/3/94): A Lecturer in the University of 
Juba and former English Language teacher in a Secondary School in Juba 
(1977/79) in the South Sudan. 
15. DrJack J. Ngalam (interviewed on 24/3/94): A Lecturer in the CoRege of 
Education,, University of Juba. 
16. General (Rt. ) Joseph Lagu (interviewed on 25/3/94): A former Leader of the 
Southem Sudan Rebel Movement (Anyanya) in the 17 years civil war in the Sudan 
(1955-1972); a former President of the Southern Regional Government and Vice 
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to 
17 
President of the Republic of the Sudan ( 1978); and a former Sudanese Ambassador 
the UN ((1990/92). 
Dr. Amelia Philip (interviewed on 25/3/94): A Lecturer in the College of 
Education, University of Juba and a former teacher of English Language in a 
Secondary School in Juba (1976-1979) in the Southern Sudan. 
18. Dr. Kabalu Sidgi (interviewed on 17/5/94): A Lecturer, University of Khartoum 
and was an active politician during President Nimeiry's regime in the Sudan. 
19. Mr. El Bagir El AM (interviewed on 19/5/94): A Lecturer in the University of 
Gezira and a former executive member of the National Teachers Trade Union. 
20. Mr. Omer Mustafa Shurkian (interviewed on 20/5/94): A Lecturer, University of 
Gezira. 
21. MY. Moharnmed Adam Mahmoud (interviewed on 20/5/94): A Lecturer, University 
of Khartoum 
22. Mr. Omer A. Mahmoud (interviewed on 20/5/94): An Assistant Lecturer, University 
of Juba and a former teacher in an intermediate school in Juba, Southern Sudan. 
23. Dr. Wani Tombe (interviewed on 25/5/94): A Lecturer, University of Juba and a 
former Cooperative Development Project Officer in the NCA in the Southern 
Sudan. He coordinated the establishment of Arapi Teacher Training Institute 
between the Southern Regional Ministry of Education and the NCA in 1986. 
24. Mr. Mark Longa (interviewed on 25/5/94): An Assistant Lecturer, University of 
Juba. 
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25. Mr. 1vo Loliya (interviewed on 28/5/94): A Lawyer and a former Legal Adviser to 
the Governor of Equatoria State in the Southern Sudan (1987/88). 
26. Mr. Brian Badi (interviewed on 29/5/94): A former Project Manager of Imatong 
Forestry Company Office in Juba in the Southern Sudan (1985-1988). The pflot 
project of the Integrated Rural Education Centres (IRECS) at Maridi in the 
Southern Sudan was within his local village area and so had a first hand knowledge 
of the impact of the project on the local population. 
27. Mr. Louis Loyaak (interviewed on 30/5/94): He was a School Inspector for the 
Primary and Intermediate Schools in Equatoria Region (1987/89) in the Southern 
Sudan and had a long experience as a teacher in these two levels of education. 
28. A Head of Charitable Organization who requested to remain anonymous was 
interviewed on 31/5/94. He has constant contacts with the Sudan. 
29. Dir. Kunjwok Kwawang (interviewed on 7/6/94): He was a Lectufef in Political 
Science in the Univef sity of Khartoum and later became a Minister of Labour in 
the Central Government of Republic of the Sudan (1989). 
30. Joshua Mure (interviewed on 10/6/94): A Technician in the Regional Ministry of 
Transport and Communications in the Southern Sudan. He had some contacts with 
the Technical Schools in the Southern Sudan. 
31. Dr. Steven Yar (interviewed on 23/6/94): He was a former Director of 
Establishment in the Regional Ministry of Public Service and Administrative 
Refonn, Southern Region (1976-1983). 
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32. Mr. Abdel Mural Girshab (interviewed on 26/6/94): A Senior Lecturer, University 
of Gezira and Head of Department (Agriculture). 
33. Mr. Victor Vuni (interviewed on 9/7/94): A Tutor in Wau Institute of Health in the 
Southern Sudan. 
34. Dr. Hakim Darious (interviewed on 7/8/94): A Lecturer, University of Juba. 
35. Dr. Peter Tibi (interviewed on 7/8/94): A Veterinary Doctor, and had been an 
active participant in the politics of the Southern Sudan. 
36. DrJohn B. Mairi (interviewed on 10/8/94): A Lecturer in the College of Education, 
University of Juba; he was formerly an English Language teacher in the Secondary 
School in Juba. 
37. Mr. Edward Momo, (interviewed on 10/8/94): A former Tutor and National 
Counter-Part for the Integrated Rural Education Centres at Maridi in the Southern 
Sudan. He left the project for a University education and later became an Assistant 
Lecturer, University of Juba. 
38. Mr. Avelino Androga (written correspondence from Nairobi): A former 
Coordinator of Education in the NCA in the Southern Sudan. 
39. A Sudanese Ambassador (wants to remain anonymous) has sent to the researcher a 
document written by him about the Islamic laws and their consequences on the 
Southem Sudan. 
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APPENDIX 7: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS. 
At the initial stage of the interview some personal details were requested from the 
interviewees such as the names and the individual credentials including the roles they have 
played in the policy-making process. This was not much of a problem as the researcher 
had this information before the date of the interview. 
There were five main questions in the interview: 
1. What educational policy/policies of the Sudan did you know during the 
period 1972-1992? 
How did you come to know these policies? 
3. How were the policy/poficies implemented? 
What were the problems in the implementations of the policies? 
What were the impacts and implications of the policies on the development 
of education in the Southern Sudan? 
Other questions that followed were those directed to lead responses of the interviewees 
which were to obtain some clarity. 
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ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE SUDAN. 
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Appendix 10: THE NILLE VALLEY IN THE MAHDIST ERA, c. 1880-c. 1900. 
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